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THE NORMATIVITY OF STRUCTURAL RATIONALITY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Many of us take for granted that rationality requires that we have our attitudes combined 
only in certain ways. For example, we are required not to hold inconsistent beliefs or 
intentions and we are required to intend any means we see as crucial to our ends. But 
attempts to justify claims like these face two problems. First, it is unclear what unifies the 
rational domain and determines what is (and is not) rationally required of us. This is the 
content problem. Second, as philosophers have been unable to find any general reason for us 
to have our attitudes combined only in certain ways, it is unclear why, or in what sense, we 
are required to comply with these putative requirements in the first place. This is the 
normativity problem.  
My dissertation offers an account of rationality which solves these problems. I argue 
that the entire domain of rational requirements can be derived from a single ultimate 
requirement demanding that we not have sets of intentions and beliefs which cause their 
own failure. This General Requirement of Structural Rationality explains the unity of the 
rational domain and directly solves the content problem. But it also solves the normativity 
problem. I argue that whenever we violate the General Requirement we are engaged in a 
form of criticizable self-undermining. I propose that this is enough to ground the claim that 
we ought to comply with the General Requirement’s demands. This conclusion can be 
secured as long as we accept the thesis of normative pluralism, according to which there is 
more than one fundamentally distinct form of normative ‘ought.’  
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1 – TWO PROBLEMS ABOUT STRUCTURAL RATIONALITY 
 
1.1 – Structural Rationality and Irrationality 
Imperfect agents like us often wind up with jumbles of attitudes that seem just plain wrong 
together. It is easy to construct true-to-life examples that illustrate the phenomenon: 
    
(1) You plan to spend the weekend with your family while also intending to complete 
your new manuscript by Sunday, and while believing that doing both of these things 
on the same weekend is simply impossible. 
 
(2) A friend of yours believes that her ex-husband still loves her, even while she 
believes this is incompatible with the mean-spirited messages he has sent her by 
email. 
 
(3) I believe that I have overwhelmingly strong reason to immediately book a flight 
to meet my long-lost relatives, but I nevertheless have no intention to do so. 
 
Something is going wrong with each of these agents—they are each making some kind of 
mistake. But, in each case, the mistake does not seem to consist in failing to do or think 
some discrete thing or in failing to have some particular attitude. 
For example, from the brief description of your circumstances given in (1), we could 
not conclude that you are making a mistake by planning to finish your manuscript this 
weekend or, alternatively, by planning to spend the weekend with your family. Perhaps you 
should do only one, or perhaps you should do neither, or perhaps you could and should find  
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a way to do both (despite your belief). Likewise, your friend in (2) could be either right or 
wrong in believing that her former spouse still loves her, and could be right or wrong about 
the meaning of those cruel messages in her email inbox. And perhaps in (3) I would 
encounter life-ruining information about my family’s history if I were to book airplane 
tickets to visit my relatives. It may be that I am achieving the best outcome by staying put at 
home. Nevertheless, I seem to be making some kind of mistake by not trying to book a 
flight while maintaining my belief. 
These considerations highlight that in each of (1), (2) and (3), the agent’s mistake is 
not located at some particular point within her or his set of attitudes. Instead, the mistake 
resides in the combination of attitudes as such (or, as I will sometimes say, in the agent’s 
arrangement of attitudes).
1 Which particular attitudes each agent would do best to hold or 
abandon (if any) appears to be a different matter entirely. Indeed, the contents of and 
justifications for their attitudes seem to be irrelevant to the kind of error I am focused on. 
Any agent with an identical combination of attitude-types would be making the same 
mistake, regardless of the circumstances and regardless of the contents of those attitudes.
2 
We have a word for people who are making the kind of mistake I am describing: we 
call them “irrational.” People with inconsistent intentions or beliefs, and people who do not 
endeavor to take the means to their chosen ends, and people who do not follow through on 
their judgments about what they should do, are all irrational. Conversely, people who do not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 When I say “combination of attitudes,” it would be more accurate to say “combination of 
attitude-types.” But for the sake of readability, I will most often say only “attitudes” rather than 
“attitude-types.” 
 
2 See Brunero 2010 for a helpful discussion on this point. 
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have their attitudes combined in these evidently prohibited ways are (to that extent) rational. 
The words “rational” and “irrational” are sometimes used to pick out other 
phenomena. A person might be called “irrational” for making some substantive mistake—
for example, for refusing to admit that The Wire is a better program than Family Ties, or for 
denying humanity’s responsibility for climate change, or for failing to give sufficient weight 
to one’s own future interests. Such people may be irrational in some sense of the word, but 
they need not be irrational in the sense displayed in (1), (2), and (3). In this dissertation, I am 
focused narrowly on irrationality due to the structure, rather than the substance, of our 
attitudes. To use a bit of philosopher’s terminology, and to avoid any unnecessary confusion, 
we can call this phenomenon “structural irrationality” and its contrary “structural 
rationality.”
3 Unless I say otherwise, whenever I use words like “rational” or “rationality,” I 
have in mind structural rationality. 
 
1.2 – Requirements of Structural Rationality 
It is common in philosophy to take for granted that there are requirements of rationality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The phrase “structural rationality” comes from Scanlon 2007. But the phenomenon of 
structural rationality has been discussed in under one label or another for decades. Bratman 1981 and 
Korsgaard’s “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason” (available in Korsgaard 2009a, but first 
published in 1997) have been consistent reference points throughout the recent debates. The most 
prominent and promising recent theories of this aspect of rationality have been developed by John 
Broome (especially in Broome 2013, but beginning in Broome 1999, Broome 2001, and Broome 
2002), Niko Kolodny (especially in Kolodny 2005, Kolodny 2007, Kolodny 2008a, and Kolodny 
2008b), Christine Korsgaard (especially in Korsgaard 2009a, Korsgaard 2009b, and Korsgaard 
2009c), T.M. Scanlon (especially in Scanlon 1998 and Scanlon 2007), Derek Parfit (especially in Parfit 
2001 and Parfit 2011a), and Joesph Raz (especially in Raz 2005a and Raz 2005b). The bulk of this 
dissertation is a reflection on and contribution to the ongoing discussion between these writers.  
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demanding that we not harbor improper combinations of attitudes. This looks like a secure 
and modest claim: it follows naturally from the observation that agents like those in (1), (2), 
and (3) are making a rational mistake simply in virtue of how they have their attitudes 
arranged. If agents make a rational mistake whenever they have their attitudes combined in 
such-and-such a way, it must be that there is a requirement of rationality demanding that we 
not have our attitudes so arranged. So the thought goes. 
For example, corresponding to your apparent rational failure in (1), we might appeal 
to a requirement of rationality demanding consistency in intention. We might state the 
requirement as follows: 
IC 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, intend to Y, and believe that you 
cannot both X and Y].
4 
This principle looks quite plausible. In (1) you have two intentions which you believe cannot 
be co-realized. You seem to be violating a demand of rationality, and this demand is 
expressed in IC. I will sometimes refer to these requirements of structural rationality simply 
as structural requirements. 
Similarly, in characterizing your friend’s rational mistake in (2), we might appeal to a 
requirement demanding consistency in belief. This principle could be stated like so: 
BC 
You are rationally required not to [believe P, believe P→Q, and believe –Q]. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  I use square brackets to emphasize that the “rationally required” takes so-called “wide 
scope” over the whole set of attitudes, barring their simultaneous holding. The requirements of 
rationality I am putting forward here are, then, wide-scope requirements on our attitudes or states of 
mind. In Chapter 2, I will investigate whether this is the correct way to model the requirements of 
rationality. See Broome 1999, 2001, and 2002 for foundational work on wide-scope requirements of 
rationality. 
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In (2), your friend believes that her ex-spouse has sent her cruel messages and she believes 
that if he has sent her cruel messages then he does not love her. But she nevertheless 
believes that he loves her. BC states a requirement of rationality prohibiting this kind of 
blatant doxastic inconsistency. 
Lastly, in (3), I seem to be irrational because I do not have the right kind of 
relationship between my belief about my reasons (for booking a flight) and my other 
attitudes. I am irrational because I am lacking an intention which I believe that I should hold. 
Recalling a Greek word pertaining to self-control, modern writers have said that rationality 
demands enkrasia
5 in intention. Consider: 
EI 
You are rationally required not to [[believe that you have decisive reason to 
intend to X] and [not intend to X]]. 
This, too, has the appearance of an intuitively plausible principle. And it seems to express 
where I am going wrong in (3), above. 
I am highlighting these three rational principles due to their relationship with my 
opening examples. But the domain of rational requirements is not exhausted by IC, BC, and 
EI. Upon reflection, it seems that there are considerably more requirements of rationality 
than just these. For example, one of the most widely acknowledged and discussed 
requirements of rationality prohibits inconsistency or incoherence between end-focused 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 I have been informed that the correct word is “enkrateia” rather than “enkrasia.” But to 
maintain consistency with most other recent work on this topic, I will use the word “enkrasia.” I will 
use this term when referring both to prohibitions against akrasia (action, intention, or belief against 
one’s normative judgment) and prohibitions against accidie (the lack of an action, intention, or belief 
one sees as required). I will also follow the trend of using “akrasia” to refer to both akrasia and 
accidie. For my purposes, these distinctions are not important. 
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intentions and means-focused intentions. We might state the requirement of means-end 
coherence like so: 
ME 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, believe that you can X only if 
you intend to Y, and not intend to Y].
6 
It is worth pointing out that ME appears to be related to the rational principle that Kant 
famously called the “Hypothetical Imperative,” and to a principle which recent writers have 
sometimes called “The Instrumental Principle.” 
The list of requirements foisted upon us by rationality does not end here, either. But 
I will abstain from cataloging all of the requirements of rationality at this stage. 
Some of the terminology I am using is unnatural. A normal, well-adjusted person 
would not say to her friend, “You are rationally required not to believe P, believe P→Q, and 
believe –Q.” A normal person would probably not even say, “You are rationally required to 
have consistent beliefs.” But, as the starting-point examples help to illustrate, the underlying 
ideas are not just philosophers’ ideas. A normal person might say, “You shouldn’t have 
inconsistent beliefs,” or “You’d be irrational to not take the means to your ends,” or “You 
must do what you think is best.” These are colloquial ways of expressing the demands of 
rationality. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 My statement of ME is admittedly imprecise. As has been pointed out in Raz 2005a, 
Wallace 2001, and elsewhere, an agent who believes that she can X only if she intends to Y, but who 
believes that she could safely Y at some point in the future, is not necessarily irrational for failing to 
intend to Y right now. This is an interesting point, but one which we could easily accommodate by 
restating ME more precisely. (For example, we could say that you are rationally required not to 
[intend to X, believe that you can X only if you now intend to Y, and not intend to Y].) It may be that 
the other requirements I am considering could also be given more precise (and lengthy) statements. 
But it is not my goal in this project to work out fine-grained versions of every requirement of 
structural rationality.  
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1.3 – Justifying the Requirements of Rationality 
That there are requirements of rationality seems undeniable. And we would not want to deny 
their existence anyway, as they do an excellent job of making sense of our intuitions about 
rationality and irrationality. But the requirements of structural rationality do not come for 
free, philosophically speaking. Rational requirements cannot be brute, arbitrary ordinances 
on the human mind. If there are indeed such things as requirements of rationality, then we 
must be able to explain why it is that we are required to comply with their demands.  
  If we have the aim of explaining the foundations of rationality, there is an obvious 
place to look. The requirements of rationality constrain our combinations of epistemic and 
practical attitudes. Perhaps, then, we can explain these principles just by citing the epistemic 
and practical considerations that count in favor of not holding the relevant combinations of 
attitudes—in virtue of which complying with the requirements of rationality is good or 
worthwhile. This is the flat-footed strategy of offering reasons to comply with the principles 
of rationality. For instance, we might propose that by complying with these principles we will 
gain more true beliefs, or gain fewer false beliefs, or that more of our ends will be realized, 
or that more total good will be produced in the world, or something else along these lines. 
The identified considerations, whatever they are, could make it true that we are required not 
to have our attitudes combined in the relevant ways. 
On the kind of proposal I am considering, a claim like  
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, intend to Y, and believe that you 
cannot both X and Y] 
is alleged to be true because it is true that 
You have reason not to [intend to X, intend to Y, and believe that you cannot 
both X and Y]. 
And, on this proposal, you have reason not to have your attitudes so arranged because there  
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is something epistemically or practically valuable about not harboring the combination of 
attitudes in question. This is a naïve, reasons-based account of the foundations of rational 
requirements.
7 
I call this approach to thinking about rationality “naïve” because, despite its 
simplicity and its first-blush attractiveness, it is saddled with an insuperable problem. The 
problem, in short, is that we do not have any sufficiently persistent and stringent reasons to 
comply with the principles of rationality. It is possible that compliance with the requirements 
of rationality is sometimes (or even often) epistemically or practically valuable or worthwhile. 
But it is completely implausible that compliance is always so beneficial as to ensure that we 
have persistent, decisive reason for compliance. For any given proposal about what generates 
our reasons to comply with the requirements of rationality, we can imagine counterexamples 
in which flouting the requirements of rationality would be better on precisely the same score. 
A violation of a rational requirement could, in a particular case, lead to an increase of one’s 
true beliefs, or an increase in one’s realized ends, or an increase in the amount of good in the 
world, and so on. Whatever values or goods are generally promoted by complying with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Throughout this dissertation, I will aim to avoid getting bogged down in questions 
concerning the nature or structure of normative reasons. I will confine most of my comments about 
the nature of reasons to footnotes, in an effort to prevent the body of the project from getting pulled 
into a series of side debates concerning reasons. 
There are a tremendous number of similar but importantly different analyses currently on 
offer from writers within the reasons-fundamentalist tradition, and I am hoping to avoid picking or 
discriminating amongst them. The most general and non-controversial description of a normative 
reason I can think of is this: a consideration, C, is a reason for an agent, A, to X (i.e,. hold an attitude 
or perform an action) if, all other things being equal, C makes A’s X-ing worthwhile in some respect 
and to some degree.  
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principles listed above might in certain cases be better promoted by violating these same 
principles.
8 
Suppose, for example, that it is claimed that our reasons for complying with a 
requirement like IC are grounded in the fact that compliance assists in the realization of our 
ends. Now, along comes an agent whose violation of IC would, in some particular case, 
result in her bringing about more of her ends than she would otherwise bring about. We can 
assume that this would be a good outcome.
9 However, we should be able to explain that this 
good outcome would be achieved despite the agent’s failure to comply with rationality’s still-
persisting demand. Unfortunately, the proposal at hand is unable to accommodate this 
thought, because it holds that IC’s force is derived from a value which, in this case, is better 
promoted by violating the principle. In any case where an agent’s compliance with a 
principle like IC would not best promote the relevant value, the proponent of the proposal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I am here assuming that a reason to comply with the requirements of rationality—to not 
hold the attitudes that rationality prohibits—must come in the form of a benefit or value or good 
which would be promoted or served by complying. In other words, I am assuming that reasons to 
comply with rational requirements must be grounded in instrumental considerations. Arguably, not 
all reasons have this form. (For example, my reasons to appreciate the wilderness may not derive 
from some external good that is promoted by my appreciating the wilderness.) So one might wonder 
whether we might have what Kolodny (2005) refers to as “intrinsic” reasons to comply with rational 
requirements. Such a reason for rational compliance would be a consideration in virtue of which 
being rational is good-in-itself, even if it serves no external purpose. I am mindfully setting aside this 
issue until Chapter 6. As it turns out, I believe that the account of rationality which I develop in 
Chapter 5 provides the most plausible explanation of why we might have intrinsic reasons to be 
rational. 
 
9 For the sake of the example, I am ignoring the fact that maximizing the realization of our 
ends is itself unlikely to be something which we have decisive, persistent reason to do. (For example, 
we may not have any reason at all to bring about our evil or malicious ends.)  
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will be forced to conclude that the agent is not, in that case, required to comply with the 
(would-be) requirement at all. This is an intuitively unacceptable result, as the agent still 
seems to be making a mistake by harboring the questionable combination of attitudes. A 
proper account of rationality must be able to explain that the end-maximizing agent with 
inconsistent intentions achieves a good outcome despite her violation of a rational demand.
10 
This observation illustrates that the naïve proposal will be unable to explain the 
nature of rationality’s force. We must be able to capture the fact that the requirements of 
rationality apply to us always, regardless of our circumstances and regardless of the contents 
of our attitudes. The naïve view could accommodate this central aspect of rationality only if 
we had persistent, invariable, decisive reason to comply with the principles of rationality. 
And this is simply not the case. 
I am far from the first person to notice that the requirements of rationality cannot be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 I am entirely sidestepping a number of worries one might have about our potential reasons 
to comply with the requirements of rationality. Most importantly, one might be worried that the 
reasons I am considering here are “state-given” reasons (i.e., reasons grounded in the benefits of 
being in the relevant state). Many current writers believe that there are no such things as state-given 
reasons. I readily admit that if there were any reasons for or against complying with the requirements 
of rationality, they would have to be state-given reasons. (I am not even sure what it would mean to 
have a reason for a set of attitude-types with no determinate content.)  
I am ignoring these worries because even if they are legitimate, they are compatible with (and 
even point toward) the point I am making in this section: that the normativity of the requirements of 
rationality cannot be explained in terms of our reasons for compliance. If there are state-given 
reasons, then the arguments of this section show that they could not serve as the basis for 
rationality’s normativity. And if there are no state-given reasons, then they could not serve as the 
basis for rationality’s normativity because they do not exist. For helpful discussions of the debate 
surrounding state-given reasons, see especially Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, Schroeder 
2012, Schroeder 2013, and Appendix A of Parfit 2011a. 
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explained by appealing to our (alleged) reasons for having our attitudes arranged in the 
relevant ways.
11 Perhaps this is not such a surprising result; after all, if we reflect on our 
judgments about cases like (1), (2), and (3) from Section 1.1, it seems unlikely that our 
judgments are guided by the thought that the agents are failing to promote or bring about 
some good result. It is doubtful that we are prohibited from having our attitudes arranged in 
certain ways because the prohibition serves some external purpose. 
If this is not a surprising conclusion, it is still a troubling one. It draws our attention 
to the fact that the requirements of structural rationality are rather peculiar entities. At the 
beginning of this section I said that rational requirements must not be brute, arbitrary 
ordinances on the human mind. A bit of investigation, however, raises the worry that they 
may be just these kinds of things. They are, taken at face value, absolute prohibitions on our 
combinations of epistemic and practical attitudes, and yet it is doubtful that they offer any 
sustained epistemic or practical benefit to anyone. Why would we be bound by any such 
requirements?  
My goal in this dissertation is to offer a theory of structural rationality which explains 
what rationality is and why it binds us as it does. But before moving on to explain the 
process I will go through in building my proposal, I must first say more about the problems 
I will be addressing. In the next two sections, I will expand on the arguments of the present 
section and raise two serious challenges for theorizing about the requirements of 
rationality.
12 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See especially Kolodny 2005, Broome 2005, and Broome 2013. 
 
12 Southwood 2008 makes reference to each of the problems I am exploring here.  
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1.4 – The Normativity Problem 
In my statements of IC, BC, EI, and ME, I have said that you are “rationally required” to 
not have your attitudes combined in the relevant ways. As I admitted in Section 1.2, the 
phrase “rationally required” is awkward and unnatural. A normal person would use words 
like “should” or “ought” or “must” when speaking about what rationality demands of us. 
I have chosen to use the phrase “rationally required” rather than “should rationally” 
or “rationally ought” (or some similar locution) in order to avoid a potential 
misunderstanding. If I were to use the words “should” or “ought,” some people might 
assume that I am using these terms to stand in for a reasons-based claim. It is not unusual in 
philosophy to say that an agent should X or ought to X when one means that the agent has 
decisive reason to X. And, as I spent the last section detailing, it is extremely doubtful that we 
have decisive reason to comply with the requirements of structural rationality. So if I had 
begun by saying that we ought not to have inconsistent intentions, and then I went on to 
explain that we do not have any general reasons to abstain from holding inconsistent 
intentions, it might have appeared that I was contradicting myself. I have chosen the phrase 
“rationally required” because it is less likely to create this initial confusion. I do not want it to 
appear that I am proposing that we have reason to hold our attitudes in any particular 
combinations. Were it not for this potential confusion, I would prefer to say “you ought to 
[…]” rather than “you are rationally required to […].” To my ear, these phrases both express 
the same idea. 
Avoiding this confusion is only superficially helpful, unfortunately. There is a 
problem here that we cannot get around just by choosing our words carefully. Whether we 
say “ought” or “must” or “rationally required,” the important point is that the requirements 
of rationality are binding or (to use a word that I have so far avoided) normative. To speak  
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metaphorically, rationality commands that we have our attitudes combined only in certain 
ways and these commands are legitimate—they have force over us. We need an explanation 
of the normativity of rationality. And we need an explanation that does not depend on the 
idea that we have reasons to comply with the requirements of rationality. Rationality’s 
commands do not have force over us in virtue of our reasons for complying with those 
commands, because we have no such general reasons. If we take our judgments at face value, 
however, these commands are nevertheless normative. 
Many contemporary normative philosophers would scratch their head at the thought 
of providing an account of rationality’s normativity which is not based in reasons. These so-
called reasons fundamentalists—most prominently Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, and T.M. 
Scanlon—hold that all normative requirements are constituted by reasons.
13 They accept that 
a principle is normative for an agent just in case it is one with which she ought to comply, 
and they claim that an agent ought to X just in case she has decisive reason to X. According 
to these writers, it is not just a matter of custom that we sometimes use reasons-talk and 
‘ought’-talk interchangeably. They think that there could not be a normative claim which was 
not, at root, just a claim about our reasons. 
Although quite little has been written about why there could not be a non-reasons-
based normative requirement, we can imagine how the argument would go. Take any claim 
or requirement which is alleged to be normative, but which is not based in any reasons for 
compliance. About any such principle, the reasons fundamentalist can ask: “If the principle 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See Raz 1990 (first published in 1975) for one of the earliest works in the reasons 
fundamentalist tradition. Raz’s view is further developed in Raz 1999, Raz 2001, and Raz 2012. 
Scanlon 1998 endorses a version of reasons fundamentalism, and Scanlon 2014 provides the fullest 
defense of the position (while also coining the term “reasons fundamentalism”). Also see Parfit 
2011a and Parfit 2011b.   
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offers no reason for compliance, then why bother complying?” It looks as though we have 
only two potential routes of response. First, we could offer some consideration in virtue of 
which compliance is demanded. We might say: “Well, you ought to do such-and-such 
because…” and then go on to say something about why we are bound to comply with the 
principle. But if we give this kind of response, then we will have given a reason to comply 
with the demand, and so it will turn out that the normativity of the requirement in question 
is of the typical, reasons-based variety. Alternatively, we might refuse to offer considerations 
in favor of complying, but insist that the principle is binding in a non-reasons-based sense, 
relative to a non-reasons-involving standard. But if we provide this kind of response, then 
why should the reasons fundamentalist believe that the principle is, in fact, normative? If 
nothing can be said in favor of complying, then what claim can the principle make on any of 
us? In short, it seems that an explanation of a principle’s normativity will invariably involve 
an appeal to reasons, whereas a failure to explain a principle’s normativity is unsatisfactory. 
Call this the Reasons Challenge. The Reasons Challenge asks us to explain how a principle with 
which we have no reason to comply could bind us—how it could be normative. 
  Jonathan Way has recently given voice to this line of thought within the context of 
rationality. In investigating the requirements of structural rationality, and in confronting the 
possibility that we have no reason to comply with rationality’s apparent prohibitions, he 
raises the question of whether these requirements could still be normative. He writes:  
“[T]he conclusion that there is no reason to comply with [these] requirements 
undermines the basic motivation for accepting such requirements. [These] 
requirements were introduced in order to explain what is wrong with 
incoherence. Since there is nothing wrong with doing what there is no reason 
not to do, requirements which do not entail reasons cannot serve this  
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purpose.”
14 
 
Way’s remarks suggest that the Reasons Challenge cannot be overcome—that a requirement 
whose normativity is not the normativity of reasons could not be normative at all. 
  One might respond to the predicament by resolving that there simply must be 
reasons to comply with the principles of rationality, even though we cannot locate them. 
John Broome has recently accepted such a position. Broome, whose groundbreaking work I 
will continue to consult throughout this project, is committed to the existence of rational 
requirements like those I have stated above. And he is persuaded that a requirement’s 
normativity must obtain in virtue of our reasons for complying with it. Having been unable 
to locate any general reasons to comply with rational requirements, and having admitted that 
he is “without [an] argument for the normativity of rationality,” Broome resolves that the 
requirements of rationality must nevertheless be reason-giving in a way that he cannot yet 
explain.
15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Way’s forthcoming paper, currently titled “Reasons and Rationality.” 
 
15 Broom 2013 p. 204. Broome says that a normative requirement can be either “derivatively 
normative” or “non-derivatively normative.” A requirement is “derivatively normative,” in Broome’s 
sense, if our reasons for complying with the requirement (i.e., the reasons in virtue of which the 
requirement normative) can be explained by appealing to values, or benefits, or considerations that 
are external to the system of requirements. The explanations I have tested (and rejected) above are all 
“derivative” in Broome’s sense. Because Broome cannot find any such explanation, he suggests that 
rationality may be non-derivatively normative: reason-giving in its own right, without appeal to any 
external considerations. But Broome does not say why, or how, the requirements of rationality might 
be reason-giving in their own right, and he says that he does “not know [an argument] that convinces 
[him].” Nevertheless, Broome believes that the requirements of rationality are normative in virtue of 
the reasons we have for complying with them. See all of Chapter 11 of Broome 2013.  
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  In the face of such a difficult challenge, Broome’s dogmatism is understandable. But 
it is not a legitimate solution to our problem. If we hope to offer a positive theory of 
rationality, then we must explain its normativity, even though we seem not to have reason to 
do what rationality requires. 
 
1.5 – The Content Problem 
Up until this point, I have been taking for granted that rationality is a single, identifiable 
(sub-)domain of principles within the broader normative domain. In the last section, I asked: 
in virtue of what is it true that we are required to comply with its dictates? But just as we 
must ask why rationality requires of us what it does, we must also ask why rationality requires 
of us what it does. In other words, in virtue of what do the principles within the rational 
domain belong to that domain, rather than to some other domain (e.g., the moral domain)? 
In the first section of this chapter, I noted that we use the word “irrational” to describe 
agents like those in (1), (2), and (3). While this labeling and grouping seems like common 
sense, it requires justification. A brief detour and comparison to the moral domain will help 
to bring out the problem I am raising.  
Most contemporary moral theorists hold that there is only one ultimate moral 
principle, which states the single, maximally general thing that morality requires of us. For 
example, the Kantian holds that we ought not to murder, ought not to cheat, ought not to 
lie, and so on. But—to speak very loosely—these moral prohibitions are all legitimized by 
the single, most general moral truth: that we ought not to violate the Categorical Imperative. 
According to the Kantian, compliance with the Categorical Imperative involves not 
murdering, not cheating, not lying, and so on. While the baseline principle and the 
surrounding architecture is different, we find a similar structure in utilitarian theories, in  
! 17 
contractualist theories, and in most other systematic moral theories. 
Not every moral philosopher holds such a view. Most famously, W.D. Ross offers a 
non-exhaustive list of distinct and irreducible prima facie moral duties. For Ross, there is no 
ultimate moral principle from which all lower-level principles, and all of our particular 
obligations, can be derived. Instead, Ross’ investigation leads him to propose a variety of 
non-derivative sources of duty which interact in complicated ways to generate specific 
demands on our conduct.
16 On Ross’ account, these basic duties cannot be further unified in 
any interesting or informative way. Ross, sensitive to other writers’ interest in a unified 
theory of moral requirements, writes that “loyalty to the facts is worth more than a 
symmetrical architectonic or a hastily reached simplicity.”
17 And about this Ross is surely 
right. Single-requirement systems have the great burden of explaining how all moral 
demands could have a shared source. Attempts to carry this burden often produce clumsy 
and unconvincing results. An ultimate requirement of morality which delivers implausible 
results, or which delivers plausible results only through implausible assumptions or 
arguments, is of little value.
18 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 In fact, I believe that Ross’ “prima facie duties” are not duties at all. They are not even what 
we would now refer to as pro tanto duties. Instead, they are sources of (pro tanto) reasons. So the 
comparison between what Ross is doing in the moral domain and what (as I will go on to explain) 
some writers are doing in the rational domain is somewhat inexact, because the rational requirements 
that I am investigating are strict, rational-duty-stating principles. This disanalogy is unimportant for 
the point I am making, so I will ignore it. 
 
17 Ross 2007, p. 23. 
 
18 Ross has no principled opposition to a unified moral theory and, indeed, he endeavors to 
create as unified a theory as the phenomenon allows. In response to the concern “that this catalogue 
! 
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However, for those pursuing an ultimate moral requirement, concerns about 
symmetry, elegance, conciseness, or simplicity are, at most, secondary. The more important 
motivation, I believe, is that an ultimate moral requirement would allow us to explain what it 
takes for some demand to be a member of the moral domain. It is an important aspect of 
common sense that morality is unified. The liar, the cheater, and the thief all have something 
crucially in common; although their mistakes are different in obvious ways, their mistakes are 
mistakes of the same kind. And it is just as central to common sense that the dictates of 
morality are distinct in kind from the dictates of, say, etiquette. (The thief is like the liar, and 
neither is like the person who puts his elbows on the table during dinner.) At the same time, 
we are not confident that we know everything that morality demands. A successful moral 
theory will offer an account of the content of morality which explains why every moral 
requirement is part of the same subject matter and why it is that morality demands certain 
things of us rather than others. A single, ultimate requirement of morality may do just this. It 
is less certain that an account like Ross’ can succeed in this respect. 
I have been talking about the moral domain, but the surveyed considerations are just 
as relevant to theories of rationality. We may accept, as I do, that there are requirements 
concerning belief consistency, intention consistency, means-end coherence, enkrasia, and so 
on. And we may be inclined to see these requirements as part of the same normative subject 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of the main types of duty is an unsystematic one resting on no logical principle,” he writes that “[i]f 
further reflection discovers a perfect logical basis for this or for a better classification, so much the 
better” (p. 23). So, as we are reminded by David McNaughton in “An Unconnected Heap of 
Duties?” Ross does not hand us an arbitrary list of duties. Ross believes that some duties are basic 
and others derivative, and philosophical reflection leads him to conclude that the number of basic 
duties must be significantly larger than one. Nevertheless, many (myself included) are unsatisfied by 
the results of Ross’ investigation.  
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matter. But the requirements of structural rationality cannot be a mess of principles bundled 
together willy-nilly. If rationality is a single, unified domain, then we need an account that 
explains its unity. 
We saw in Section 1.4 that the failure of a naïve, reasons-based account of rational 
requirements has thrown into question the normativity of rationality. It is worth pointing out 
that in the absence of the naïve account, the content of rationality may also seem puzzling. 
Had the naïve view succeeded, it would have given us an explanation of what rationality is all 
‘about.’ For example, suppose again that compliance with the demands of rationality is 
required because compliance ensures that we maximize our realized ends. In this case, it is 
quite obvious what unifies the domain of rationality and explains its content: rationality, as a 
subject matter, could be understood as a domain of prohibitive attitudinal principles which 
ensure the optimal realization of our ends. Of course, this is a fiction, and this is not what 
rationality is about. But without some account of the value or goods that rationality serves, it 
is deeply unclear what rationality is about. 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of explaining rationality’s 
content and unity, and some writers have chosen not to pursue a unified account. Again, a 
reference to John Broome is instructive. Broome might be considered the W.D. Ross of 
rationality. In fact, he may exhibit more of the Rossian quality than Ross himself.
19 Broome 
believes that there is no hope of a unified theory and so he adopts a piecemeal approach to 
locating and formulating rational requirements. He proceeds simply by considering his 
intuitions about which mental properties an agent must have in order to be fully rational and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 While Ross goes some length to find as much unity as possible and to reduce the number 
of requirements he takes as primitive, Broome has no such preoccupation. 
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then formulating a principle that states a demand for the properties in question. As long as 
the resulting formulation does not have any implausible implications, Broome is content to 
conclude that we have located a genuine requirement of rationality. Broome is not concerned 
to derive any requirement from any other, nor is he committed to there being any particular 
relationship between the various requirements that populate the rational domain.
20  
We should not be satisfied with a haphazard collection of intuitively linked 
principles. Our bare confidence that agents like those in (1), (2), and (3) are all deserving of 
the title of irrationality is not philosophically adequate. If we hold that rationality is a single 
domain of principles, then we must be prepared to explain what holds the domain together.  
Structural rationality is fascinating because although its dictates are readily accessible 
to common sense, it is remarkably resistant to theorization and explanation. It seems that 
there must be requirements of structural rationality, but we do not know where they come 
from, why they bind us, or what makes them what they are. 
 
1.6 – The Arguments of this Dissertation 
This dissertation is an effort to provide a theory of rationality that overcomes both the 
normativity problem and the content problem. The first half of the dissertation is 
exploratory and critical, as I attempt to both justify some of the claims made in this 
introductory chapter and analyze a range of competing accounts of rationality. The second 
half of the dissertation is positive, as I construct a novel theory that explains the unity and 
bindingness of rationality. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See Broom 2013, pp. 150-151. It is striking that Broome accounts for neither the 
normativity nor the content of rationality.  
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In the next two chapters, I will investigate two very different proposals about the 
nature of rational requirements. In the second chapter, I will turn to Christine Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism and consider its bearing on the issues raised in this introductory chapter. 
Korsgaard’s “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason” unintentionally gave rise to the 
ongoing debate concerning structural rationality, and although her view about the 
relationship between action and normativity was not created with the goal of delivering an 
account of structural requirements, it is deeply informative in two respects. First, 
Korsgaard’s work challenges an important premise I have adopted: that rational 
requirements constrain combinations of attitudes. Korsgaard argues that rational 
requirements must instead be understood as principles governing the process of thinking 
and reasoning, rather than as prohibitions on static sets of attitudes. Second, Korsgaard’s 
work provides tools that could be used to respond to the normativity problem and the 
content problem. According to Korsgaard’s constitutivism, all normative requirements 
(moral, prudential, rational, and so on) have a single fundamental normative source: the 
inescapable demand that we think and act.  If we could derive the requirements of structural 
rationality from the constitutive standards of agency, then we may be able to explain both 
the normativity and the content of rationality.  
My investigation of constitutivism will have mixed results. Regarding the first point, I 
will argue that Korsgaard and others inclined to view rationality in exclusively procedural 
terms are bound to miss out on crucial aspects of the phenomenon of rationality. I will use 
this discussion as an opportunity to reconfirm that—regardless of whether there may be 
some independent requirements of reasoning—there must be some static, purely structural 
requirements. Second, and more constructively, I will propose that we should retain 
Korsgaard’s insight that constitutive features of our agency can generate normative demands.  
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Although I will contend that Korsgaard’s constitutivism, as stated, does not have the 
resources to provide a full theory of structural rationality, I will argue that Korsgaard’s work 
may offer the tools we need to see our way around the challenges posed by reasons 
fundamentalists. A Korsgaardian insight will ultimately play an important role in my account 
of structural rationality. 
  In the third chapter, I will investigate some recent work by reasons fundamentalists. 
The reasons fundamentalists are responsible for bringing to light the normativity problem 
for structural rationality explored in Section 1.4. Because there is no general reason to have 
particular combinations of attitudes types, the reasons fundamentalists conclude that there 
must be no requirements of structural rationality at all. However, they appreciate that they 
must attend to and make sense of our widespread, shared intuitions about rationality. 
Toward this end, a number of reasons fundamentalists have developed compelling reasons-
based error theories of structural rationality. The third chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to 
assessing the prospects of these error theories. I will propose that even the most 
sophisticated version of the error theory—as provided by Niko Kolodny—is left with some 
uncomfortable puzzles about how to accommodate our intuitions regarding rationality and 
its normativity. I will argue that either the error theorist is forced to rely on at least one 
reasons-independent but plainly normative structural requirement (which would undermine 
the point of the error theory), or she will be left unable to explain core aspects of the 
phenomenon of rationality. 
At the end of the second and third chapters, I will have reaffirmed the starting-point 
judgment that there are binding rational requirements on combinations of attitudes, but also 
reaffirmed that there is no hope for providing an account of these principles within an 
exclusively reasons-based system. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, I will endeavor to  
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construct a theory of structural rationality which resolves both the problem of content and 
the problem of normativity. I do so, in part, by drawing on the resources provided by the 
constitutivist and the reasons fundamentalist. 
  In the fourth chapter, I will take a brief step back from the topic of structural 
rationality and offer a conceptual analysis of normativity in general. I will note that the 
constitutivist and the reasons fundamentalist are both normative monists—they hold that 
there must be a single, unified normative domain, and that all normative demands must 
ultimately be demands of the same normative “type.” I propose that the monist thesis may 
be responsible for part of the mysteriousness surrounding the requirements of structural 
rationality. In opposition to the monist thesis, I will articulate and defend a version of 
normative pluralism, according to which there may be multiple fundamentally distinct classes of 
normative claims. Although I agree with the reasons fundamentalist that there must be basic 
normative truths about reasons, I will argue that there is nothing conceptually confused in 
the idea there may be something we ought to do even though we have no reason to do it. 
There are two steps to my argument. First, will I argue that an agent ought to comply with a 
requirement if and only if the agent’s violation of the requirement would be a criticizable 
failure or mistake. Second, will I argue that there can be a requirement the violation of which 
is a criticizable mistake, even if we have no reason for complying with the requirement. I will 
conclude that while some normative requirements invoke the ‘ought’ of reasons, others may 
invoke a fundamentally distinct yet wholly normative sense of ‘ought.’ 
Although the pluralist thesis is not itself a thesis about structural rationality (or any 
other substantive normative matter), I believe the thesis can be put to work in the debate at 
hand. I will make progress toward doing just this in the fifth chapter, where I will propose 
that every requirement of structural rationality can be derived from a single basic  
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requirement which I call the General Requirement of Structural Rationality. Stated concisely, the 
General Requirement says that we ought not to attitudinally undermine the functional 
success of our agential attitudes. In other words, the General Requirement prohibits holding 
a set of intentions and beliefs which is itself responsible for the failure of some of its 
members. The General Requirement resolves the content challenge by providing a road map 
of the entire domain of structural rationality and explaining the relationship between all of 
the domain’s members. 
Together with the resources provided in the fourth chapter, the General 
Requirement also allows us to resolve the normativity challenge concerning structural 
rationality. By understanding what structural rationality is ‘about,’ we gain insight into the 
unique sense in which we are required to comply with its demands. In the closing chapter, I 
will argue that we ought to comply with the General Requirement, even if it is a principle 
with which we have no reason to comply. Although my view is distanced from Korsgaard’s, 
it draws on lessons provided by her work. I will propose that agents who violate the General 
Requirement exhibit a criticizable functional defect by undercutting the operation of their 
own attitudes. I will argue that because intention and belief are core and unavoidable aspects 
of our agency, violating the General Requirement is always a form of agential self-undermining. I 
will argue that this is enough to make true the claim that we ought to have our attitudes 
structured as demanded by rationality. Nevertheless, it remains true that we have no reason 
to be structurally rational. 
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2 – CONSTITUTIVISM, REASONING, AND RATIONALITY 
 
2.1 – Assistance From Constitutivism 
The apparent impropriety of harboring certain combinations of attitudes indicates that there 
are requirements of rationality. These requirements seem to take the form of prohibitions on 
our attitudinal arrangements. However, as we have seen, there are serious problems facing 
any attempt to provide a theory of rationality’s requirements. In this chapter, I will look 
toward a novel account of rationality which promises to solve both the normativity problem 
and the content problem of rationality, but which does so by rejecting one of my central 
claims in Chapter 1.  
Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism delivers a powerful account of rationality which 
promises to explain both the normativity and content of rational requirements. However, on 
Korsgaard’s view, the requirements of rationality are not, as I have suggested, prohibitive 
requirements banning certain combinations of mental states. Instead, Korsgaard proposes 
that the requirements of rationality are principles which guide the processes of practical and 
theoretical reasoning. According to the Korsgaard’s proposal, all normative demands, 
including the demands of rationality, are manifestations of a single basic normative 
requirement: that we comply with the constitutive standards of agency. If Korsgaard’s view 
were successful, it would explain both what rationality is ‘about’ and why it binds us. 
I will ultimately reject Korsgaard’s proposal. But my argument in this chapter is 
intended to be primarily positive, rather than negative. My main ambition is not to show that 
the constitutivist is wrong, but instead to harvest two important results from a discussion of 
the constitutivist project. First, by examining an important limitation of the constitutivist 
proposal, I hope to secure a claim that I could make only provisionally in the opening  
! 26 
chapter. Specifically, I hope to show that the requirements of rationality are what I call 
structural requirements: prohibitive principles banning the simultaneous holding of certain 
attitudes. I will argue that the constitutivist is unable to account for these prohibitive 
requirements and that, as such, she cannot deliver a comprehensive account of rationality. 
Second, I will argue that although the constitutivist proposal cannot be right as stated, it does 
open the door to an important possibility. I propose that the constitutivist is right to say that 
features of our agency can generate legitimate normative demands. Korsgaard’s arguments 
highlight that there is nothing conceptually confused in the idea that a requirement’s 
normativity might be grounded in a non-reasons-based source. Later, in Chapter 4, this idea 
will play a crucial role in my solution to the normativity problem. 
In Section 2.2, I will provide a brief overview of the general constitutivist approach 
to thinking about normativity and normative requirements. In Section 2.3, I will explain how 
constitutivism can be used to generate a theory of requirements of rationality, and I explain 
why this approach offers potential solutions to both the normativity problem and the 
content problem. In Section 2.4, I will highlight the most important way in which the 
constitutivist enterprise challenges my claims in Chapter 1—namely, by holding rational 
requirements as principles to be used by agents in reasoning. In Sections 2.5-2.7, I will argue 
that an account of purely structural requirements is an indispensible part of a proper theory 
of rationality and propose that no solely process-oriented view of rationality can deliver an 
explanation of structural requirements. In Section 2.8, I reflect on a crucial lesson that we 
may be able to take away from the constitutivist's focus on the standards of agency. 
Although we must reject Korsgaard’s account as stated, we should retain the important 
insight that an agent may be bound to comply with the standards delivered by features of her 
agency.  
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2.2 – A Sketch of Korsgaard’s Constitutivism 
To understand how Korsgaard’s constitutivism delivers a theory of rational requirements, we 
must begin by exploring what Korsgaard says about normativity. This section is dedicated to 
providing some background about Korsgaard’s view about normative requirements in 
general. Although this will take us quite far afield from the central topics of my dissertation, 
this detour will ultimately prove to be instructive. For the purposes of exposition, I will 
follow Korsgaard in focusing primarily on the case of practical norms.  Toward the end of 
the section I will explain how epistemic matters fit within the picture.  Once Korsgaard’s 
general account is on the table, I will move on, in the subsequent section, to explain how her 
view applies to the debate about the requirements of rationality.
21 
The starting point in Korsgaard’s account is the observation that we rational agents 
have no choice but to act. Korsgaard points out that not-acting is never an option for us; an 
effort to not-act would be futile, for it would itself involve a choice and action. If I roll over 
and go to sleep so as to avoid having to make a choice about what to do, then in fact I have 
made a choice and I have acted—I have chosen to go sleep so that I do not have to think 
about what else I might do. So there is no way out. As Korsgaard puts it, we rational agents 
are “condemned to choice and action.”
22 
Korsgaard argues that this fact—the fact that we must act—has deep implications, 
because she believes that not just anything counts as a genuine action. Korsgaard believes 
that the activity of acting has constitutive standards. On her view, there are certain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 My overview of Korsgaard’s position is drawn primarily from Korsgaard 2009b. For a 
fuller picture of Korsgaard’s view, see also Korsgaard 2009a and Korsgaard 2009c. 
 
22 Ibid., p. 1.  
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conditions which must be satisfied in order for one to be legitimately engaged in acting. This 
means that our condemnation to action is, in fact, a condemnation to satisfying the 
constitutive standards of action.
23 The inescapable demand that we act carries with it a larger 
burden than it originally appears. According to Korsgaard, this burden is at the root of any 
legitimate normative requirement. 
One might wonder about Korsgaard’s reasons for thinking that action has 
constitutive standards. It is a complicated story involving multiple stages of conceptual 
analysis, which I will only summarize here. To begin, Korsgaard notes that when I am faced 
with the necessity of acting, what I am actually tasked with is “determining myself” to do 
something. According to Korsgaard, what separates a mere bodily movement from an action 
is that an action, unlike any old movement, is brought about by an agent’s active choice 
about how to behave. I act only when I determine my movements.
24 So the demands of 
action are in fact demands of self-determination. Now we can ask: what would have to 
happen in order for me to determine myself? Korsgaard has two answers, corresponding to 
two closely related constitutive standards. 
First, Korsgaard argues that self-determination must be a matter of actively making 
myself the cause of whatever ends I adopt. And Korsgaard says that making myself the cause 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 This is, to my mind, the most crucial and contentious moment in the entire constitutivist 
argument. My primary worry is that Korsgaard slides between two uses of “act” (and “action”). It is 
true that we are condemned to action in the sense that, as active beings, we cannot help but do 
something at any given moment. But I am unsure that we are thereby bound to engage in what I have 
called “legitimate” action (i.e., action in a full-bodied, constitutive-standards-referencing sense). But it 
would be far too much for me to to try to show that Korsgaard is wrong about this, and it’s 
orthogonal to my aims in this chapter and dissertation. So I will not address my worry here. 
 
24 Ibid., p. 69.  
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of an end requires committing to doing whatever is required to realize that end. If I do not 
make myself the cause of my end in just this way, then I will not and cannot succeed in 
determining myself. Of course, some potential end of mine may be realized even while I lack 
a commitment to bringing it about, but then the end’s realization will not be attributable to 
me—it will not be something that I have done. In that case, the end will come about despite 
me. So Korsgaard says that determining myself must include intending to bring about 
whatever means are crucial to the realization of my ends. In other words, Korsgaard believes 
that a process of self-determination—and so an action—is inherently bound by Kant’s 
Hypothetical Imperative. 
Second, Korsgaard claims that a process of self-determination must demonstrate the 
distinction between an agent and that agent’s incentives. When I self-determine, I hold 
myself apart from my incentives and make a choice about what I will do and why I will do it.  
If my bodily movements were simply the result of various incentives and appetites going to 
war with each other, then those movements would not be attributable to me, because I am 
not identical with my incentives. When an agent self-determines, says Korsgaard, the agent is 
an entity distinguishable from the incentives she chooses to reject or endorse. Korsgaard 
argues that we hold ourselves distinct from our incentives only when we act on maxims that 
have universal form.
25 This part is (to say the least) a bit tricky.  To see why Korsgaard thinks 
that this is so, consider a case in which I try to “will particularistically,” by acting on a 
principle which could not be willed universally. In such a case, I cannot be acting on the 
basis of considerations which I think could be invoked as reasons to act the same way across 
a range of identical or relevantly similar cases. If I acted on that kind of basis, then I would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Or, at least, on maxims which we take to have universal form. 
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be willing a maxim that I took to have universal applicability. So when I will 
particularistically, my behavior must be dictated willy-nilly, by whatever incentives happen to 
have a hold on me. And when that happens I am no longer holding myself apart from my 
incentives and making a choice about what I will do and why I will do it—the distinction 
between me and my desires is lost.
26 And so whatever I end up doing, my behavior will not 
be attributable to me, and I will not have self-determined. For this reason, Korsgaard 
believes that a process of self-determination—and so an action—is bound by the demand 
that we will universalizably. In other words, self-determination is constrained by the 
Categorical Imperative. 
On the basis of the considerations sketched in the past three paragraphs, Korsgaard 
concludes that there are certain standards which must be met in order for a putative process 
of self-determination to count as actual, legitimate self-determination. According to 
Korsgaard, the standards in question—the Hypothetical Imperative and Categorical 
Imperative—are internal to the concept of action.
27 This is intended to be a definitional 
point: Korsgaard says that “what it means to deliberate is to be guided by those 
imperatives.”
28 Since we agents are inescapably bound to the activity of acting, we are always 
bound by the Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., p. 75. 
 
27 Korsgaard gestures to the idea that, in fact, the Categorical Imperative and Hypothetical 
Imperative may not be distinct principles at all.  She says: “nothing counts as trying to realize some 
end that is not also trying to determine yourself to realize that end, and nothing counts as determining 
yourself to realize the end that is not also trying to determine your own causality.” Ibid., p. 80. 
 
28 Ibid., p. 131 
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I have been discussing practical agency, because Korsgaard’s primary focus in much of 
her work is the practical domain.  But a similar story applies to the doxastic domain. We 
agents are tasked not only with making choices about what to do, but also with deciding 
what is true (i.e., forming beliefs). And the process of determining ourselves to belief is 
governed by principles of logic, just as the process of determining ourselves to action is 
mediated by practical principles like the Hypothetical Imperative. About this, Korsgaard 
says:  
The laws of logic govern our thoughts because if we don’t follow them we just 
aren’t thinking.  Illogical thinking is not merely bad, it is defective, it is bad as 
thinking.
29 
Korsgaard has in mind principles like modus ponens. She believes that such principles are 
constitutive of the activity of theoretical reasoning, just as principles like the Hypothetical 
Imperative are constitutive of the activity of practical reasoning. According to this view, if I 
think or reason in a way that flouts modus ponens, then what I am doing is not really 
thinking, just as action that violates the Hypothetical Imperative is not really action.  
  This is, admittedly, an almost comically condensed version of Korsgaard’s 
arguments. There are many questions to ask concerning the legitimacy of the arguments just 
canvassed (and my exposition of those arguments). But given my purposes, I will not focus 
on whether these arguments succeed. Instead, I plan to assess how Korsgaard’s theory 
contributes to the debate regarding the requirements of rationality. 
 
2.3 – The Normativity and Content of Constitutivist Rationality 
If Korsgaard’s conceptual analysis concerning action and thinking is successful, then the 
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view delivers an account of requirements on reasoning. These requirements look like 
requirements of rationality, even though they are not identical to the structural requirements 
I put forward in Chapter 1.  
Recall, for example, the principle I provisionally endorsed in the first chapter which 
prohibits a certain from of means-ends incoherence: 
ME 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, believe that you can X only if 
you intend to Y, and not intend to Y]. 
This requirement is similar in content to Korsgaard’s (and Kant’s) Hypothetical Imperative, 
a version of which might be modeled as such: 
If you intend to X and believe that you can X only if you intend to Y, then you 
are rationally required to intend to Y.  
Now consider, as a second example, the principle I put forward in Chapter 1 which prohibits 
a certain form of inconsistency in belief: 
BC 
You are rationally required not to [believe P, believe P→Q, and believe –Q]. 
This putative requirement of rationality has some similarities to Korsgaard’s requirement 
concerning modus ponens, which says: 
If you believe P and believe P→Q, then you are rationally required to believe Q.  
Although the structure of Korsgaard’s requirements differs from the structure of the 
requirements that I provisionally offered in Chapter 1, it appears—at least on the surface—
that Korsgaard’s account may be capturing the same rational phenomena. 
  In a moment, I will turn my attention to assessing whether the difference between 
Korsgaard’s requirements and my requirements is important. But before looking in that 
direction I must highlight a significant advantage of Korsgaard’s constitutivism. Korsgaard’s 
account promises to explain both the normativity and the content of rationality, and so  
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provides potential solutions to the two problems I presented in Chapter 1.  
  First, consider how Korsgaard’s view responds to the normativity problem. 
According to Korsgaard’s view, simply in virtue of being an agent, each of us is bound by 
certain requirements on our practical and theoretical reasoning. Take the example of the 
practical realm. If we accept Korsgaard’s claim that agents are unavoidably bound to act, and 
Korsgaard is correct that complying with the Hypothetical Imperative is part of what it means 
to act, then agents are therefore unavoidably bound to comply with the Hypothetical 
Imperative. As Korsgaard puts it, “a constitutive principle for an inescapable activity is 
unconditionally binding.”
30 An agent is unconditionally bound by the Hypothetical 
Imperative not in the sense that violating the principle is impossible, but in the sense that 
violating the requirement would always be a mistake on the part of the agent, given the type 
of being that the agent is. As a being who must always be engaged in action, a failure to 
engage in legitimate action is a failure of the agent. 
  This way of thinking about the normativity of rational requirements could be used to 
alleviate the pressure applied by what I have referred to as the Reasons Challenge. The 
Reasons Challenge asks us how a principle with which we have no reason to comply could 
be normative. But once we are viewing our topic through Korsgaard’s lens, the request that 
we provide reasons for compliance with the requirements of rationality sounds odd. If what is 
being requested is some consideration that counts in favor of my complying with the 
Hypothetical Imperative—something like an incentive for complying, or an external benefit 
that I or someone else might obtain if I were to comply—Korsgaard is likely to admit that 
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we cannot provide an answer.
31 But Korsgaard’s view can give us a ‘reason’ to comply in the 
sense that it offers an explanation of the unavoidable defect in an agent who fails to comply. 
If Korsgaard’s arguments are successful, then seeking an incentive to justify the demand for 
compliance with the Hypothetical Imperative is just wrong-headed. “Why bother complying 
with the Hypothetical Imperative?” asked to the Korsgaardian agent is a bit like asking a 
firefighter—qua firefighter—why he bothers to put out all of those fires. “This is just what I 
have to do, given the kind of being that I am,” is an adequate response, and one which 
explains the force of the norm in question. 
  I will come back to Korsgaard’s insight concerning normativity later in this project. 
But now consider how the constitutivist view may provide a solution to the content 
problem. According to Korsgaard’s view as I have described it, the content of rationality is 
provided by the constitutive standards of action and thought. There is no deep puzzle on 
this view about what separates actual rational requirements from illegitimate requirements or 
about what unifies the principles that comprise the rational domain. The requirements of 
rationality are manifestations of the basic demand that we think and act. It is, of course, 
another matter to demonstrate that the constitutive standards of action and thought are able 
to give rise to versions of each of the requirements sketched in Chapter 1. I will not attempt 
here to perform any such derivations. My point is only that Korsgaard’s view proposes an 
explanation of what unifies the requirements of rationality. Whether that explanation 
ultimately accommodates all of our intuitions about rationality is another matter. 
  I am not endorsing the view that I am discussing. Indeed, in the next section I will 
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instrumental, purely “intrinsic” reason to comply with the requirements of rationality. Refer to fn 7 in 
Chapter 1; again, I must defer discussion of this question until Chapter 6.  
! 35 
proceed to explain why Korsgaard must be wrong in at least one crucial respect. However, it 
is important for my longer-term purposes to highlight how well-positioned the constitutivist 
is to explain the normativity and content of rationality, because the constitutivist's strategy 
for answering our two problems bares a striking resemblance to the strategy that I will 
ultimately endorse. 
  Toward the end of the chapter, I will come back to these issues concerning the 
normativity and content of rationality. But for the next several sections, my goal is to 
consider Korsgaard’s proposal from a different perspective, in order to vindicate an aspect 
of the provisional proposal I offered in the first chapter. 
 
2.4 – Rational Requirements: Narrow/Wide, Process/State 
As should be obvious by this point, there is a significant difference in form between 
Korsgaard’s requirements and the requirements I put forward in Chapter 1. Consider, again, 
Korsgaard’s Hypothetical Imperative. It says: 
If you intend to X and believe that you can X only if you intend to Y, then you 
are rationally required to intend to Y. 
The parallel requirement that I have provisionally endorsed says: 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, believe that you can X only if 
you intend to Y, and not intend to Y]. 
Although these requirements look similar, they are importantly different. Korsgaard's 
requirement is a narrow-scope requirement, in the sense that the normative operator 
(“rationally required”) takes scope over only a particular attitude—the attitude which is to-
be-held whenever the principle’s antecedent is satisfied. By contrast, my requirements are 
wide-scope requirements, because the normative operator in each requirement takes scope over 
a whole set of disparate attitudes.  
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Because these requirements differ in their form, they also differ in their use or 
applicability to the agents they address. Korsgaard’s requirements are what have sometimes 
been called process requirements: they are requirements which direct their subjects to undergo a 
certain transition in reasoning or thinking (i.e., from certain attitudes to the attitudes over 
which the normative operator takes scope). My requirements, on the other hand, are what 
have been called state requirements: they dictate only that their subjects not be in a particular 
state at any time. 
  It may not be immediately apparent why it matters whether we conceive of the 
requirements of rationality as wide-scope or narrow-scope, or as process-directed or state-
directed. But it turns out that it makes a whole world of difference. Indeed, various writers, 
including Korsgaard, are quite conscious of the form of the requirements they endorse, and 
are convinced that requirements like those I put forward in Chapter 1 could not be legitimate 
requirements. The requirements I put forward in the first chapter were modeled as 
prohibitions on combinations of attitude-types in order to accommodate our basic intuitions 
about rationality and irrationality. But it may turn out that requirements built to match the 
contours of our intuitions about rationality cannot survive close scrutiny. 
Numerous writers have provided this scrutiny. According to Niko Kolodny, for 
instance, purely structural requirements must be misstatements of the requirements of 
rationality, because “they do not tell you to do anything.” To Kolodny’s mind, wide-scope 
requirements barring combinations of mental states could not be counted as normative 
requirements at all. Kolodny says that such requirements would be mere “evaluative 
requirements,” because they miss out on the crucial action-guiding or thought-guiding role  
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played by the requirements of rationality.
32  
  Kolodny’s claim suggests that a task I have given myself in this project is an 
impossible one. If Kolodny is correct, then the way I formulated the requirements of 
rationality in the first chapter may be responsible for our inability to explain the normativity 
of rationality. But Kolodny’s claim cannot be accepted as stated, for two reasons. First, 
contrary to Kolodny’s suggestion, there is a clear sense in which my wide-scope 
requirements do tell you to do something. Although they do not demand that you have or 
form any particular attitude, they command something specific of you: that you only have 
your attitudes arranged in certain ways. This is something that you can do or fail to do, as it 
is something which is under your control (as much as anything is, anyway). Second, even if 
we were to agree with Kolodny that IC, BC, EI, and ME do not tell you to do anything, it is 
not clear why we should then accept that they are not normative. In the absence of an 
argument for the claim that every normative requirement is a requirement that tells you to 
“do something” and greater specificity about what counts as being told to “do something,” 
there is no reason to accept that my requirements would be merely “evaluative.” I see no 
principled reason to refuse the “normative” label to my principles. Without more being said, 
it strikes me as a matter of stipulation which principles we call “normative” and which we 
call “evaluative” and which, if any, deserve both labels.  
Still, there is something important undergirding Kolodny’s thought. Korsgaard has a 
similar worry in mind. She writes: 
On my view, rational requirements do not govern combinations of our attitudes. 
They govern thinking, the activity of thinking; and that means that they govern 
someone who is actively trying to determine what she has reason to believe or to 
do. And thinking has a certain temporal direction. To be rational is not just to 
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have a set of attitudes that happen to conform to a rational requirement. It is to 
follow a rational requirement, to take it as an instruction. […] If the job of 
rational requirements is to govern the activities of thought and deliberation, and 
the point of those activities is to direct us to belief and action, then rational 
requirements cannot be wide scope, since wide scope requirements cannot do 
that job.
33 
Kolodny’s claim that structural requirements do not tell you to do anything is a bit obscure. 
Korsgaard puts the point more clearly: there is nothing for you to do with a wide-scope 
requirement of rationality. Upon being confronted by my one of my principles in the heat of 
deliberation, you might question its significance to you. If you find yourself failing to intend 
the means you see as crucial to your ends, and I direct your attention to a requirement 
banning such an attitudinal state, you might respond: “Well, that’s fine. But what good is 
your principle to me?” Korsgaard's Hypothetical Imperative, on the other hand, gives you an 
instruction: take the means! 
  Korsgaard’s comment actually has at least two sharp points. First, she is claiming that 
a view like mine misses out on the role that rational requirements play in the life and thought 
of rational beings. As she puts it, “the claim that rational requirements are requirements on 
our attitudes seems to me to ignore the context in which we deploy rational requirements.” 
There is, no doubt, something to this thought. It seems that reasoning and thinking is an 
activity that can go well or badly. There must be something that distinguishes proper 
reasoning from a jumble of thoughts bundled together, one after another, arbitrarily. And an 
agent engaged in reasoning does seem—consciously or not—to be appealing to certain 
principles to guide her in her efforts. What else could she be appealing to than principles of 
rationality? Second, Korsgaard’s comments highlight that there may be something odd about 
wide-scope state requirements in the first place, since they are not the kinds of requirements 
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that beings like us can do anything with. Wide-scope prohibitions on combinations of 
attitudes may not be fit-for-purpose for agents.  I suspect that Kolodny would agree with 
Korsgaard on both of these points. With considerations like these in mind, Korsgaard, 
Kolodny, and others have endorsed a view according to which the requirements of 
rationality must be understood as narrow-scope requirements on reasoning.  
It is worth pausing to point out that, strictly speaking, there are not only two options. 
It is sometimes assumed that rational requirements must either take the form of narrow-
scope process requirements like those endorsed by Korsgaard and Kolodny or, alternatively, 
as purely structural (wide-scope, state-directed) requirements like those I put forward in 
Chapter 1. In principle, there is at least one other view that one could defend. One could 
argue that there are wide-scope requirements of rationality which function as requirements 
on reasoning. It turns out that such a view is not conceptually incoherent, but only very bad. 
It is worth saying why it would be unwise to see wide-scope requirements as requirements 
on reasoning, because doing so will help to further clarify what underlies Korsgaard’s and 
Kolodny’s concerns. 
  In Chapter 1, I quickly arrived at formulations of numerous requirements of 
rationality by reflecting on the apparent irrationality of harboring certain combinations of 
attitudes. For example, from the fact that it is irrational to fail to intend to Y while both 
intending to X and believing that you can X only if you intend to Y, I concluded that you are 
rationally required not to [intend to X, believe that you can X only if you intend to Y, and 
not intend to Y]. And I implicitly accepted that this requirement is a static, state-based 
requirement. But if I were so inclined, I could argue that this principle functions as a 
requirement on reasoning. To defend this position, I would have to claim that you are 
rationally required to reason in whatever way will maintain or regain compliance with this  
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wide-scope requirement.
34 For instance, if you currently intend to X and believe that you can 
X only if you intend to Y, then the principle I have called “ME,” understood as a 
requirement on your reasoning, would direct you to do any one of the following: (I) form an 
intention to Y, or (II) abandon your intention to X, or (III) abandon your belief about the 
importance of intending to Y. Because the requirement’s normative operator is wide-scope, 
the requirement has no preference for how it is satisfied. Taken as a requirement on 
reasoning, the principle would just demand that you reason along one of the three available 
routes—take your pick.
35 
  This proposal is exceptionally implausible. Imagine that I intend to pass tomorrow’s 
exam and believe that I will pass the exam only if I plan to study all night. If I were, in 
Korsgaard’s terminology, to take ME as an “instruction” to guide my deliberations, then I 
might do so by abandoning my belief in the necessity of studying. But that is just weird. 
Rationality, if it governs my reasoning at all, does not do so by allowing me to reason from 
(a) my intention to pass the exam and my absence of an intention to study to (b) abandoning 
my belief that studying is crucial to passing. This is just one example. The problem is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Kolodny was the first to note that wide-scope requirements could be taken as process 
requirements. He was also the first to point out that this would be a terrible idea. See Kolodny 2007. 
For a related discussion, see Broome 2007. 
 
35 It is worth noting that here and throughout this dissertation I am ignoring so-called 
bootstrapping worries about the requirements of rationality. As I suggested in Chapter 1, many writers 
have wondered whether we have reason to comply with the requirements of rationality. If we do, then 
it may be that we can too easily generate (i.e., “bootstrap” into existence) reasons for action and 
belief, especially if the requirements of rationality have narrow-scope. There are interesting questions 
about bootstrapping, but these are not the questions I am attending to here. See, for example, 
Bratman 1981, Raz 2005a, Broome 2005, and Setiya 2007.  
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reproducible for almost any attempted formulation of a wide-scope requirement on 
reasoning. In short, my wide-scope principles, if they are taken as principles governing 
reasoning, produce implausible results regarding what constitutes good or acceptable 
reasoning. If there are any requirements on reasoning, my requirements are not them. 
  So, as I said, claiming that my wide-scope requirements can function as requirements 
on reasoning is not a good strategy. Any plausible account of wide-scope requirements of 
rationality must take these requirements to be purely structural principles concerning the 
relationships between one's static attitudes. With this in mind, we can return to Korsgaard's 
concern. As Korsgaard presents the matter, wide-scope state requirements are bizarre 
entities, because there is nothing for us to do with them. Structural requirements seem blind 
to the active role that rationality plays in our agential lives. 
  The observations of this section leave me with a limited menu of options. Two 
options are the most obvious. First, in an effort to provide an account of how the 
requirements of rationality govern reasoning, I could abandon the provisional requirements I 
put forward in Chapter 1. Alternatively, I could double down on my commitment to wide-
scope, purely prohibitive requirements of rationality. I favor this second option. 
The next three sections are dedicated to defending my position that the requirements 
of rationality are wide-scope state requirements. In Section 2.5, I aim to show that wide-
scope state requirements are less bizarre and useless than Korsgaard proposes and that such 
requirements may play an important role in our self-conception as rational beings. In Section 
2.6, I will argue that these requirements are not only intelligible, but in fact an indispensible 
part of any comprehensive theory of rationality. Specifically, I will argue that my 
requirements could not, as some have proposed, be derived from an account of narrow-
scope process requirements. In Section 2.7, I go even further and attempt to cast doubt on  
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the existence of any narrow-scope requirements of reasoning at all.  
 
2.5 – The Role and Importance of Structural Requirements 
It is not my goal to show that requirements of structural rationality can guide us in our 
reasoning. In Section 2.6, I will say something about the relationship between rationality and 
reasoning. In this section, I simply hope to illuminate what sort of role a purely state-based 
ban on combinations of attitudes might play in our lives. I hope to show that my wide-scope 
state requirements are perfectly intelligible as agent-directed requirements and, even more, 
that these particular requirements are central to our self-conception as rational beings. 
To be sure, one role that a principle or requirement can play is to provide concrete 
procedural guidance to someone who is engaged in an activity. A child learning to tie her 
shoes can follow a principle taught to her by her parents in order to help her do the job well. 
Someone doing basic math in high school might appeal to the principle demanding that they 
deal with the brackets first in order to ensure that they arrive at the proper result. It is easy to 
come up with examples of requirements playing a procedural role in reasoning and decision. 
But this is not the only role that can be played by a principle or requirement.  
Those who grew up around skating rinks should be familiar with a sign that reads, 
simply: “No Shoes on the Ice!” These signs issue a sort of wide-scope state requirement to 
their readers. The sign could be rewritten without loss of meaning to say: “You may not 
[stand on the ice and wear shoes].” The command offered by the sign is perfectly intelligible 
as an instruction, even though the guidance it offers is limited to identifying a particular no-
go zone for you and your shoes. You could not use the sign’s command to make up your 
mind about what to do, regardless of where you are standing. For instance, if you are already 
complying with the sign’s demand, then you cannot appeal to the sign to help you decide  
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what to do next: if you are standing outside of the skating area then the sign does not ask 
you to enter the rink, and if you are standing on the ice in a pair of skates, the sign’s order 
cannot help you decide whether to stay there, or to leave, or anything else. On the other 
hand, if you are violating the sign’s directive—by standing on the ice in your shoes—the 
content of the command offers no recommendation about what to do to rectify the 
situation. The sign does not encourage you to put on some skates while staying on the ice, or 
to walk off the ice in your shoes, or to melt the ice from beneath your feet, or anything else. 
The sign says only that you may not stand on the ice in your shoes. And the sign’s 
prohibitive demand is clear to us, and registers as a demand with which we can comply or 
fail to comply, even though it is of little use in deciding what we will do or how we will do it. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that there are no better or worse ways of complying with the 
sign’s demand when you enter the skating arena. I am simply pointing out that the demand 
itself does not provide guidance concerning how you might maintain or regain compliance, 
and I am claiming that this does not undermine the intelligibility of the sign’s dictate. 
  Korsgaard suggests that a view of wide-scope state requirements ignores the context 
in which we deploy rational requirements. But as we have just seen, a requirement is not 
always taken up into thought with the purpose of reasoning or making up one’s mind. We 
may also appeal to a principle for instruction about where we may or may not go. And in 
some cases we reflect on a requirement just in order to assess whether we are, or someone 
else is, complying with its demand.  
If we reflect on the circumstances in which we judge ourselves or others to be 
irrational, it is quite plausible that the requirements of rationality take the form of wide-scope 
bans on combinations of attitudes, rather than requirements to engage in some process of 
reasoning. When we find an agent with a set of inconsistent beliefs—your friend in (2) from  
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Chapter 1, for example—our inclination is to think “You shouldn't do that!” And we make 
this judgment without also judging that there is some particular change that she ought to 
make in light of this mistake. Wide-scope requirements of rationality cannot lead us from 
thought to thought or help us decide what to do or believe. But they can nevertheless 
operate as instructions that set hard limits on where our minds may go. The job of a 
structural requirement of rationality would not be to guide us, but rather to constrain us, by 
ruling out certain ways that we might put our attitudes to work.  
  This raises the question: but why are we subject to these constraints? Put another 
way: what is wrong with being in the state of having one’s attitudes structured in one of the 
prohibited ways? Of course, these questions are simply restatements of the request that we 
explain the normativity and content of rationality. At this stage, I cannot offer a full 
explanation of why we are subject to the constraints of structural rationality. In the second 
half of this dissertation, I will offer a proposal. Currently, my point is only to show that there 
is nothing intrinsically confused or bizarre in the idea of a wide-scope, state-directed 
requirement. 
 
2.6 – Can Structural Requirements Be Derived from Requirements on Reasoning? 
The arguments of the previous section are not nearly enough to vindicate an account of 
rationality that focuses on structural requirements. Even if we accept that there is nothing 
bizarre in the idea of a wide-scope state requirement, and even if we find it plausible that at 
least some requirements of rationality take this form, we may be able to do without a theory 
of requirements of structural rationality. The reason is simple: we may be able to deliver a 
story about the requirements of structural rationality from an account of requirements on 
reasoning. About this, Korsgaard writes:  
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It is worth noting that if there are narrow-scope requirements, there are also 
wide ones. […] You can derive a wide-scope requirement from a narrow-scope 
one, but you can’t derive a narrow-scope requirement from a wide-scope one. So 
if we can explain the narrow-scope requirements in terms of the activity of 
reason […] then we can explain the wide-scope ones as well.
36 
In Section 2.4, I admitted that we cannot use a wide-scope account of rational requirements 
to explain or derive any requirements on reasoning. My opponent may be able to do better. 
Perhaps a view which sees the requirements of rationality as principles which govern 
reasoning could offer an explanation of why there are rational prohibitions on mental states. 
If this approach succeeds, then it will leave my view out in the cold, because it will account 
for everything in my view and a lot more. So, for the remainder of this section, I will assume 
that there are a variety of (not-yet-wholly-specified) requirements of procedural rationality 
that govern the activity of thinking and reasoning, and I will assess how far such a view can 
get us in explaining requirements of structural rationality. 
  It is easy enough to imagine how derivations would work. Suppose that Korsgaard's 
modus ponens principle is legitimate. In light of this principle, it seems obvious what is 
defective in an agent who simultaneously believes P, believes P→Q and believes -Q. An 
agent with this combination of attitudes has flouted a rational requirement on the activity of 
reasoning, by failing to draw the proper conclusion. So it may be that this wide-scope 
requirement prohibiting belief inconsistency is a mere byproduct of a requirement which 
governs theoretical reasoning. I said in the previous section that when we find an agent with 
a set of inconsistent beliefs, we are inclined to deem her irrational just in virtue of the 
impropriety of her attitudinal arrangement. While that may be true, our inclination to 
criticize her combination of mental states may be grounded in the fact that her attitudes were 
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arrived at by way of a rationally impermissible process of thinking. 
  This argument is too quick. Certainly, there will be cases in which an agent who 
violates one of the wide-scope requirements of structural rationality will come into their 
violation state by flouting some putative requirement on reasoning. But the argument at 
hand proposes that every banned state must be one which is arrived at through a process of 
defective reasoning. This is not a secure assumption, for it is not necessary that every mental 
state is one arrived at by any form of reasoning, defective or otherwise. Non-agential 
processes can generate attitudes and combinations of attitudes. Beliefs and intentions often 
arrive without any reasoning at all, as a result of dreams, bare perceptual experiences, 
physical interventions into the brain, instinctual reaction, and other physiological events. 
There is no guarantee that a person’s set of inconsistent beliefs or intentions will be the 
result of any process of reasoning whatsoever. An agent may awake one morning believing 
P, P→Q, and –Q, or intending to X, intending to Y, and believing that she cannot do both. 
A person in this condition will be violating a requirement of structural rationality, but will 
not (yet, anyway) be violating any rational requirement on her reasoning. 
  This might sound silly. And it might seem unwise to allow my argument to hinge on 
fringe cases of abnormally generated attitudes. So I need to be clear about the point I am 
trying to make. Although I suspect that there are, in fact, many real-life cases of structural 
irrationality that are not the result of any processes of thinking at all, it is not important to 
my argument that such cases occur often (or ever). I am making a point about whether a 
requirement on mental states can be strictly speaking derived from a requirement on processes 
of thought. I am saying that it cannot, because states are not (as a logical or metaphysical 
matter) necessarily the product of processes. Consider, again, my analogy regarding the signs 
posted at skating rinks that demand that we not stand on the ice in our shoes. Could we  
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derive this prohibition from a system of procedural requirements governing our actions and 
movements with respect to the ice rink? Strictly speaking, the answer is No. You could come 
to be standing on the ice in your shoes without having done anything at all. You could be 
spontaneously generated on the ice in your shoes or, alternatively, someone else might knock 
you unconscious on the street, drag you onto the ice, and wake you up. If all we have at our 
disposal are requirements governing how people may choose to move with respect to the ice 
rink, then we will not be able to prohibit people from standing on the ice in their shoes per se. 
The same is true in the case of mental states. Requirements on reasoning cannot be used to 
derive strict bans on combinations of mental states, because mental states need not be the 
result of any processes of reasoning or thought. 
  An opponent might say that she can accept this result. With her focus set on 
reasoning alone, my opponent could claim that there is not necessarily any irrationality in a 
person whose mental states have not arisen from defective reasoning. The proponent of 
process requirements may admit that she cannot derive principles like IC, BC, ME, and so 
on, but may also claim that she is willing to reject these requirements altogether. 
It would strain credulity to observe an agent with a set of inconsistent intentions and 
claim that unless he made a mistake in his reasoning he is making no mistake at all and is 
unbound by any requirement. So my opponent will need something to say about this kind of 
agent. She might argue, then, that an agent with an intuitively unacceptable combination of 
mental states would be irrational only if he did not go on to reason his way out of the 
relevant state in some rationally permissible fashion. For example, if an agent were to awake 
from a science experiment in a state of intending to X, intending to Y, and believing that he 
could not both X and Y, my opponent could argue that the agent would be irrational only if 
he did not exit that state by reasoning in accordance with some narrow-scope principle of  
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practical reasoning.  
But if an agent with a set of inconsistent or incoherent attitudes is always required to 
reason out of the state that she is in, we need an explanation of why this is so. But it will not 
be easy to provide a general account of why one is always rationally required to reason out of 
an intuitively improper attitudinal state that does not rely on or take for granted the rational 
impropriety of being in the relevant state. For example, as I have argued above, IC cannot be 
derived directly from any requirements on reasoning. My opponent may be happy to reject 
IC. My opponent will then have to explain why, as a general matter, any agent who intends 
to X, intends to Y, and believes that she cannot both X and Y will be irrational if she does 
not reason her way out of her attitudinal circumstances. But the explanation cannot make 
reference to the irrationality or defectiveness of having the relevant combination of attitudes, 
because doing so would grant me too much. If my opponent explains the rational 
requirement to reason out of some state by pointing out the impropriety of being in that 
state, then that very explanation could be used to explain a requirement of structural 
rationality instead. 
In fact, this is a concern for any attempt to justify requirements on reasoning more 
generally. When we ask what justifies some particular requirement on our reasoning, it is 
difficult to offer an explanation that does not make reference to the bad outcomes that a 
failure of compliance with the principle would produce. But those bad outcomes—the states 
that I would like to count as irrational—are what we are now attempting to explain by 
appealing to the requirements on reasoning. Of course, without a full list of the requirements 
on reasoning that a proponent of the narrow-scope view of rational requirements is offering, 
I cannot conclusively prove my point here. However, I believe that the burden of proof rests 
with my opponent.  
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  Even if we put aside what I have said so far and imagine that we can, somehow, 
provide a system of requirements on reasoning that can be used to derive the requirements 
of structural rationality, I am skeptical that such an account would be explanatorily 
satisfactory. A derivation of the requirements of structural rationality from some principles 
on reasoning would, by its nature, suggest that structural requirements are parasitic on the 
principles of reasoning. To my mind, this is an unnatural and counter-intuitive form of 
explanation, even if it is extensionally adequate. When I introduced the requirements of 
rationality in the opening section of this project, I made no reference to reasoning into (or 
out of) any state—I did nothing more than characterize the combination of mental states 
harbored by the agents in question. And that is enough, I think, to generate our judgments 
about the irrationality of the states that such agents are in. 
At this stage, I have not claimed that there are no rational requirements that govern 
reasoning. I have said only that we cannot do without the requirements of structural 
rationality and that we cannot derive these important prohibitive requirements from 
requirements on reasoning. If there are requirements on reasoning, they must be 
independent of the wide-scope state requirements of rationality. 
 
2.7 – Skepticism About Requirements on Reasoning 
The previous two sections, taken together, suffice as a response to part of the challenge that 
I am considering. What I have tried to show is that structural requirements are intelligible 
and important aspects of a proper theory of rationality. But I have not said anything to 
suggest that they could be the whole story about rational requirements. Even if there is 
important work that can only be done by wide-scope prohibitive principles, it may be that 
there is important work that can only be done by procedural requirements as well. This  
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might be an appropriate ending point to this line of inquiry. Although philosophers have 
been keen to try to make us choose between a theory of structural requirements and a theory 
of requirements on reasoning, there could be both kinds of requirements. Perhaps the 
domain of rationality is just a bit messy. 
In fact, I suspect that things are not this messy. Although I am not prepared to rule 
out the possibility that there are requirements on reasoning, I doubt that any such 
requirements exist. This section is dedicated to expressing my skepticism about narrow-
scope, process-directed requirements of rationality. To begin, I will attend to some candidate 
requirements on reasoning and explain why I am not satisfied with them. This will eventually 
lead me to offer a more general explanation about the relationship between rationality and 
reasoning. 
If there is such a thing as a rational requirement that guides the activity of theoretical 
reasoning, you might expect that it has something to do with modus ponens. Consider an 
example of how an agent might be required to employ modus ponens in his reasoning. 
Imagine that Brett hears a jingle outside of his front door. It is a very familiar sound which 
he has heard countless times before. Immediately, he comes to believe that what he is 
hearing is the jingling of keys just outside of his front door. Given how this has gone many 
times in the past, he is already carrying a background belief that when he hears the jingling of 
keys just outside his front door, someone will unlock the door and walk inside. If Brett’s 
reasoning is governed by a narrow-scope requirement based on modus ponens—if when he 
believes P and believes P→Q, he is rationally required to then believe Q—then, rationally, 
he must now form the belief that someone will unlock the door and walk inside. This might 
sound pretty plausible. If Brett did not draw the conclusion and arrive at the new belief, he 
might appear to be exhibiting a breakdown in his reasoning.  
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  But whether it seems plausible that Brett is required to draw the conclusion via 
modus ponens actually depends on what else Brett believes. Suppose that at the same time 
that Brett forms his first two beliefs, he recalls that neurotoxins eradicated the rest of 
humanity last week. Upon having this recollection, Brett judges that it is overwhelmingly 
unlikely that someone will unlock the door and enter his home and, so, at once he believes 
that it is false that there is anyone standing outside and about to come in. In light of this, he 
also loses his initial belief about hearing the jingling of keys just outside of his front door. “It 
must just be the wind chime,” he thinks. 
  Brett has not reasoned in accordance with modus ponens from his initial two beliefs. 
If he were rationally required to do so, then it would be a mistake in reasoning to not draw 
the conclusion that someone standing outside is about to enter. However, intuitively, he 
makes no mistake in not reasoning to this conclusion. It seems that the way he has reasoned 
is rationally immaculate. Examples like this are easily reproducible. There cannot be a 
requirement of rationality which says that we must always reason in accordance with modus 
ponens. To be clear, I am not here denying that Brett is reasoning in accordance with some 
legitimate principle. I am pointing out only that his reasoning is not subject to a requirement 
based on modus ponens.  
  The same difficulty emerges when we try to construct a requirement which governs 
the process of practical reasoning. Recall, again, the version of the Hypothetical Imperative 
which says: 
If you intend to X and believe that you can X only if you intend to Y, then you 
are rationally required to intend to Y. 
It is very unlikely that there is any such requirement on our reasoning. Suppose that you 
extensively plan to buy a new boat tomorrow morning—picking out the model, color, the 
dealership, the time of purchase, and so on. Now suppose that at some point this evening  
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you come to believe that robbing a bank tonight is the indispensible means to your 
successfully buying a boat in the morning. (Until after dinner, you had forgotten that you do 
not have nearly enough money for a boat.) The principle stated above would direct you to 
reason to an intention to rob a bank. Presumably, you will not in fact go ahead and intend to 
rob a bank. For the sake of ease, we can imagine that you already have a background 
commitment to abstain from committing crimes. In light of this preexisting commitment, 
rather than forming an intention to rob a bank, you abandon your intention to buy a boat 
tomorrow morning. This seems to be a rationally acceptable process of reasoning. As stated, 
however, your reasoning violates the Imperative. This suggests that there is no such 
requirement on practical reasoning. 
  This is not enough to show that there are no rational requirements on reasoning. All 
that I have argued so far is that some of the obvious candidate principles are illegitimate. It 
may be that there are requirements on reasoning which explain what is going on in both of 
these cases. Here is one potential explanation. It could be argued that what makes the agents’ 
reasoning rationally acceptable is their compliance with their own normative judgments. In 
the theoretical case, Brett has a normatively loaded belief regarding his circumstances: he 
believes that the evidence (the neurotoxin apocalypse) overwhelming favors the proposition 
that there is no one standing outside and about to come in. When he does not draw a 
conclusion from his other two beliefs—the conclusion that someone will unlock the door 
and walk inside—this is because he has responded to his normative judgment in a certain 
way. In the practical case, when you abandon your intention to buy a boat in the morning, 
rather than intending to rob a bank, you do so in accordance with your judgment that you 
have strong reason not to rob a bank. In both cases, then, one might argue that the agent’s 
rationality in reasoning is secured by the fact that there is an appropriate alignment between  
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the agent’s normative judgments (about what to do or believe) and the agent’s other 
attitudes. Moreover, it could be argued that the agents would be irrational if they did not 
exhibit this alignment between their normative judgments and their other attitudes. If, for 
example, Brett reasons from P and P→Q to Q, but does so while believing that there is 
insufficient evidence in support of Q (or, even more, conclusive evidence against Q, given 
humanity’s destruction), then he may be making a rational mistake. 
  Considerations like these are no doubt behind a proposal put forward by Joseph Raz 
and Niko Kolodny which says that rationality, as a whole, is rooted in the demand that we 
respond appropriately to our perceived reasons. Inspired by Raz’s work, Kolodny put 
forward the following two principles of rationality:
37 
(C+) If one believes that one has decisive reason to have attitude A, then one is 
rationally required to have attitude A. 
(C-) If one believes that one has insufficient reason to have attitude A, then one 
is rationally required not to have attitude A. 
Kolodny proposes that any other apparent procedural requirements on our reasoning are 
derivable from these two basic requirements. This approach promises to explain why it is 
that we are often rationally required to, for example, reason in accordance with modus 
ponens. In many cases, an agent who believes P and believes P→Q will thereby be in the 
position of taking himself to have conclusive reason to believe Q. If the agent is in this 
position, then he will, by Kolodny’s first principle, be rationally required to believe Q. So the 
agent will in this case be rationally required to reason in accordance with modus ponens, 
even though there is no general rational requirement demanding that one reason in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See Kolodny 2005, pp. 541-542 and p. 557. I have superficially changed the presentation 
of Kolodny’s principles, simply to bring out their narrow-scope structure.  
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accordance with modus ponens (or any other principle of logic, for that matter). Perhaps we 
should follow Kolodny and identify the enkratic requirements as the basis of rationality’s 
imposition on our reasoning. 
  I share at least some of the judgments behind the Raz-Kolodny proposal. Like Raz 
and Kolodny, I am confident that we are not, as general matter, rationally required to reason 
in accordance with any set principles of logic. And I also agree that an agent who believes 
that he has conclusive reason to have an attitude but does not have that attitude is irrational. 
But I cannot endorse Kolodny’s proposal as a proposal about requirements on reasoning, 
because I am skeptical that the principles listed directly above are requirements on reasoning. If 
what we are looking for are requirements that could govern processes of thinking or 
reasoning or attitudinal adjustment, then these requirements seem either trivial or useless. 
   On the proposal at hand, we are to imagine that there is some process of reasoning 
or thought that can bring an agent from a normative judgment to the attitude that the 
judgment represents as to-be-held, and that one must engage in this activity in order to 
satisfy a requirement of procedural rationality. When an agent inspects the evidence before 
her and forms a judgment like I have decisive reason to believe P, then, if she is rational, she will 
transition in thought from that normative judgment and come to believe P. This strikes me 
as an awkward and unconvincing description of what does or should happen. We do not 
reason or think our way from normative judgments like these to the attitudes that our 
judgment represents as to-be-held. When we have reached a normative judgment like I have 
decisive reason to believe P, our reasoning and thinking is finished. There need not and should 
not be any temporal, attitudinal, or procedural gap between the formation of the normative 
verdict and the formation of the attitude that is judged as to-be-held. There need not be any 
process of moving from one to the other—the formation of the normative belief brings  
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about, at the same time, the attitude that is deemed as to-be-held. Certainly, we have no use 
for any principle that would “guide” us in some process like this.  
I am not denying that an agent can have her attitudes out of alignment with her 
normative judgments. An agent may, for example, believe that she has decisive reason to 
intend to X, but not intend to X. Such an agent is suffering from a form of akrasia in 
intention. Indeed, in example (3) at the outset of Chapter 1, I am exhibiting precisely this 
form of irrationality when I fail to intend to book a flight to visit my long-lost relatives. I 
have not changed my opinion about the irrationality of agents in such circumstances. What I 
am saying is that a breakdown between one’s normative judgments and one’s other attitudes 
is not easily understood as a procedural failing, as a breakdown in thinking or reasoning.
38 It 
is much more plausible that enkratic requirements are wide-scope state requirements. So 
even these enkratic principles, which stood the best chance of surviving scrutiny, are unlikely 
candidates as legitimate requirements of procedural rationality. 
To be clear: I am not yet rejecting the possibility that we might use enkratic 
principles to explain or derive other principles of rationality. I will attend to that possibility 
in Chapter 3. For the moment, I am only registering my skepticism about grounding a 
network of principles of procedural rationality in requirements of (procedural) enkrasia.  
The arguments of this section are suggestive rather than definitive. I cannot here 
prove that there are no requirements of procedural rationality. And it is not important to the 
positive proposal that I will go on to offer that there are no procedural requirements of 
rationality. But I hope that what I have argued indicates where the preponderance of the 
evidence currently lies. Earlier in this chapter, I encountered a position which tells us that the 
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38 I will come back to this point in Chapter 5, when I discuss how we should conceive of 
structural requirements governing enkrasia.  
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only legitimate requirements of rationality are narrow-scope procedural requirements, and 
according to which my purely structural requirements, if intelligible at all, can be explained 
away as mere byproducts of the principles which govern reasoning or thinking. I have tried 
to show that, quite differently, not only is it impossible to derive my wide-scope 
requirements from requirements governing reasoning, but that it is quite difficult to find 
intuitively plausible requirements on reasoning at all.    
  Before closing this section, I must clear up two potential misunderstandings that 
could arise from what I have argued so far.  
First, it may seem that my arguments in this section conflict with my earlier claims 
about the requirements of structural rationality. For example, in this section, I have argued 
that there is no rational requirement to form an intention to Y whenever you intend to X 
and believe that you can X only if you intend to Y. I gave the example of you abandoning 
your intention to buy a boat after coming to believe that you could buy a boat only if you 
intended to rob a bank. In this example, as described, there is moment at which you both 
intend to X and believe that you can X only if you Y, but during which you do not intend to 
Y. During this moment, you are violating the principle that I have labeled “ME.” But given 
that I have said that your reasoning is unassailable in the case, it may seem that I am 
committed to saying that you are at no point irrational. This would be odd, as I have 
endorsed ME as a legitimate requirement of structural rationality.  
However, I did not say that that you are at no point irrational in the example. I have 
argued only that you are not irrational in virtue of your reasoning. Specifically, your 
irrationality is not due to your failing to form an intention to Y. Indeed, I believe that you are 
irrational in this case, and the proposal I will put forward in Chapter 5 will explain what your 
mistake consists in. For the moment, my point is only that your reasoning, qua reasoning, is  
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unassailable. 
   Second, my skepticism about rational requirements on reasoning may make it appear 
that I have nothing at all to say about what is going on when we reason. If there are not any 
rational requirements governing our reasoning, then is reasoning just a mishmash of 
disconnected thoughts? Am I denying that we generally reason in accordance with the rules 
of logic? To both of these questions: No. Reasoning is what we do when we are trying to 
reach judgments about how we should act and what we should believe. When we are 
engaged in this process, we routinely put to use the rules of logic, just like we call on the 
rules of mathematics and even the laws of nature (as we understand them). Facts about the 
way that the world is organized (logically, mathematically, physically, and so on) are of 
considerable use in this effort. I am not skeptical about any of this. I am skeptical only that 
there are requirements of rationality demanding that we reason in accordance with the rules 
of logic, or with any other fixed rules. 
 
2.8 – Lessons From Constitutivism 
I began this chapter by talking about Korsgaard’s constitutivism. But I have since travelled a 
long way from that starting point. In closing, I must restate the two important conclusions 
that I have tried to harvest from this discussion. 
  The first major result, which has been the subject of the second half of this chapter, 
is a vindication of the intuition that there are purely structural requirements of rationality. In 
looking at the limitations on Korsgaard’s exclusively procedural conception of rationality, I 
have tried to show both that it faces its own set of obstacles and that it could not be used to 
derive a system of wide-scope state requirements of rationality. And, at the same time, I have 
argued that purely structural requirements are intelligible normative principles which play an  
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important role in our thinking about rationality and irrationality. 
  While disagreeing with Korsgaard on these important issues, I have suggested that 
there is a crucial insight that we might carry forward. In the first half of the chapter, I 
explored Korsgaard’s account of the foundations of normativity. Korsgaard argues that a 
requirement could have force over an agent if it were derived from the constitutive standards 
of agency. The underlying idea is that if an agent’s non-compliance with a putative 
requirement would unavoidably involve an agential failure, then the agent is bound, as the 
type of being that she is, to comply with the requirement in question. Though I am not 
optimistic about Korsgaard’s arguments concerning the constitutive standards of agency, I 
will put her general insight to work in my own proposal. I will come back to Korsgaard’s 
arguments in Chapters 4 and 6. 
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3 – REASONS FUNDAMENTALIST ERROR THEORIES  
 
3.1 – The Return of the Reasons Fundamentalists 
Although there seem to be requirements of structural rationality—wide-scope prohibitions 
on our combinations of attitudes—we have little idea where they come from, what binds 
them together as members of a single domain of principles, or in virtue of what we are 
required to comply with their dictates. In Chapter 4, I will begin building an account of 
rationality which is intended to answer these questions. 
  Before moving on to the constructive half of this project, however, I will first take a 
deeper look at the reasons-based views that got us into this trouble in the first place. In 
Chapter 1, we saw that the requirements of structural rationality cannot be explained by 
appealing to our reasons for having our attitudes arranged only in certain ways. But some 
contemporary normative theorists—the reasons fundamentalists—propose that any 
normative requirement must be normative simply in virtue of the reasons we have for 
complying with it. Given the fact that we have no general reasons to comply with the 
requirements of rationality, these reasons fundamentalists deny that there are normative 
requirements of structural rationality at all.  
  While the reasons fundamentalists are free to deny the existence of the requirements 
of rationality, this denial comes at a cost. They cannot completely ignore the starting-point 
judgments that put this project, and many others, in motion. If the reasons fundamentalists 
wish to reject the requirements of structural rationality, they must also offer an explanation 
of why we possess these (allegedly mistaken) judgments about rationality. Unsurprisingly, a 
number of reasons fundamentalists have done precisely this, by constructing reasons-based 
error theories of structural rationality. This chapter is dedicated to exploring the plausibility  
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of these error-theoretic efforts. 
  In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I will sketch and discuss two related versions of the reasons-
based error theory: the original error theory offered by Joseph Raz, and the new error theory 
developed by Niko Kolodny. In Sections 3.4, I will construct an example that I will use to 
illustrate a network of problems facing the error theories. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6, I explore 
those problems and a number of potential error-theoretic responses. Ultimately, I will argue 
that the reasons-based error theorist is left with a choice between (a) leaving unexplained 
some of our most basic intuitions about rationality and (b) abandoning the error theory by 
accepting at least one reasons-independent normative requirement. 
 
3.2 – The Early Razian Error Theory 
In a pair of seminal articles on instrumental rationality, Joseph Raz proposes that there are 
not any normative requirements of rationality at all. Raz, one of the earliest proponents of 
reasons fundamentalism, does not deny the intuitive appearance of requirements of 
rationality. But he believes that we can make sense of our judgments about rationality 
without accepting that there are any genuine, normative requirements. Raz’s illuminating 
(though sometimes cryptic) work set the agenda for constructing a reasons-based error 
theory of structural rationality. 
The crux of Raz’s view comes in the following passage: 
The fallacy to avoid is the thought that irrationality […] occurs only if one fails 
to conform to a reason […].  It can consist in faulty functioning, that is in ways 
of thinking and of forming beliefs or intentions, and so on, which do not 
conform to standards of rationality.
39 
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39 Raz (2005a), p. 15.  
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One might wonder what Raz means by “faulty functioning,” as there are many ways in 
which an agent might be said to function poorly. But Raz has in mind a very specific form of 
faulty functioning. Speaking to the issue of so-called instrumental irrationality (which I have 
been referring to primarily as “means-end incoherence”), Raz says that irrationality consists 
in a “malfunctioning of our capacity to react properly to perceived reasons that manifests 
itself in failure to pursue [the believed] available means to our ends.”
40 In other words, Raz 
tells us that instrumental irrationality is simply a failure of enkrasia.  
Although Raz’s comments are directed to the phenomenon of means-end 
incoherence, some writers have understood Raz to be offering a fully general proposal about 
rationality. And regardless of Raz’s intentions, the proposal certainly can be generalized. 
Inspired by Raz’s work, Niko Kolodny has offered one such explicitly generalized account. 
In “Why Be Rational?” Kolodny proposes that every putative requirement of rationality 
could be derived from a pair of “core” requirements, each demanding that we respond 
appropriately to our perceived reasons, by having every attitude we take ourselves to have 
decisive reason to hold and by having no attitude we see ourselves as having insufficient 
reason to hold.
41 If Kolodny is right, then all of rationality is rooted in the requirements of 
enkrasia. 
I first introduced this proposal in Chapter 2, within the context of assessing whether 
there might be some requirements of procedural rationality. I have argued that we should 
not see the requirements of enkrasia as procedural requirements, but instead as wide-scope 
requirements of structural rationality. For the purposes of this chapter, that debate is largely 
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40 Ibid. 
 
41 Scanlon offers a similar proposal in Scanlon 2007.  
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irrelevant. And, in fact, as we will see, Kolodny’s new version of the error theory is 
specifically focused on explaining away the requirements of structural rationality, rather than 
providing an account of procedural rationality. So I will say nothing more about the 
state/process debate. 
As I indicated at the beginning of this section, these Razian views about rationality 
are error theories. What I mean by this is that these accounts propose that there are no 
legitimate (i.e., normative) requirements of rationality at all, while at the same time seeking to 
make sense of and explain away our preexisting judgments about rationality. It may not be 
immediately obvious why these views should count as error theories, given that they appear 
to put forward a positive account concerning the foundations of rationality (in enkrasia). 
Raz and Kolodny do not believe that there are any normative rational requirements, 
including the requirements of enkrasia. While Raz and Kolodny have the ambition of 
showing that every apparent rational failure is an enkratic failure, they also hope to show that 
enkratic failures are themselves but apparent failures, rather than genuine normative failures. 
How we are to understand the merely apparent normativity of enkrasia is a topic that I will 
save until Section 3.6. For now, I am merely flagging this important aspect of the error 
theory.  
Setting aside questions about rationality’s normativity, I will for the moment focus 
on rationality’s content. In order for the Razian error theory to succeed, it must successfully 
account for all of our central intuitions about rationality and irrationality. And in order to do 
this, it must show that every standard requirement of structural rationality—those like IC, 
BC, and ME—can be derived from the demands of enkrasia. As it so happens, this is an 
extremely challenging problem for the error theory. 
Some cases of structural irrationality do seem to involve enkratic failure. Suppose,  
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for example, that you intend to make dinner for your partner who will be returning home 
from abroad this evening. You know that you will succeed in making the meal only if you get 
off the couch right now and head to the grocery store immediately. But without abandoning 
your intention to make dinner, you have and form no intention to get off the couch to go to 
the store, instead opting to watch another episode of your favorite television show. At first 
blush, we would be inclined to appeal to ME to explain your irrationality. But the Razian 
error theorist will insist that your failure is in fact an enkratic failure: you are failing to have 
the attitudes deemed appropriate by your perceived reasons. In the case at hand, this is quite 
plausible. Perhaps you intend to make dinner for your spouse because you view yourself as 
having decisive reason to do so. Accordingly, we can imagine, you view yourself as having 
decisive reasons to take the necessary means (i.e., get off the couch and go to the store) in 
order to realize your end (i.e., making the meal). So when you lack an intention to get off the 
couch, you are lacking an attitude which you see as demanded by your reasons. As such, your 
means-end incoherence can be categorized as an enkratic failure. We do not need to appeal 
to ME in order to explain what is going wrong with you, as we can appeal directly to the 
demands of enkrasia. 
While it is easy to imagine cases which are accommodated by the error theory, it is 
deeply implausible that the requirements of enkrasia can be used to completely discard every 
other requirement of structural rationality. Cases of means-end incoherence need not exhibit 
the simple structure displayed in the example of the last paragraph. For example, an agent 
may intend to realize an end for which she sees herself as having merely sufficient reason. In 
such a case, the agent may also view herself as having merely sufficient reason to pursue the 
necessary means. As such, if she fails to intend the (believed) necessary means, she will 
merely be lacking an intention for which she views herself as having sufficient reason. But  
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enkrasia does not demand that we hold every attitude for which we see ourselves as having 
sufficient reason. So while the agent in question will be means-end incoherent, we will not be 
able to explain what is wrong with her by appealing only to enkrasia. While some cases of 
instrumental irrationality involve enkratic failure, some may not. This means that we cannot 
so quickly discard ME. 
Other forms of structural irrationality are also difficult for the Razian error theory to 
explain. Kolodny admits as much at the end of “Why Be Rational?” He writes: 
[T]he requirement to intend the apparent means if one intends the end, does not 
seem to have the form of either of the core requirements. […] Likewise, rational 
requirements to have logically consistent beliefs do not seem reducible to the 
core requirements. After all, one is rationally required to hold logically consistent 
beliefs, no matter what their subject matter: that is, whether or not they are 
beliefs about reasons for attitudes.
42 
Despite this worrisome acknowledgment, Kolodny ends his paper on a hopeful note: he 
suggests that, despite appearances, every requirement of rationality may be derivable from 
his core requirements. But no such comprehensive derivation scheme has been forthcoming, 
and I am inclined to believe that the prospects are bleak.
43 
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42 Kolodny 2005, pp. 559-560. 
 
43 In this chapter, and in the rest of this project, I will be ignoring a range of views which 
have a great deal in common with the reasons-based error theories of Raz and Kolodny. According 
to these other views, which we might called subjective-reasons theories of rationality, rationality is (in whole 
or in part) a matter of responding appropriately to our “subjective reasons.” Views of this form have 
been developed in Schroeder 2009 and Parfit 2011a. 
  At first glance, a subjective-reasons view may look identical to the early Razian error theory, 
because to say that (A) one is rationality required to respond appropriately to one’s perceived reasons may seem to 
amount to the same thing as saying that (B) one is rationally required to do what one’s subjective reasons 
require. But there may be an important difference, depending on how we analyze the notion of a 
subjective reason. If we say that one has subjective reason to X just in case one believes that one has 
! 
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3.3 – Kolodny’s New Error Theory 
The failure of the basic Razian account is not the end of the road for the reasons 
fundamentalist error theories. More recently, Kolodny has gone to great lengths to provide 
an error theory with more explanatory power than the old Razian account.
44 Though 
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reason to X, then the subjective-reasons account may be identical to the Razian error theory. But the 
notion of a subjective reason could be defined more broadly. We might say, for example, that one 
has subjective reason to X just in case one has beliefs whose truth would make it that case that one 
(in fact) has reason to X. This would allow one might have subjective reason to X while having no 
beliefs at all about one’s reasons for X-ing. (For example, one might believe that it is raining outside, 
even though it is not raining outside. In such a case, on this broad account of subjective reasons, one 
would have a subjective reason to take an umbrella when leaving the house, even if one has no beliefs 
about having a reason to take an umbrella, simply because one would have a reason to take an 
umbrella if one’s belief about the rain were true.) How much overlap there is between the enkrasia-
grounded Razian error theory and the subjective-reasons theory depends on how the notion of a 
subjective reason is unpacked. 
  I am ignoring these subjective-reasons theories of rationality because they are less plausible 
and less well-developed than the error theories I am discussing in this chapter. In Parfit 2011a, Parfit 
is agnostic about whether the entirety the rational domain can be explained by a subjective-reasons 
view or whether there may be completely independent requirements of rationality. See p. 36 and pp. 
118-125 of Parfit 2011a. Schroeder has developed his account only with respect to means-end 
coherence, and it is doubtful that it could be extended to account for every requirement of 
rationality. (Although, the introduction to Schroeder’s forthcoming paper entitled “What Makes 
Reasons Sufficient?” suggests that Schroeder may hold such a view.) Additionally, the arguments I 
press against Raz and Kolodny in this chapter are equally applicable to subjective-reasons theories. 
One might ask whether subjective-reasons theories are error theories. This is an interesting 
issue and one that I cannot settle here. The short answer is that it is possible to be a subjective-
reasons theorist who is a realist about rational requirements and also possible to be a subjective-
reasons theorist who is an error theorist about rational requirements. 
 
44 See especially Kolodny 2008a and Kolodny 2008b. In this section, I am aiming to 
condense Kolodny’s extremely complicated arguments into a more concise and palatable form.   
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Kolodny’s arguments are richer and more complex than I can do justice to in a short space, I 
will try to provide a sketch that brings out its most salient details. 
Kolodny’s new error theory does not attempt to show that every failure of structural 
rationality involves an enkratic failure. In fact, the core of the new error theory has nothing 
to do with responsiveness to perceived reasons. Instead, Kolodny argues that whenever a 
person is in a position that we normally associate with the violation of a structural 
requirement, they are in fact failing to respond appropriately some of their actual reasons. At 
first glance, this is bound to look like a version of the naïve reasons-based view rejected in 
Chapter 1. But Kolodny’s suggestion is not that we have decisive reasons to hold our 
attitudes only in certain kinds of combinations. Instead, Kolodny proposes that when people 
have certain combinations of attitudes (i.e., those we normally associate with structural 
irrationality), they are in a position which guarantees that they are failing to comply with 
some demand of their reasons which itself has nothing to do with attitude arrangement.  
Some care is required to explain why Kolodny’s new view is distinct from the naïve 
view. According to the naïve reasons-based view rejected in Chapter 1, structural irrationality 
is a matter of failing to respond to our wide-scope reasons to have (or not have) a particular 
arrangement of attitudes. On the naïve view, there are normative principles which say, 
roughly, that you have decisive reason not to [attitude A, attitude B, attitude C …]. This naïve view is 
a realist view about structural rationality, because it proposes that there are legitimate, wide-
scope, reasons-based requirements on our combinations of attitudes. According to 
Kolodny’s new error theory, there are no such wide-scope requirements. Instead, Kolodny 
proposes that instances of apparent structural irrationality can be explained away by 
appealing to two basic demands of our reasons: to only hold attitudes for which we have 
sufficient reason and to hold every attitude for which we have decisive reason. Kolodny  
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argues that agents we would normally interpret as structurally irrational are in fact having a 
non-structural problem, as there is bound to be some specific spot within their set of 
attitudes where they are going wrong with respect to their reasons.  
Kolodny’s view is an error theory because it denies that there are any structural 
requirements per se—there are, on this view, only the typical demands of our reasons, and it 
just so happens that agents with certain combinations of attitudes are bound to fail with 
respect to their reasons. If Kolodny is correct, then I moved too quickly in Chapter 1 when I 
inferred from cases like (1), (2), and (3) that there are wide-scope state requirements of 
rationality. The new error theory tells us that what we should take away from those examples 
is that such agents are bound to be making a mistake somewhere within their attitudes, 
rather than that their mistake resides in the combination of attitudes as such. 
To make Kolodny’s new theory more tractable, consider a familiar putative 
requirement of rationality: the requirement of consistency in intention (IC). I have proposed 
that there is a requirement of rationality demanding that you not [intend to X, intend to Y, 
and believe that you cannot both X and Y]. If the error theory is correct, then whenever you 
have the relevant combination of attitudes, you will have gone wrong with respect to your 
reasons for some particular attitude or attitudes within the set. Kolodny considers a number 
of potential explanations concerning where you might have gone wrong. For expository 
purposes, I will consider only one very straightforward potential explanation.  
Suppose that whenever one intends to X, one also thereby believes that one will X—
that an intention comes bundled with a belief about its own success.
45 This is a contentious 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 This claim about intention has been defended, in various forms, in Harman 1976, Wallace 
2001, Setiya 2007, and elsewhere. It is worth noting that these writers have tried to use this claim to 
ground requirements of practical rationality in requirements of epistemic rationality. In short, so-
! 
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assumption, but for present purposes we can suppose that it is true. If this is so, then 
whenever one intends to X, intends to Y, and believes that one cannot both X and Y, one 
thereby believes that one will X, believes that one will Y, and believes that one cannot both 
X and Y.  These three beliefs have logically incompatible contents. Now (an additional 
assumption) suppose that it is not possible to jointly have sufficient reason to believe P, Q, 
and (P → -Q). This is a plausible claim, since evidence in favor of P is, on its face, evidence 
against Q, if (P → -Q) is true. If this is all correct, then it is clear why inconsistency in 
intention involves a failure of compliance with your reasons: if you intend to X, intend to Y, 
and believe that you cannot both X and Y, then you will have at least one belief for which 
you lack sufficient reason. The normative failure of the agent who suffers from inconsistency 
intention is simply that she has at least one belief that is unsupported by her reasons. In this 
explanation, the putative structural requirement (IC) becomes unnecessary baggage that we 
can jettison. And, of course, the same explanation could be used for requirements 
concerning consistency in belief (such as BC). 
I provide this sample explanation only to illustrate the mechanics of the new error 
theory. I am not supposing that the explanation just canvassed makes the most persuasive 
case possible. This explanation relies on controversial theses about the epistemic 
concomitants of intention and the possible relationships between epistemic reasons. 
Kolodny realizes that the argument is contentious. In light of this, Kolodny provides a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
called “cognitivists” about practical rationality hold that instances of practical inconsistency or 
incoherence necessarily involve doxastic inconsistency or incoherence. These proposals have received 
a great deal of attention, but I am not persuaded that they are particularly plausible. Even if we were 
to grant that practical rational failures are undergirded by epistemic rational failures (which, I think, is 
unlikely), the cognitivist would have to provide an explanation of the normativity of epistemic 
rationality.  
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second potential route to the conclusion that inconsistency in intention involves failing to 
respond to the demands of our reasons. This alternative explanation is much more 
complicated than the first, and the costs of exploring it far outweigh the benefits. I do not 
want to dwell here on whether Kolodny can provide us with an error-theoretic derivation of 
every structural requirement. Kolodny has dedicated a number of articles to this endeavor, 
and while I have some doubts about the success of the project, I think that it would be a 
mistake to focus my attention on this part of the theory. Plugging through a series of 
counterexamples to Kolodny’s proposed derivations would not demonstrate any deep, 
principled problem with the theory. 
In this section, I have aimed only to explain how Kolodny’s new error theory is 
intended to work. For the purposes of this chapter, I am content to suppose that the new 
error theory could locate a narrow-scope, reasons-relative failure in any agent who possesses 
a combination of attitudes that we would customarily associate with structural irrationality. I 
believe that even if the error theory were to succeed in this respect, it would still face serious 
problems. In Sections 3.6 and 3.7, I will focus on a pair of problems that together cast 
considerable doubt on the project’s fundamentals. In order to pave the way for these 
objections, I must do some set-up work in Section 3.4. 
 
3.4 – The Mary-Mary* Case 
As I have just explained, the new error theory proposes that the normative failure in a case 
of apparent structural irrationality is in fact a failure to do what is required by some non-
structural requirement of reason (such as the requirement to not hold beliefs for which one 
has insufficient reason). But there are counterexamples that cast doubt on the plausibility of 
this explanatory strategy. Specifically, there are cases in which an agent’s combination of  
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attitudes seems to make her do better than her peers in a certain respect, even though she is 
blatantly doing a worse job of responding to the requirements of her reasons. Cases like 
these suggest that a wholly reasons-based account is missing something. 
Consider two agents, Mary and Mary*, who are found in nearly identical physical and 
psychological circumstances, in qualitatively identical though separate universes. Mary and 
Mary* are each aboard a sinking ship in the middle of the ocean, scrambling to find a way to 
save themselves and the other people aboard. Mary and Mary* are aware of two potential 
courses of action, each of which seems extremely important: first, a flare can be shot into the 
sky which would alert passing vessels to their distress; second, an emergency raft can be 
lowered into the ocean so that passengers can begin to leave the sinking ship. However, 
Mary and Mary* each firmly believe that it is impossible to both fire a flare into the sky and 
release the emergency raft into the water. As far as each believes, their ship will be 
completely submerged in less than a minute, and there is simply no time to both fire a flare 
into the sky and release the emergency raft. Mary and Mary* believe that the flares are stored 
on the west-facing end of the ship, that the emergency raft is located on the east-facing end 
of the ship, and that accomplishing either task will take the entire amount of time remaining 
before their ship has gone underwater. Mary and Mary* see themselves presented with two 
extremely important though mutually unrealizable ends. 
In fact, Mary and Mary* are mistaken: it is possible to fire a flare into the sky and 
release the emergency raft into the water. Immediately next to the crank that lowers the 
emergency raft on the east end of the ship, there is a button that automatically discharges the 
flare cannon located on the west end of the ship. Mary and Mary* were told about this 
button multiple times during their safety lessons, and they even recently passed tests 
demonstrating that they had internalized the information about the flare-button’s placement.  
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Even more, there are signs strategically positioned around the ship that expressly state the 
button’s placement next to the escape raft’s crank. But Mary and Mary*, due to some 
combination of stress, forgetfulness, and inattentiveness, falsely and unjustifiably believe that 
the two compatible ends are mutually unrealizable. Not only are these ends compatible, but 
they are both ends which the Marys have decisive reason to pursue. In this situation, Mary 
and Mary* each have decisive reason to intend to fire a flare into the sky and decisive reason 
to intend to lower the emergency raft into the water, although they each believe that doing 
both is impossible.  
As described so far, Mary and Mary* are in identical circumstances. But now I will 
amend the story to add one crucial difference between the two agents. Suppose that Mary, in 
believing that the two ends are incompatible, holds only one relevant intention: she intends 
to lower the raft into the water. (She figures that it is better to be stranded on an emergency 
raft without having alerted anyone than to successfully alert passing ships but drown before 
they arrive.) But Mary*’s attitudinal situation is different. Mary* both intends to fire a flare 
into the sky and intends to lower the raft into the water, despite her belief in the 
impossibility of doing both things together. In short, Mary* possesses a combination of 
attitudes that we would normally associate with structural irrationality, while Mary does not. 
In light of Kolodny’s error theory of structural rationality, what can we say about the 
normative circumstances of Mary and Mary*? First, consider Mary*. Mary* possesses a 
combination of attitudes which we would normally associate with structural irrationality: she 
has two intentions which she believes are incompatible. According to Kolodny’s error 
theory, Mary*’s mistake does not reside in her harboring a rationally impermissible 
combination of attitudes, for there are no such impermissible combinations. If the error 
theory is correct, then it must be that Mary* is not doing right by all of her reasons. And,  
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indeed, we are able to find the kind of mistake that Kolodny’s theory anticipates: Mary* has 
a belief for which she has insufficient reason. As explained above, Mary* has a false and 
unjustified belief in the incompatibility of firing the flare and lowering the raft. Otherwise, 
Mary* is doing quite well by her reasons; after all, she has the two intentions which she has 
decisive reason to hold.  
This may sound fine so far, but the error-theoretic explanation of Mary*’s situation 
looks a bit strange when viewed alongside an analysis of Mary’s. Like Mary*, Mary has a false 
and unjustified belief in the incompatibility of the two relevant actions. Although Mary is not 
exhibiting the kind of attitudinal arrangement that we would normally associate with 
structural irrationality, she is making the same mistake which the error theory finds in the 
structurally irrational agent. Moreover, Mary is making an additional normative mistake: she 
is failing to hold an intention (to fire a flare into the sky) for which she has decisive reason. It 
seems, then, that Mary is doing doubly bad by her reasons: first, she has a belief for which 
she lacks sufficient reason; second, she lacks an intention for which she has decisive reason. 
Mary is normatively worse-off than Mary*, as Mary* is only failing in one respect. 
This is a bizarre result. If we only look at their reasons—which the new error theory 
would have us do—then it is correct to say that Mary is doing worse than Mary*. But what 
this case reveals is that there is something important about these agents’ normative 
circumstances which is not captured by a wholly reasons-focused analysis. It seems 
undeniable that Mary* is making a mistake that Mary is not making. Specifically, Mary* 
seems to be making the mistake of holding intentions despite her belief in their inconsistency. 
Although Mary is flouting reasons that Mary* is not, at least Mary is not making this other 
mistake. We might say “At least Mary is not being irrational.” This indicates that there is 
something independently deficient about the structural arrangement of Mary*’s attitudes. It  
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is not enough that the new error theory can find a problem in Mary*’s case: it must be able 
to find the right problem. And Mary’s* problem, intuitively, is not simply a failure of 
responding to reasons.  
 
3.5 – Enkrasia and the New Error Theory 
The error theory does not lack the resources to provide a more complete analysis of the 
Mary-Mary* case. Kolodny is aware of the kind of issue I am raising, and he believes that the 
new error theory can accommodate the phenomenon I am gesturing toward.
46 The proposed 
solution is to appeal to the intuitively plausible idea, outlined in Section 3.2, that rationality 
demands enkrasia—that we are required to respond appropriately to our perceived reasons. 
While Raz and Kolodny originally thought to build an account of rationality entirely on the 
basis of enkratic principles, Kolodny’s newer strategy is to use this idea only as a supplement. 
This is a more plausible place for enkratic requirements, as it requires them to do 
considerably less work in the error theory. Instead of expecting enkrasia to hold the whole 
weight of the error theory, it is only needed to do some mop-up work. 
  According to the augmented version of Kolodny’s new error theory, someone like 
Mary does well (in a way that Mary* does not) by responding appropriately to her perceived 
reasons. We can imagine that Mary, in believing (falsely) that the two intentions could not be 
mutually realized, thereby judges that she has insufficient reason to hold the two intentions 
together. Mary might think: “I’ll never have a time to do both, and so it would be absolutely 
dangerous and wrong of me to try!” Suppose that this is why Mary holds only one of the two 
intentions. Although Mary’s judgment about her reasons is incorrect, she is responding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Kolodny 2008a, pp. 32-33.  
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appropriately to the reasons she believes apply to her. Assuming that Mary* has the same 
judgment about her reasons, she is being insensitive to those perceived reasons when she 
nevertheless intends to fire the flare and intends to lower the raft. This is the spot where 
Mary* is failing and Mary is succeeding. 
This addition to Kolodny’s new error theory leaves the core of the theory in place, 
but adds a second device: while some of our intuitions about structural rationality are 
explained away by the insight about failing to respond to actual (narrow-scope) requirements 
of reasons, other intuitions are explained away by appealing to the demands of enkrasia. In 
light of this amendment, we can now summarize the normative circumstances of Mary and 
Mary* as follows: Mary and Mary* each have a belief for which they lack sufficient reason 
(i.e., in the incompatibility of the two relevant actions); Mary, but not Mary*, fails to have an 
intention for which she has decisive reason (i.e., the intention to fire a flare); Mary*, but not 
Mary, fails to respond appropriately to her perceived reasons (i.e., by having the pair of 
intentions despite her judgment). Mary and Mary* each get something right that the other 
does not. The amendment to the new error theory promises not only to find a problem in 
Mary*, but also the right kind of problem. 
The Mary-Mary* case is a helpful device for illustrating the two-part mechanics of 
the new error theory. And looking at this case places us in a good position to begin revealing 
the account’s inadequacies. Before moving on to examine the most pressing challenge facing 
the error theory in Section 3.6, I would like to briefly highlight one problem with Kolodny’s 
new account that results from the diminished but important role it gives to enkrasia. 
  Recall that the content problem of structural rationality demands that we explain 
what makes a rational requirement count as a rational requirement (rather than a member of 
some other domain) or, to put the point another way, what unifies rationality as a set of  
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requirements. Of course, the error theorist will reply that rationality has no content and that 
the set of normative rational requirements is empty. There is, if we take the error theorist at 
her word, nothing to unify. But the error theorist nevertheless owes us an explanation of 
why it seems to us that rationality is a unified subject matter. 
  On its face, the original error theory of Raz 2005a and Kolodny 2005 offers an 
attractive and persuasive account of rationality’s apparent unity. According to the old error 
theory, every requirement of rationality is grounded in the fundamental demand that we 
respond appropriately to our perceived reasons. If the original error theory’s derivation 
scheme were successful, then this would explain why rationality appears to be a unified 
subject matter: disparate cases of apparent structural rationality appear unified to us because 
every irrational agent is, in fact, failing to respond appropriately to her perceived reasons. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that it is implausible that every violation of a rational requirement 
involves a failing of enkrasia. So rationality cannot be unified in this neat and tidy way. 
  The two-part mechanics of Kolodny’s new error theory are superior in that they 
promise to locate a problem in every problem-case: every agent who seems to be suffering 
from irrationality has her irrationality accounted for within the two-part system. But this 
extensional success comes at the cost of destroying the unity of the original error theory. If 
the new error theory were correct, then in some cases, an agent with such-and-such an 
arrangement of attitudes will seem irrational to us in virtue of her response-failure to actual 
reasons; in other cases, an agent with such-and-such an arrangement of attitudes will seem 
irrational to us in virtue of her response-failure to her perceived reasons. But it is not clear to 
me that this kind of explanation is faithful to our intuitions about rationality. Our intuitions 
about rationality do not have this bipartite structure. The requirements of enkrasia seem 
closely connected to other requirements of rationality, just as requirements concerning  
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consistency in belief seem connected to requirements concerning means-end coherence. The 
new error theory cannot easily accommodate the fact that our judgments about rationality 
suggest that rationality is unified. 
  This observation is suggestive rather than decisive, and so I do not want to make too 
much hang on this point. If the new error theory were otherwise successful, perhaps its 
fragmented mechanics would not be a strong reason to discount it.  
 
3.6 – The Normativity of Enkratic Requirements and the Normativity of Rationality 
I now turn to the most pressing problem facing the error theories, both new and old: the 
normative status of enkratic requirements. As we have seen, both the old Razian error theory 
and Kolodny’s new error theory rely crucially on requirements demanding that we respond 
appropriately to our perceived reasons. Enkratic requirements seem to have all of the 
markings of standard requirements of structural rationality: they demand that we not have 
particular combinations of attitudes. While an error theory is free to appeal to these 
requirements, doing so creates a new explanatory burden. An error theory cannot explain 
away some structural requirements by appealing to other structural requirements, unless it is 
prepared to also explain the status of these other structural requirements.  
Of course, Raz and Kolodny want deny that the requirements of enkrasia are 
legitimate normative requirements. They will hope to persuade us that the requirements of 
enkrasia are themselves but apparent requirements, which can be explained away like all 
other requirements of structural rationality. The question is whether either account has the 
resources to discharge any commitment to legitimate requirements of enkrasia. 
  It is worth making the obvious point that new error theory’s primary method of 
explaining away structural requirements is ineffective in the case of enkratic requirements. It  
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is false that whenever one goes wrong by one’s perceived reasons one is thereby failing to 
conform to some of one’s actual reasons. Consider an agent who falsely—but on the basis of 
compelling evidence—believes that she has decisive reason to intend to X, while at the same 
time she does not intend to X. This agent need not be lacking any attitude for which she has 
decisive reason, as she may have no reason at all to X (or intend to X). And it may be that 
the agent does not hold any attitude for which she has insufficient reason, as the available 
evidence may strongly (though misleadingly) support her belief that she should intend to X. 
So the requirements of enkrasia cannot be subjected to the new error-theoretic explanation 
that Kolodny favors. This means that the old error theory and Kolodny’s new error theory 
are in the same spot with respect to the requirements of enkrasia.  
The going error-theoretic strategy is to suggest that the explanatory burden is much 
lower in the case of enkratic requirements than for other requirements of rationality. In the 
case of some structural requirements, it has proven to be quite complicated to explain why 
we believe that we are bound by these requirements even though they do not exist. But the 
error theorist argues that enkratic requirements are different—that there is no puzzle about 
why it seems to us that we are bound to comply with the demands of our reasons.  “Why 
does it seem to you that you are required to do that which it seems to you that you are 
required to do?” is barely intelligible as a question. Of course it will seem to you that you are 
required to comply with your reasons! This is thought behind the so-called transparency account 
first proposed in Kolodny 2005.
47 
We can return to the Mary-Mary* case to illustrate the idea. When Mary* fails to 
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47 See, also, Kolodny 2008a and Kolodny 2008b. In both articles, Kolodny reinforces that enkratic 
requirements must be understood as mere seeming requirements, rather than actual, normative 
requirements.  
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comply with her judgments about her reasons—by simultaneously intending to fire the flare 
and lower the raft, despite her belief that her reasons require her not to pursue both courses 
of action at the same time—it will seem to her, first-personally, that she is doing something 
wrong. By Mary*’s own lights, her simultaneous pursuit of both ends will seem like a 
dangerous mistake. And, indeed, this is all that a failure of enkrasia amounts to; a failure with 
respect to one’s normative judgment just is a failure by one’s own lights. So when we assess 
Mary’s and Mary*’s normative circumstances, and we judge that Mary* is making a mistake 
that Mary is not making, the error theorist will suggest that we are only noticing that Mary* 
is making a mistake by her own lights. If this is so then (so goes the theory), we do not need 
to appeal to a full-blown, normative requirement of rationality governing enkrasia. On this 
way of thinking, the requirements of enkrasia are themselves but apparent requirements, the 
apparent force of which is provided by our apparent reasons. 
This is what the error theorist would have us believe, but the story elides an 
important feature of the phenomenon of enkratic failure. It is true, of course, that Mary* is 
making a mistake by her own lights. And, first-personally, in the heat of the moment, it may 
be this perception of substantive error (e.g., “I know I shouldn’t be trying to do both of 
these things!”) which dominates Mary*’s mental experience. But this observation should not 
distract us from the fact that Mary* is, in addition to making a mistake by her own lights, 
making an actual mistake. Mary*’s actual mistake is the mistake of making-a-mistake-by-her-
own-lights. This may sound silly, but it is an important point: a failure to do right by one’s 
own lights is a failure of the not-just-by-one’s-own-lights variety. The driving intuition 
behind the Mary-Mary* case is precisely that it is an objective rational failing to not do what 
one believes one’s reasons demand. 
The error theorist directs our attention to the idea that, first-personally, it is easy to  
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explain why we feel bound to comply with our perceived reasons. This slight-of-hand 
maneuver masks the fact that, third-personally, we routinely assess other agents as bound to 
comply with the reasons they take themselves to have.
48 But it also ignores the complexities 
of our self-evaluations. Suppose that I believe that I have overwhelmingly strong reason to 
stop eating boxes of donuts before bed, but that I nevertheless persist in eating them each 
night. As I set out toward the kitchen for tonight’s treat, I might think “I am such a failure 
for eating another donut,” where my focus is on the substantive mistake of eating another 
donut. At the same time, however, I might also think “I am such a failure for eating another 
donut even while I know I shouldn’t,” where my focus is on the structural mistake of failing to 
comply with my own normative judgments. If an omniscient dietician appears and informs 
me that (contrary to all our worldly evidence), eating donuts before bed is the secret to 
human health, she will ease my guilt about only one of my two failures. Even from the first-
person perspective, the demands of my reasons are separable from the demands of enkrasia.   
The Mary-Mary* case initially seemed problematic for the error theorist because it 
seemed to reveal that although the error theory could account for a problem in Mary*’s case, 
it could not account for the right problem. The error theory’s appeal to requirements of 
enkrasia was intended to patch up this hole in the account. This left the error theory saddled 
with a new set of structural requirements which demand explanation. An error-theoretic 
account of enkratic requirements may be possible, but the strategy just explored is not a 
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48 Kolodny’s transparency account provides an attempted explanation of our third-personal 
judgments about others who violate enkratic requirements. According to this view, if I see an agent 
failing to intend to X despite her belief that she has decisive reason to intend to X, my critical 
appraisal would be limited to the judgment that she should, by her own lights, intend to X, and that 
she will be making a mistake, by her own lights, unless she does so. My contention is that this 
strategy only captures a piece of our common-sense thinking about enkratic failures.  
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winning one. We cannot appeal to enkratic requirements to do work which the error theory 
could not otherwise do and then declare that they are nothing but illusions provided by the 
nature of first-person deliberation.  
The error theorist will be forced to cede some ground here. He may admit that there 
are requirements of enkrasia, but while denying their normative significance. To make this 
move the error theorist could  appeal to a distinction first noted by John Broome (albeit, for 
very different purposes). Broome draws our attention to the fact that we use the word 
“requirement” in at least two different senses. He distinguishes “property requirements” 
from “source requirements.”
49 A source requirement is a requirement which makes an active 
demand on one’s conduct or behavior, and whose authority derives from some source. 
Moral requirements and legal requirements are, arguably, examples of source requirements. 
And these requirements are legitimate, robustly normative requirements of the sort that I 
have been analyzing throughout this project. Property requirements, on the other hand, are 
merely conditions which an individual must satisfy in order to have a specified property. The 
requirements of smugness or beauty are, arguably, mere property requirements. There is no 
denying that there are requirements of smugness and beauty: we often make statements like 
“smugness requires a feeling of self-satisfaction” and “beauty requires gracefulness.” But in 
saying such things we do not commit ourselves to the idea that certain sources—Smugness 
and Beauty—place demands on our conduct. We do not think that the requirements of 
smugness or beauty call on us to be or act a certain way. In other words, the requirements of 
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49 See Broome 2013, Chapter 5. 
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smugness and beauty are not normative requirements.
50 
The error theorist could attempt to use this distinction to insulate his appeal to 
enkratic requirements. The error theorist may conceive of rationality (or this part of 
rationality) in purely definitional or descriptive terms. It may be that an agent who violates 
the (property) requirements of enkrasia is simply failing to instantiate the property of 
rationality, much the same way that the ugly person fails to instantiate the property of 
beauty. And this could simply mean that she is not functioning in the way that agents 
typically function qua rational agent (i.e., by responding to their own normative judgments). 
The error theorist may admit that it is a central part of being a rational agent that one 
responds to one’s judgments about one’s reasons, without thereby accepting that there are 
normative requirements demanding that we do so. 
I suspect that some version of this thought is operating in the background of Raz’s 
seminal articles on instrumental rationality. While Raz freely writes of agents’ rationality and 
irrationality, and of the poor functioning exhibited by irrational agents, he avoids saying that 
there are any requirements of rationality. Raz’s choice to treat rationality solely in property 
terms is rhetorically wise, as it avoids raising questions about the source and normativity of 
these requirements. Raz is happy for us to see rationality (i.e., responsiveness to perceived 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 In many cases, property requirements correspond to source requirements in that you can only have 
a specified property if you satisfy a certain range of source requirements. For example, you can only 
have the property of being moral if you satisfy the (source) requirements of morality. While every set 
of source requirements corresponds to a potential property (which one might have in virtue of 
satisfying the source requirements), not every property requirement corresponds to a set of source 
requirements. For example, although there are property requirements of smugness (i.e., conditions 
that must be met in order to have the property of being smug) there are no source requirements of 
smugness.  
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reasons) only as a property of agents, rather than as a source of binding requirements. 
Unlike Raz, Kolodny does appeal to explicitly labeled requirements governing 
enkrasia. But I suspect that he would be satisfied to conclude that these requirements are 
mere property requirements. This move would produce a somewhat messy though internally 
consistent version of the new error theory. For many apparent structural requirements (e.g., 
the requirements of belief consistency, intention consistency, means-end coherence, and so 
forth), the new error theory acknowledges that there is an underlying normative 
phenomenon at work, but explains the requirements away by a locating non-structural, 
reasons-based failing in relevantly situated agents. Then, in order to explain away our 
judgments about the distinctive rational failings of people like Mary*, the new error theory 
allows that there are independent requirements of enkrasia. But the theory asserts that 
enkratic requirements are only “requirements” in a very loose sense of the word. They are, 
according to the proposal being canvassed, mere property requirements—conditions that 
agents must satisfy in order to fully instantiate a property we call “rationality.” 
This appeal to the distinction between property and source requirements may be the 
most plausible strategy available to the error theorists, given their reliance on enkrasia. But I 
find the response deeply unsatisfying. I am sympathetic to the idea that an enkratic failure 
involves a failure to function normally or appropriately as a rational being. Indeed, it is quite 
plausible that every failing of structural rationality involves a related form of functional 
failure. As I will go on to explain in the coming chapters, I suspect of our intuitions about 
rationality and irrationality are undergirded by judgments about the standards of proper 
agential functioning. So I am not hostile to Raz’s thought that irrationality involves a 
functional deficiency. I am hostile only to the idea that we might move directly from this 
observation to the conclusion that rationality is a mere property, rather than a source of  
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normative requirements.  
We do not conceive of the irrational person as merely failing to instantiate a 
property, as we would the non-beautiful person or the non-smug person. The driving 
intuition behind the Mary-Mary* case is that Mary* is getting something interestingly wrong. 
If irrationality is a form of faulty functioning, as Raz would have us believe, then it is a form 
of faulty functioning which we ought not to exhibit. Of course, as we have seen, there are 
serious problems with interpreting the “ought” I am employing here as the familiar, reasons-
based “ought.” But I am reminding us that, intuitively, rationality is rather clearly a source of 
requirements, rather than a mere property. To do its job well, the error theory must be able 
to explain, or explain away, these central aspects of the phenomenon of irrationality. 
Categorizing certain rational requirements as mere property requirements is a bold and 
revisionary move, not an accommodation of our starting-point intuitions.  
If we arrive at a range of apparent normative requirements which the error theory 
cannot explain away, it is philosophically illicit to declare by fiat that those difficult 
requirements are simply not normative. After all, we could have jumped directly to this stage 
as soon as we noticed in Chapter 1 that we do not have any general reasons to comply with 
the requirements of structural rationality. We could have declared at the outset that all of the 
apparent requirements of structural rationality—the requirements of belief consistency, 
intention consistency, means-end coherence, enkrasia, and so forth—are but conditions that 
an agent must satisfy in order to count as a normally functioning rational being, rather than 
normative demands. Just as it would have been inappropriate to make this move at the 
beginning, it is inappropriate to make this move here. We should not so quickly conclude 
that the requirements of enkrasia, or the requirements of rationality more generally, are mere 
property requirements.  
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Of course, the error theorist has the option of offering a new error-theoretic 
explanation of enkrasia, or a different error theory of structural rationality altogether. But I 
know of no alternative approach for the reasons fundamentalist to take. So unless a new 
explanation is offered, I think we must conclude that the error theories have failed. 
 
3.7 – The Failure of the Error Theories 
I have used this chapter to see how far we can take the reasons-based error theories, but I 
must conclude that they are unsuccessful. Both Raz’s original error theory and Kolodny’s 
new error theory face an uncomfortable choice. They could simply refuse to provide us with 
a sufficient explanation of our intuitions about irrationality and enkratic failure. But this 
would be tantamount to admitting the failure of the theory. Alternatively, they could 
entertain the possibility that the principles of enkrasia are legitimate, non-reasons-based 
normative requirements. But this would involve abandoning the entire error-theoretic 
project. 
Unsurprisingly, abandoning the error theory is precisely what I think the reasons 
fundamentalist should do. As we have seen, the error theory culminates in a bald refusal to 
consider the possibility of non-reasons-based normative requirements. In the following 
chapters, I will suggest that we have good grounds for seeing the requirements of structural 
rationality as legitimate, normative requirements, even if they are not requirements with 
which we have reason to comply. My arguments will be aided by Raz’s suggestion that 
irrationality is a matter of improper functioning. 
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4 – THE POSSIBILITY OF NORMATIVE PLURALISM 
 
4.1 – Toward a New Account of Structural Rationality 
I will begin the second half of this project by recounting where we have been and outlining 
where we are headed. 
In Chapter 1, upon reflecting on our common-sense judgments about agents with 
seemingly improper sets of intentions and beliefs, I introduced the requirements of structural 
rationality: wide-scope prohibitions on some combinations of attitudes. At first blush, these 
requirements seemed almost undeniable, as they made sense of our judgments about 
rationality and irrationality. But difficulties arose when we learned that it is implausible that 
we have any sufficiently general and persistent reasons to comply with these apparent 
requirements. This finding called into question the normativity of rationality, as well as the 
unity and content of the rational domain. We were left wondering whether there could be 
any way to explain and justify the requirements that initially seemed so intuitively plausible. 
  In Chapter 2, I took a close look at Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism. Korsgaard 
offers a theory of rationality, though one that disagrees with my foundational claim that 
rational requirements are wide-scope prohibitive principles. While I argued that Korsgaard’s 
view, as stated, could not provide an account of the requirements of structural rationality, I 
harvested two important results from the discussion. First, I found that, regardless of 
whether there may be some requirements on processes of reasoning or thinking, we still 
need an account of purely structural requirements. Second, and more positively, I found that 
Korsgaard’s arguments suggest how a requirement’s normativity might not be based in any 
facts about reasons.  
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  In Chapter 3, I looked at the recent error theories of the reasons fundamentalists. 
These error theories attempt to explain away the requirements of structural rationality by 
appealing (to various degrees) to the demands of enkrasia. I found these views to be 
unsuccessful, because they are left with an uncomfortable choice between either losing their 
error-theoretic status or leaving certain core intuitions about rationality unaccounted for. At 
the same time, I registered my agreement with the idea, first explored by Raz, that 
irrationality involves a form of improper functioning as an agent. 
The rest of this project—this chapter, along with the two following—is dedicated to 
offering an account of structural rationality that explains both its content and its normativity. 
In providing this account, I will rely in various ways on the views that I have just considered 
and rejected. I will offer a (selective) synthesis of ideas from both the constitutivist and the 
reasons fundamentalist, with the goal of showing that there are, as intuition suggests, wholly 
normative requirements of rationality which take the form of wide-scope, state-based 
prohibitions on our combinations of attitudes. I will argue that while there are requirements 
whose normativity is constituted by reasons (as the reasons fundamentalist would suggest), 
there can also be non-reasons-based normative requirements, as the constitutivist has 
indicated. I will argue that the requirements of structural rationality are examples of non-
reasons-based normative requirements, and I will claim that these requirements are rooted in 
rational agents’ agential powers. 
In order to build this positive account, however, I must first attend to a central claim 
on which my proposal depends and which places me in deep disagreement with both the 
reasons fundamentalist and the constitutivist. The views I have considered so far in this 
dissertation are monist theses about normativity. According to the reasons fundamentalist, all 
normative claims ultimately bottom out in claims about reasons. And according to the  
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constitutivist, all normative claims ultimately bottom out in claims about agency. Although 
these views disagree with each other about what gives rise to and binds together the 
members of the normative domain as a whole, they agree that there is some basic normative 
commodity from which all other normative goods are derived. According to both of these 
views, there is only one ultimate source of normative requirements. 
Against these monist views, I will defend a thesis that I call normative pluralism. The 
thesis, stated concisely, says that there is more than one fundamentally distinct type of 
normative requirement or, put slightly differently, that there are legitimate requirements 
made relative to fundamentally distinct normative standards. Normative pluralism is not 
itself a view about the requirements of structural rationality, but instead a view about the 
foundations of normativity in general. One could be a normative pluralist while rejecting 
everything that I will go on to say about structural rationality. But the account of rationality 
that I favor relies on the truth of the pluralist thesis, and so I must defend the pluralist 
proposal before offering my account of structural rationality. Defending normative pluralism 
is the focus of the present chapter. 
I will defend normative pluralism by arguing that a requirement is normative for an 
agent if and only if the agent’s violation of the requirement would be a criticizable failure. 
Pluralism’s truth is secured by the fact that there are fundamentally distinct and independent 
grounds on which a lack of compliance with some putative requirement can constitute a 
failure. For instance, although some principles bind us because if we do not comply with 
them we will be failing to do what our reasons demand, other principles are binding because 
if we do not comply with them then we will be exhibiting some independent agential defect. 
There can be, I will argue, principles which it is criticizable to violate even if we have no 
independent reason to comply with their demands.  
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After I have offered my defense of normative pluralism in this chapter, I will return 
to the topic of structural rationality. In Chapter 5, I will begin to make the case that the 
requirements of structural rationality are normative because failing to comply with them is a 
criticizable agential failure. But the progress of my argument in the fifth chapter will be 
somewhat indirect. Rather than straightforwardly arguing that structural irrationality is 
criticizable on non-reasons-involving grounds, I will set out to provide a comprehensive 
characterization of the content of rationality. I will argue that the behavior we identify as 
structural irrationality always involves the same form of agential self-undermining. Although 
I cannot yet clarify exactly what this means, I will argue that every apparent requirement of 
structural rationality—IC, BC, EI, ME, and so on—is but an instance of a more general 
demand that we not undermine the success of our own beliefs and intentions. I will develop 
a principle that I will call the General Requirement of Structural Rationality, and I will propose that 
this General Requirement allows us to explain the unity of the rational domain and to 
articulate its members. In the sixth and final chapter, I will complete my account of 
rationality by reflecting on why the relevant form of attitudinal self-undermining is a 
criticizable agential failure, and I will highlight a number of questions that, though beyond 
the scope of this project, deserve further attention. 
  But in the current chapter I will pursue only the first of these goals: I will seek to 
sketch a preliminary defense of normative pluralism. In the process, I will occasionally take 
note of the requirements of structural rationality. But my focus in this chapter is on 
pluralism itself. 
 
4.2 – Defining “Normative Pluralism” 
I must begin by clarifying what I mean by “normative pluralism” before I can tell you why  
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you should find the view plausible.   
Normative discussions are discussions about what we are required to do, or, in other 
words, about what we ought to do. The words doing the normative work here are 
‘requirement’ and ‘ought.’ If there were no facts about what we ought to do, then there 
would be no normative facts at all. So I will assume that the most familiar and 
uncontroversially normative term is the term ‘ought.’ And, similarly, I will take it that the 
most familiar and uncontroversial type of normative claim is what I will call an ‘ought’-claim: 
a claim like You ought to X.
51 So I will characterize normative pluralism by looking at what it 
has to say about ‘ought’ and about ‘ought’-claims.
52 
A quick, though potentially misleading, way of characterizing normative pluralism is 
to say that, according to the pluralist view, there is more than one legitimate sense of ‘ought’ 
and more than one type of true and binding ‘ought’-claim. This is the characterization of 
normative pluralism that I offered in the introductory section of this chapter. But this way of 
putting things may be misleading because it may make normative pluralism sound like a 
position that nearly everyone already accepts. After all, it is not uncommon for normal 
people—or philosophers, anyway—to speak as if there are different kinds of ‘ought’-s. 
For example, one might say that there are legal ‘ought’-claims and moral ‘ought’-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Not all claims of the form ‘You ought to X’ are legitimately normative. Many ‘ought’-
claims which purport to be normative are not normative, because they are false. Differently, some 
claims of the form ‘You ought to X’ do not purport to be normative at all. For example, one might 
say “According to the news, it ought to rain tomorrow,” where the ‘ought’ is used in a predictive 
rather than a normative sense. I am focused only on normative (and purportedly normative) ‘ought’-
claims.   
 
52 I do not mean to suggest that ‘ought’ is the only foundational normative term or concept.  
I believe that there are other equally fundamental normative terms, such as the term ‘requirement.’  
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claims and prudential ‘ought’-claims, and so on. I ought to file my taxes by the fifteenth, and 
to say so invokes a legal sense of ‘ought’ and makes a legal ‘ought’-claim. I ought to keep my 
promise to water your plants today, and to say so invokes a moral use of ‘ought’ and makes a 
moral ‘ought’-claim. I ought to exercise tonight, and to say so is to make use of a prudential 
‘ought’ and to make a prudential ‘ought’-claim. This is not an altogether unfamiliar way of 
speaking. So it may look as though we already all agree that there is more than one sense of 
‘ought’ and more than one legitimate type of ‘ought’-claim. Despite appearances, this way of 
speaking does not involve an endorsement of normative pluralism. Once we understand 
what I mean by “type,” it will be clear these three ‘ought’-claims are most plausibly all claims 
of the same type. So I need to say more about what I mean when I say that normative 
pluralism is the view that there are ‘ought’-claims of different types. 
In the relevant sense of “type,” two ‘ought’-claims are of the same type when they 
are claims that could, in principle, conflict with each other. Two ‘ought’-claims conflict with 
each other in some circumstance if the truth of one claim (together, perhaps, with certain 
other facts) would ensure the falsity of the other claim. In other words, two ‘ought’-claims 
can conflict with each other if they may be in competition with each other for their truth. In 
the above examples—of paying taxes and fulfilling promises and exercising for one’s 
health—all of the involved ‘ought’-claims are most plausibly claims of the same type, 
because these ‘ought’-claims could conflict with each other.  
Imagine that it is late in the afternoon on the fifteenth of the month and I have only 
enough time to file my taxes, water your plants, or exercise. For the sake of argument, just 
allow that I cannot, no matter how hard I were to try, do any more than one of these three 
things tonight. In such a case, it would be unusual to hold that each of the three ‘ought’-
claims would remain true. It sounds unnatural to say that I ought to file my taxes and that I  
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ought to water your plants, even though I no longer can do both. This is because the ‘ought’-
claims conflict with each other, as either claim’s truth would guarantee each other claim’s 
falsity. Perhaps what I ought to do in these circumstances is water your plants. If this is true, 
then it is guaranteed to be false that (tonight) I ought to exercise and false that (tonight) I 
ought to file my taxes. So I believe that claims like ‘I ought to file my taxes,’ ‘I ought to water 
your plants,’ and ‘I ought to exercise’ are all ‘ought’-claims of the same type and all invoke 
the same sense of ‘ought.’ If the thesis of normative pluralism is true, then there are some 
‘ought’-claims which cannot conflict in this way, because the ‘ought’-claims are of 
fundamentally different types. 
I must explain, then, why some ‘ought’-claims can conflict with each other while 
others cannot. The answer is that different types of ‘ought’-claims are made relative to 
different standards or, in other words, are made regarding fundamentally different normative 
subject matters. Consider, again, the examples of fulfilling a promise, doing taxes, and 
getting some exercise. Each of the involved ‘ought’-claims can conflict with each other 
because they are each made relative to the same ultimate standard and involve the same 
fundamental normative subject matter. Specifically, in my view, each of the three ‘ought’-
claims is made relative to the standard of most or decisive reason.  
As the reasons fundamentalist would expect, these ‘ought’-claims are each made true 
(when they are true) by the reasons I have for pursuing the various courses of action. If in 
some circumstance I ought to water your plants, ought to file my taxes, and ought to get 
some exercise, then this is because I have decisive reason to do each of these three things. 
The ‘ought’-claims can conflict with each other because I cannot have decisive reason to take 
more than one of various incompatible courses of action. When time prevents me from 
completing more than one of the actions in question, there is a single, all-in fact about which  
! 92 
of these three things I ought to do, made relative to the reasons standard. If this is correct, 
then although we might sometimes speak of moral, legal and prudential ‘ought’-claims, we 
do so without thereby endorsing any form of normative pluralism.
53 To be normative 
pluralists, we would have to believe that there are different types of ‘ought’-claims made 
relative to fundamentally distinct normative standards.  
Although I suspect that no one would hold such an implausible view, it is worth 
flagging that one could believe that moral, legal, and prudential ‘ought’-claims are each made 
relative to fundamentally distinct standards and, as such, that they are different types of 
‘ought’-claims. Holding such a view would make one a kind of normative pluralist. This view 
would imply that morality, the law, and prudence are all normatively isolated subject matters, 
and that there are no all-things-considered normative facts that take into account these 
disparate sources of normative claims. In the case above, where it is late on the fifteenth of 
the month and I only have time to pursue a single course of action, this view would allow 
that I nevertheless ought to water your plants, ought to file my taxes, and ought to exercise. 
The view would insist that these three claims employ different forms of ‘ought’ and that, as 
such, there is no all-things-considered fact about which of these three things I “really” ought 
to do. This kind of view is not incoherent, although it conflicts with common sense. I have 
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53 According to the line of thought I am employing in this paragraph, to say that I “ought 
legally” to X is only to say that a certain subset of reasons having to do with the law, if held in 
isolation from reasons that do not have to do with the law, decisively count in favor of my X-ing. 
According to this position, all reasons are ultimately subjected to the same overall normative 
‘weighing’. When the weighing is done, all reasons are just reasons, and there is a single all-in standard 
of most or decisive reason which takes into account legal reasons, moral reasons, prudential reasons, 
aesthetic reasons, familial reasons, and so on. On this view, there is in fact only a single type of 
‘ought’-claim at play here.  
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been assuming that this view is false in order to help bring out what is distinctive about 
normative pluralism. But it is not important for my purposes that this weird view is false, 
because the truth of the view would itself establish the truth of normative pluralism. 
Normative pluralism is the thesis that there can be more than one type of legitimate 
and binding ‘ought’-claim because ‘ought’-claims can be made relative to distinct normative 
standards. While all pluralists must accept this claim, there is no need for them to agree 
about anything beyond this. There are innumerable conceptually available varieties of 
normative pluralism. In the remainder of this project, I will discuss only a very small range of 
potential versions of pluralism. As I have just made clear in my use of examples, the version 
of normative pluralism that I favor takes onboard the reasons fundamentalist’s claim that 
there are legitimate, non-derivative ‘ought’-claims made relative to the reasons standard. But 
I am a normative pluralist because I believe that there are other legitimate types of ‘ought’-
claims which are made relative to a fundamentally distinct standard. In principle, one could 
be a normative pluralist who rejects the reasons fundamentalist position entirely. The 
boundaries of normative pluralism are broader than my own theoretical allegiances. 
Although the bare pluralist thesis is not itself a view about rationality (or any other 
substantive matter), it is obvious how one might offer an account of the normativity of 
structural rationality that relies on a version of normative pluralism. One could argue that 
philosophers have made the mistake of assuming that the ‘ought’ operative in the 
requirements of structural rationality could only be the ‘ought’ of reasons, when in fact there 
is a distinct, non-reasons-involving standard according to which the ‘ought’-claims of 
structural rationality are made. This is precisely what I will argue in Chapters 5 and 6. 
I have a rough sketch of the pluralist thesis on the table. I have not yet offered any 
particular pluralist proposal. And so the obvious question is: what other legitimate uses of  
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‘ought’ are there and what could be their basis? But before offering a defense of the version 
of normative pluralism that I find most plausible, I will say something about the status of the 
view in contemporary normative philosophy. 
 
4.3  – The Current Status of Normative Pluralism in Philosophy 
As I suggested in Section 4.1, the views I have discussed in the first three chapters of this 
project are all monist, rather than pluralist, views about normativity. According to the 
reasons fundamentalist, there is only one ultimate normative standard: the reasons standard. 
The reasons fundamentalists tells us that all legitimate ‘ought’-claims are made true by the 
reasons we have for complying with them. The constitutivist agrees that there is only one 
ultimate normative standard, but holds that this standard is the standard of agency itself. 
According to the constitutivist, any legitimate ‘ought’-claim is made true because it is 
appropriately conceptually connected to the nature of thought and action. 
Normative pluralism is not endorsed by many (or perhaps any) current writers. I am 
aware of no single explanation of why this is the case. It may be the result of the 
ambitiousness of most normative theorists; a comprehensive, single-source account would 
be an elegant, simple, and powerful way to explain the workings of the normative domain. I 
suspect that this motivation is shared by reasons fundamentalists and constitutivists alike. At 
the same time, it may be that monism is simply the received view and that its dominance in 
contemporary philosophy is more a matter of tradition than argument. Indeed, pluralism is 
most often not even considered a possibility; it is generally ignored without being argued 
against.  
Although there are very few affirmed normative pluralists within mainstream 
philosophy, there have been occasions on which the possibility of pluralism has been raised.  
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In recent years, there have been several cases in which an author’s view has appeared to drift 
toward endorsing or assuming the truth of normative pluralism. In these cases, the author in 
question makes quick work of issuing a correction. There are two particularly interesting 
examples of this within the literature concerning rationality. 
  Recall Joseph Raz’s maddeningly difficult article, “The Myth of Instrumental 
Rationality,” which I introduced in Chapter 3. As we saw, Raz argues that even though there 
is no principle of reasons which demands means-end coherence, there is nevertheless 
something going wrong with an agent who fails to take the means she views as crucial to the 
realization of her ends. Raz, making a point which I take seriously and which I will come 
back to in the next two chapters, suggests that such agents are exhibiting a kind of “faulty 
functioning.” According to Raz, that an agent so situated is defectively functioning is 
supposed to explain the mistake she is making when she is means-end incoherent. In 
Chapter 3, I proposed that Raz implicitly advocates for a mere property-requirement 
conception of rationality, as he attempts to do justice to our intuitions about rationality 
without endorsing that there are any normative requirements. 
Nevertheless, some writers misunderstood Raz and took him to be suggesting that 
there may be an additional form of normative demand, beyond the normative demands 
provided by our reasons. Alongside the publication of Raz’s paper, David Sobel offered one 
such interpretation of Raz.
54 According to Sobel’s interpretation, Raz believes that some 
normative claims have to do with reasons, while others have to do with proper functioning. 
If this were Raz’s actual position, Raz would be a normative pluralist. But Raz’s response 
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54 See Sobel 2005. 
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makes clear his dissatisfaction with Sobel’s characterization. He says:
55 
Sobel appreciates [that people who fail to take the means to their ends are 
exhibiting a functional failure], but he distorts its meaning by thinking that it is a 
claim about ‘two sources of normativity.’ [What] I have in mind has nothing to 
do with different sources of normativity. 
This comment lends further credence to the interpretation I offered in Chapter 3. Raz does 
not advocate that there could be more than one fundamentally distinct kind of ‘ought’-claim. 
To Raz, legitimate ‘ought’-claims are, in every case, judgments stating what we have decisive 
reason to do. Raz’s hope is to explain away our intuitions about rationality by appealing to a 
non-normative standard of proper functioning. 
  Something similar has happened to John Broome. Broome’s case is more confusing 
than Raz’s. Broome used to advocate—or, at least, seemed at one time to advocate—that 
there can be more than one sense of ‘ought’ and, accordingly, more than one distinct brand 
of normative requirement. In his early work on rationality, Broom used a wide-scope ‘ought’ 
operator when stating the requirements of rationality. Those requirements appeared 
extremely similar to the ones I have endorsed in this project, and he called such 
requirements “normative.” Given that Broome at no point argued that we have decisive 
reason to comply with requirements like these, it was natural to interpret Broome as 
implicitly suggesting that these principles invoked a distinct form of ‘ought.’ Some readers, 
myself included, understood Broome to be attempting to highlight a distinction between the 
‘ought’ of rationality and the ‘ought’ of reasons. But according to Broome’s recent writing, 
this was not his intention. Broome says that he was insufficiently clear in the past, but that 
he does not endorse any such pluralist view. According to Broome, to say that one ought to 
do something is to say the one has decisive reason to do that thing. Recently, Broome has 
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! 97 
said that “to say a requirement […] is normative is to say that the requirement constitutes a 
reason.”
56 This is why, as we saw in Chapter 1, Broome is left believing that there must be 
reasons to comply with rational requirements, even though he can locate no such reasons. 
Broome, who once seemed to be one of pluralism’s defenders, is in fact an opponent. 
It is humorous, and perhaps telling, that both Raz and Broome have been 
misinterpreted in this way. Of course, given their commitment to reasons fundamentalism, it 
is no surprise that they would resist being understood as pluralists. But while the reasons 
fundamentalists are quick to point out that they have not endorsed any pluralist thesis, one 
could argue that they have no choice. One might argue that reasons fundamentalists, while 
avowed monists, are in fact normative pluralists in disguise. 
Although the fundamentalists argue that all normative claims are constituted by 
reasons, this simple phrasing ignores the fact that reasons come in at least two very different 
forms: practical and epistemic. It is not clear how much epistemic and practical reasons have 
in common with each other beyond their label as reasons. To appeal to the criterion 
introduced earlier in this chapter, it seems quite likely that an ‘ought’-claim made true in 
virtue of one’s epistemic reasons and an ‘ought’-claim made true in virtue of one’s practical 
reasons cannot conflict with each other in the way that normative claims of the same type 
must be able to. I suspect that this issue is in the background of the ongoing debates 
concerning whether there are any practical reasons for belief. Imagine a case in which an 
agent is given overwhelmingly strong practical reason to believe P, even though she has 
insufficient evidence for P. To the extent that we can make sense of this kind of example, it 
seems most natural to say that she ought to believe P in the practical-reason-involving sense 
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of ‘ought,’ but that she ought not to believe P in the epistemic-reason-involving sense of 
‘ought.’ It would be odd to expect that the completely disparate epistemic and practical 
considerations could be combined to generate an all-things-considered normative verdict 
about what the agent “really” ought to believe.
57 This suggests that the standard appealed to 
in the ‘ought’ of epistemic reasons is normatively distinct from the standard appealed to in 
the ‘ought’ of practical reasons. If this line of thinking is right, then reasons fundamentalists 
should not have any principled opposition to normative pluralism, as they are already 
normative pluralists. 
Although I find this argument provocative, it does not matter too much for my 
purposes whether reasons fundamentalists are unintended pluralists. In either case, I am 
sympathetic to a crucial aspect of the reasons fundamentalist position: I believe that there are 
basic, irreducibly normative facts about what we have reason to do (or believe, or intend, 
and so on). And I am content with the idea that many ‘ought’-claims are made legitimate by 
the reasons we have for complying with their demands. As we have seen so far in this 
project, however, not every part of the normative world can easily be explained by appealing 
to our reasons. And if an exclusively reasons-based view prevents us from fully mapping the 
normative domain, then we must be willing to look beyond the reasons fundamentalist’s 
system. This is why I am a normative pluralist.
58 
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57 The reasons fundamentalists may wish to argue that there are no such things as practical 
reasons for belief. Although this would threaten to make my example irrelevant, it would not 
demonstrate that the ‘ought’ of epistemic reasons and the ‘ought’ of practical reasons are of the same 
type. For helpful discussions concerning practical (or pragmatic) reasons for belief, see Williams 
1973, Kelly 2002, Reisner 2009, and the broader literature on object-given/state-given distinction. 
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4.4 – A Pluralist Proposal: Normativity and Criticizable Failure 
I now need to explain how it could be true that someone ought to do something, even if 
they have no reason to do that thing. In this section, I will provide a proposal which I 
believe illuminates the plausibility of normative pluralism. 
To begin, it is helpful to think, in the most general terms available, about what is 
involved in it being true that one ought to do something. It is tempting to endorse 
immediately the reasoning behind the Reasons Challenge and respond that the defining 
characteristic of it being the case that one ought to do something is that one has decisive 
reason to do that thing. But that answer is insufficiently general. A more general answer is 
available, and it is one that does not assume that the only norm-generating standard is the 
reasons standard.  
Here is a proposal: the most general thing we can say about someone who ought to 
X is that if she does not X then she will have made a real mistake. When you ought to do 
something, then you must do that thing, not in the sense that you cannot avoid doing it, but 
in the sense that failing to do it would be a legitimate failure—a failure of the sort that would 
warrant criticism. And, continuing to speak in maximally general terms, we can observe that 
any behavior or action which constitutes a genuine failure is a failure to do something 
required; if it was not the case that one ought to have done differently than one did, then 
one’s doing as one did would not really be a failure at all. So this is what separates normative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 As I indicated in a footnote in Chapter 3, there is an interesting question about how to 
categorize a subjective-reasons theory of rationality. It is worth flagging here that there could be a 
subjective-reasons theory of rationality which would involve an endorsement of normative pluralism. 
One could hold that the standard of objective reasons and the standard of subjective reasons are 
home to fundamentally normatively distinct, but equally legitimate, types of ‘ought’-claims. A view 
along these lines is suggested in Schroeder’s forthcoming “What Makes Reasons Sufficient?”.  
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principles from other principles. A true ‘ought’-claim—one which binds us, which we are 
required to follow—is a principle which one can violate only on pain of criticizably failing.
59 
Notice that this proposal makes no reference to reasons. 
The proposal I have just offered passes the sniff test. It is quite plausible that a 
requirement is normative if and only if non-compliance with the requirement is a criticizable 
failure. Nevertheless, the reasons fundamentalist may insist that my appeal to the notions of 
criticizability and failure is an unhelpful distraction that does not shed any new light on the 
nature of normativity. To see why one might have this worry, consider how my proposal 
would have us assess a typical, run-of-the-mill ‘ought’-claim.  
Consider the following statement: You ought to maintain a healthy body. Ignoring deviant 
cases, it is safe to say that this ‘ought’-claim is true. Why? Well, in keeping with what I have 
just said about the link between criticizable failure and the legitimacy of an ‘ought’-claim, we 
might say that the ‘ought’-claim is true because if you did not maintain a healthy body (e.g., if 
you ate poorly and never exercised) then you would be making a criticizable mistake. But an 
opponent will note that this is an uninformative statement of why you ought to stay healthy. 
There must be something to say about why you would be criticizable if you failed to 
maintain your health. To provide a more informative characterization, we might note that 
staying healthy is crucial to many other valuable endeavors, or that maintaining a healthy 
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59 I say “criticizably failing” instead of simply “failing” because not everything which might 
be called a “failure” is a failure to do something required. If I miss when I try to throw a ball of paper 
into the recycling bin, I have failed, but I have not failed in a normatively relevant sense. The notion 
of criticizability helps to pick out the relevant class of failures. Of course, one might try to do this in 
other ways. (To name one example, one might propose that normative requirements are principles 
which it would be an “objective” failure not to satisfy. But this strikes me as a murkier and more 
problematic proposal than mine.) I will say more about criticizability later in this chapter.  
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body will help to prevent you from future disease and suffering, or that being healthy feels 
good. However, in offering this fuller explanation of why not maintaining a healthy body 
would be a criticizable failure, all we will have done is list your reasons for staying healthy. My 
reasons fundamentalist opponent will point out that you are criticizable for ignoring these 
reasons because an agent is always criticizable for failing to do what she has decisive reason 
to do. Looking at this case may make it seem as though appealing to the more general notion 
of a criticizable failure is pointless. If the class of criticizable failures is identical to the class 
of failures to do what one’s reasons demand, then we might as well forget this extra business 
about criticizability.  
This reasons fundamentalist’s objection is just another instance of the Reasons 
Challenge. But now we can show why it comes up short. Of course, when we are operating 
within the domain of giving and receiving reasons, we do not need to keep reminding 
ourselves that failing to respond to one’s reasons is a real failure. When we are in the 
business of offering and assessing reasons, we take for granted the criticizability of non-
compliance with our reasons. But should not take this to mean that criticizably failing is just 
the same as failing to do as one’s reasons require or that whenever an agent criticizably fails it is 
because she is criticizable for failing to do what she has reason to do. There can be standards 
other than the reasons standard which it is a failure not to live up to. It is easy to lose sight 
of this fact, since such a dominant aspect of rational agency, and interpersonal interaction, 
consists of providing and considering our reasons. But the notion of criticizability can still 
do quite a lot of work. If there are a variety of dissimilar grounds on which an agent’s 
behavior can constitute a criticizable failure, then there are a number of independent 
standards according to which legitimate ‘ought’-claims can be made. 
Recall the discussion Korsgaard’s constitutivism in Chapter 2. Korsgaard proposes  
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that all normative requirements flow from the standards of agency. She argues that because 
we cannot help but be engaged in the activity of agency, the standards of agency are 
standards which we are required to live up to. As she puts it, “a constitutive principle for an 
inescapable activity is unconditionally binding.”
60 Now, it does not matter too much whether 
you agree with the details of Korsgaard’s argument. What matters for my purposes is that 
she highlights a perfectly intelligible way in which an agent could commit a criticizable 
mistake that is not a mistake of failing to comply with some independent set of reasons. We 
do not have persistent and decisive reason, in the reasons fundamentalist’s sense, to comply 
with Korsgaard’s principles, and Korsgaard is not alleging that we do. The mistake made by 
the Korsgaardian non-self-determiner is of an entirely different variety. You do not need to 
agree that non-self-determination is, in fact, a criticizable mistake. You need only to accept 
that there can be a meaningful, substantive discussion about whether this is a form 
criticizable failure. Accepting even this much is to admit the coherence and possibility of 
normative pluralism. 
When we are assessing the legitimacy of a proposed ‘ought’-claim, there are at least 
three sequential questions which must be asked. The first question is: what is the standard 
relative to which the ‘ought’-claim is being made? The second question is: is it the case that 
not meeting the standard in question would constitute a legitimate failure on the part of the 
agent? The third is: is it the case that the proscribed action (or inaction), state of mind, way 
of being, or what have you, is one demanded by the standard in question. Think again of 
keeping a maintaining a healthy body. To assess the legitimacy of the ‘ought’-claim on offer 
(You ought to keep a healthy body), we must ask the three questions just listed. The answer to the 
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60 Korsgaard 2009b, p. 39.  
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first question, arguably, is that the ‘ought’-claim is made relative to the reasons standard. In 
claiming that one ought to keep a healthy body, we are claiming that one’s reasons decisively 
favor keeping a healthy body. Now we can ask the second question: is it the case that not 
meeting the standard in question (i.e., the reasons standard) would constitute a legitimate 
failure on the part of the agent? The answer—which is a substantive answer, requiring 
normative judgment—is “Yes.” Then, for the third question, we must ask: is it true that the 
reasons standard demands that we keep a healthy body? Here, too, the answer is “Yes,” 
which is just to say that we do indeed have (decisive) reason to keep a healthy body. So, in 
sum, it is true that you ought to keep a healthy body because there is a legitimate standard 
which you would be failing to live up to if you did not keep a healthy body. The truth of 
normative pluralism resides in the fact that there is more than one legitimate standard 
relative to which failure-assessments are made. Not every criticizable failure is a failure to 
behave in accordance with the demands of one’s reasons.
61 
This gives us the resources to respond to the Reasons Challenge and to diagnose 
why it seemed like such a challenge in the first place. The Reasons Challenge asks us, in 
short: “How could it be that I ought I to X if I have no reason to X?” If in response we 
attempt to provide some consideration in virtue of which one ought to X, then we will—so 
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61 I am in the process of attempting to open the door to the possibility that some legitimate 
normative claims are made relative to a standard other than the reasons standard. But one might put 
pressure on a different point. One might suggest that I have been going too easy on the reasons 
standard itself, and so might ask for clarification about what, exactly, the reasons standard is and why 
(and in what sense) deviation from that standard is a criticizable failure. As with other issues 
concerning the nature and structure of reasons that I have confined to footnotes, I am afraid that this 
is an issue that I could not hope to adequately deal with in this project. My view—which I cannot 
defend here—is that a failing to comply with one’s reasons is a matter of failing to appreciate or 
respond to the good-making (or truth-making) properties in the world.   
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says our opponent—be providing a reason for X-ing, and so we will not have met the 
challenger. Alternatively, if we refuse to answer, then we will be left without grounds for 
believing that we really ought to X. But now we can see that the puzzle is an illusion. If you 
ask “Why ought I to X?”, it is a sufficient answer to explain how you would be going wrong 
if you failed to X. This explanation need not take the form of offering a set of considerations 
which constitute reasons in favor of X-ing and which you would be ignoring if you did not 
X.  Instead, a full explanation can be given by providing an account of the type of failure 
that you would be engaging in if you did not X. 
  I have been arguing at a fairly high level of abstraction. I have been arguing that 
there is nothing confused in the thought that there may be multiple sources of normative 
demands and, as such, that there might exist a non-reasons-constituted normative 
requirement. But I have not yet made progress toward giving an account of a requirement-
generating standard other than the reasons standard. And, most importantly, nothing I have 
said so far bears directly on the questions concerning the requirements of structural 
rationality. Even if what I have said indicates how we might respond to the general worry 
created by the Reasons Challenge, I have not say anything about why the requirements of 
structural rationality are normative. For that, I would need to explain the (non-reasons-
based) criticizability of non-compliance with these requirements. I will make progress on this 
issue in the next two chapters.  
Before closing this chapter, I must make a number of important clarifications and 
respond to a number of crucial worries about the proposal I have offered in this chapter. In 
the next section, I will march through a number of clarifications concerning the general 
thesis of normative pluralism, and a number of clarifications concerning the particular 
pluralist proposal that I am endorsing. Then, in Section 4.7, I will consider a crucial line of  
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response from the reasons fundamentalist which threatens to undercut the pluralist thesis. 
 
4.5 – Clarifications: Pluralism in General and My Pluralist Proposal 
I need to make six points of clarification. The first two points concern the nature of 
normative pluralism in general. The third through sixth points concern the specific version 
of normative pluralism that I laid out and defended in the previous section. 
First, it is worth emphasizing that one could, in principle, be a normative pluralist 
without endorsing the proposal concerning criticizable failure that I sketched in the last 
section. Normative pluralism is the view that there are multiple fundamentally distinct types 
of ‘ought’-claims, relative to multiple fundamentally distinct normative standards. I have 
proposed that pluralism is true because (i) an ‘ought’-claim is binding just in case deviation 
from the claim’s demand is a criticizable failure and (ii) there is more than one fundamentally 
distinct standard relative to which non-compliance can be a criticizable failure. In making 
these two claims I am offering a particular pluralist proposal, rather than expanding on 
pluralism’s definition. I am not alleging that my proposal concerning failure and criticizability 
is conceptually contained within the bare concept of normative pluralism. I find the 
criticizable-failure proposal to be the most plausible candidate explanation of pluralism’s 
truth. But it is important to underline that, in principle, normative pluralism could be 
defended by a completely different proposal. 
Second, the bare pluralist thesis says nothing about how many distinct requirement-
generating standards there may be, and it says nothing about what those standards are 
(however many there are). The thesis of normative pluralism says only that there is more 
than one such standard. I have accepted that the reasons standard is an ‘ought’-generating  
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standard and I believe that there are others. But, in principle, one could be a normative 
pluralist while altogether rejecting the reasons standard as a basic normative standard. There 
could be a version of pluralism which rejected the notion of a normative reason, or which 
hold that normative reasons as parasitic on some other, more basic, normative standard. And 
one could be a pluralist while believing that there are two, or twenty, or two thousand 
distinct normative standards. As it concerns the version of pluralism that I endorse, I do not 
have a settled view about the number of distinct grounds of criticizable failure. I believe that 
there are at least two. 
Now onto four important points of clarification about the specific pluralist proposal 
I offered in Section 4.4. First, you may be wondering whether the pluralism I am endorsing 
is actually a pluralist view at all, given that I am saying that all normative principles share a 
common property: they make demands on us which warrant criticism when we fail to 
comply. Might this suggest that the normative domain is unified? In a sense, yes. But not in 
any interesting sense. The domain of normative requirements is unified only in the sense that 
all of its members are normative. A principle’s normativity consists in the fact that deviation 
from its demands is a relevant kind of failure. But this does not suggest that there is any 
important relationship between every normative requirement. 
Second, I am using “criticizable” here to mean something like “fit to be critically 
appraised” rather than merely “can be criticized.” Agents and behaviors which are not 
criticizable can be criticized, just like items which are not edible can be eaten.  So my use of 
“criticizable” is similar to our uses of “edible”, “wearable,” and “flushable” and unlike our 
uses of, say, “unbreakable” (since something which is unbreakable really cannot be broken). 
An ‘ought’-claim is true for an agent when the agent’s deviation from the principle’s 
demands warrants critical appraisal of the agent.  
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Third, when I say that an agent is “fit to be criticized” or “fit to be critically 
appraised,” I do not mean that (necessarily) we should offer outward criticism toward her, or 
that criticizing her would be a good idea, or even that criticizing her would be permissible. In 
many cases, criticizing people for their criticizable mistakes is unwise or rude. In part, this is 
due to the way that we (humans) tend to deal with criticism and due to the likely 
consequences of criticizing each other. Many of us get upset when we are criticized and have 
difficulty maintaining healthy relationships with our criticizers. If we went around criticizing 
each other every time that one of us made a criticizable mistake, we would never get 
anything else done. We have good grounds for not criticizing each other in many of the 
cases in which we are criticizable in the sense that I have in mind. People who drive slightly 
below the speed limit on open roadways, and people who skip to the end of good books, 
and people who take professional sports too seriously are all intelligible and proper targets of 
critical appraisal, and they are all making criticizable mistakes. But it would normally be a bad 
choice to offer our critical judgments to these people. 
Finally I come to the most important point of clarification. One might wonder how 
it is that we learn whether an agent’s failure to comply with some putative ‘ought’-claim is a 
failure of the normatively relevant variety. This question gives rise to a set of worries which 
will be the subject of the next section of this chapter. But as a way of paving the way for that 
discussion, I offer the following flat-footed thoughts. I said earlier that in assessing whether 
some putative ‘ought’-claim is legitimate, we must ask (i) what standard is being appealed to, 
(ii) whether the standard is one which it would be a criticizable mistake to violate, and (iii) 
whether the proscribed action or behavior is one demanded by the standard in question. The 
question at hand now concerns the second of these steps: how are we to come to know 
whether a particular standard issues binding dictates?   
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There is an easy answer here, and I think that it is the only plausible answer available, 
but it is one that some will find unsatisfying. The answer is that we must engage in the same 
style of deliberation and analysis that we engage in whenever we must make a substantive 
normative judgment. There is no special mechanism or formula for determining whether it 
would be criticizable to do or be like such-and-such. Which kinds of failures to comply with 
a demand are criticizable and why they are criticizable are substantive questions the answers 
to which will require that we attend to and think about the details of the relevant cases and 
proposals. Consider, again, Korsgaard’s constitutivist proposal. To find out whether it is a 
criticizable failure not to comply with the constitutive standards of action, we have no option 
other than to consider what this form of putative failure involves and think about why this 
form of failure would be relevant to us. No more specific method is available. And the fact 
that there is no more specific method available should not make us doubt that there are facts 
about when an agent is and is not criticizable for a failure to comply with some proposed 
demand. 
 
4.6 – A Covert Appeal to Reasons? 
In making my sixth point of clarification in the last section, I may have inadvertently raised a 
red flag. I just proposed that determining which standards are ‘ought’-generating standards 
requires normative judgment, because there is no non-normative mode of evaluation which 
will inform us whether a failure to be like such-and-such is a criticizable failure.  
The difficulty for my proposal—and, specifically, for its status as a pluralist 
proposal—is that a judgment about whether a particular standard serves as the basis for 
legitimate ‘ought’-claims appears to be a judgment about reasons. If we conclude that  
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deviating from the claims of Standard A is a criticizable mistake, while deviating from the 
claims of Standard B is not, then what sort of normative judgment are we making? Plausibly, 
we are judging that we have good grounds for caring about whether we comply with the 
demands of Standard A and that we do not have such grounds for being concerned about 
complying with the demands of Standard B. And this is just a judgment about our reasons 
for caring about compliance with these standards. My account, so goes the charge, involves a 
covert appeal to reasons in determining the normativity of any ‘ought’-claim. And this might 
undermine my contention that I am putting forward a form of normative pluralism 
according to which there can be non-reasons-based normative claims. 
I must admit that there is something to this characterization of my view. I will readily 
admit that judgments about which standards (and so which forms of failure) are relevant are 
normative judgments. They are judgments about which standards are important to comply 
with and which are not. And this is very close to saying that they are judgments about our 
reasons for caring (or not caring) about complying with the standards in question. It 
approaches unintelligibility to say that we could be bound by a principle or standard which 
we have no reason to care about complying with. Nevertheless, I do not think that these 
insights raise a serious problem for my view. 
The first question to ask is whether my view, in appealing to reasons-concerning 
judgments, somehow collapses into a version of standard, reasons-fundamentalist monism. 
Here the answer is obviously “No.” As I explained in Chapters 1 and 3, reasons 
fundamentalists hold that the only normative ‘ought’ is the ‘ought’ of most or decisive 
reason. On their view, a statement of the form A ought to X is true just in case A has decisive 
reason to X. If the worry expressed in the previous paragraph has teeth, then it may be that I 
am committed to the view that a claim of the form A ought to X is true just in case A has  
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reason to care about whether she Xs. But having a reason to care about whether one Xs is 
not the same as having (decisive) reason to X. Indeed, it does not follow from one’s having 
reason to care about X-ing that one has any reason at all to X (let alone decisive reason to X). 
Reasons for caring about compliance are, in many cases anyway, distinct from reasons for 
compliance. So even if a judgment about which standards are binding is (always?) a reasons-
involving judgment, it does not follow that every requirement’s normativity is constituted by 
reasons for complying with that requirement. 
A critic may claim that reasons are still featuring too prominently in this allegedly 
pluralist account. If a principle is normative only if it is one we have reason to care about 
complying with, then it is still reasons that are doing all of the important normative work. It 
may seem as though reasons, or reasons-related facts, are still what make a principle 
normative, because it is in virtue of these reasons (to care about compliance) that a standard 
can generate binding requirements. If these reasons did not exist, then the standard would 
and could not be requirement-generating. 
This worry is misguided. I can accept that a principle is normative only if it is one 
that we have reason to care about complying with. But the fact that we have reason to care 
about complying with the principle is not a part of the explanation of the principle’s 
bindingness. The reasons we have for caring about compliance are produced by the ultimate 
source of the principle’s bindingness, but are not themselves that source. Take some putative 
non-reasons-constituted ‘ought’-claim demanding that you X. In order to assess whether the 
‘ought’-claim in question is binding, we must ask whether it would be a mistake to fail to live 
up to the X-demanding standard. Suppose that the answer is “Yes.” If so, this is due to 
certain facts about what is involved, for a being like you, in not living up to the standard 
which demands that you X. These facts, whatever they are, will at the same time explain why  
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your failure is criticizable and why you have reason to care about complying with the 
requirement. This is simply because any considerations which make non-compliance a 
criticizable failure will also deliver reasons for caring about whether you comply. This should 
be no surprise. If your not-X-ing is something that would be a failure on your part of the 
sort that would warrant critical appraisal, then of course you will have reason to care about 
whether you comply with the demand. But the reasons for caring are not doing the work of 
making it the case that you ought to comply. You ought to comply just because your non-
compliance would be a mistake in some (here unspecified) way. So even though judgments 
about which standards are binding involve judgments about our reasons for caring about 
compliance, facts about our reasons for caring about compliance are not themselves what 
make any requirement normative.  
  There still remains an interesting question regarding whether there could be a 
completely reasons-independent form of normative ‘ought’-claim. For example, we might 
wonder whether there could be an ‘ought’-claim that bound a non-reasons-responsive 
intender and believer. Or, a bit differently, we might wonder whether in a ‘reasonsless’ world 
(if there could be such a thing), it would still be true of beings like us that there were things 
that we ought to do or ways that we ought to be. I suspect that the answer is “No”: if we 
had no reasons, or if we were non-reasons-responsive beings, then there could be no 
normativity at all. This suggests that reasons have a special place in the world’s normative 
architecture, but it does not suggest that all normative claims are claims about our reasons. I 
will not further pursue these issues here. 
To close this section, and the chapter, I will make one final point of clarification. 
There is a distinction that I have so far been intentionally blurring because it does not affect 
any of my core claims. There is a difference between the claim that a principle’s normativity  
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is constituted by reasons—in other words, that the principle is normative because it is one we 
have reason to comply with—and the claim that all normative principles are principles with 
which we have reason to comply. The first claim is much stronger than the second. One 
could hold that any normative principle or claim is one with which we have reason to 
comply without holding that every normative principle’s normativity is delivered by the 
reasons we have for complying. For example, the reasons we have for complying with some 
normative principles could be incidental to, or in addition to, the principles’ non-reasons-
constituted normativity. Although I have on occasion rather loosely said that there can be 
normative requirements with which we have no reason to comply, the important point is 
only that there can be normative requirements whose normativity is not constituted by 
reasons. 
I am open-minded as to whether we do have some reason, of some strength, to 
comply with some or all of the non-reasons-constituted normative principles which bind us.  
For example, it may be that because failing to comply with a legitimate demand is a failure, 
and because we have reason not to make criticizable mistakes, we always have some 
derivative reason to bring ourselves into conformity with the normative requirements to 
which we are subject. I have no settled judgment about this question. If this turns out to be 
true, then it does no harm to the pluralist thesis, since this would not suggest that the 
normativity of every legitimate principle is just the normativity of reasons. It would still be 
true that there was more than one legitimate sense of ‘ought’ and more than one legitimate 
type of ‘ought’-claim. 
 
4.7 – Next Steps  
My defense of normative pluralism in this chapter has been merely provisional, because I  
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have come up short of establishing that there are any requirements whose normativity is not 
constituted by reasons. I have not yet show that there are any requirements it is a criticizable 
failure to violate regardless of whether we have any reasons for compliance. And, most 
importantly, I have said nothing about the normativity of the requirements of structural 
rationality.  
In isolation, my arguments in this chapter have established relatively little. But this 
ground-clearing work will prove critical to my arguments in the rest of this project. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I will concretize and put to work the pluralist proposal I have just finished 
detailing. In the next chapter, I will uncover the standard that undergirds all of structural 
rationality. Doing so will solve the content problem of rationality, while at the same time 
providing us with an explanation of rationality’s normativity. As we will see, once we have 
understood what rationality, as a whole, is ‘about’—once we have revealed the unifying 
standard of structural rationality—there will be no deep question concerning why we are 
criticizably failing when we fail to meet its demands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
! 114 
5 – THE CONTENT OF STRUCTURAL RATIONALITY 
 
5.1 – A General Requirement of Structural Rationality 
My positive argument has two crucial pieces, one of which is now in place. In Chapter 4, I 
argued that a putative requirement is binding for an agent—that it is one with which she 
ought to comply—as long as her violation of the requirement would be a criticizable failure. 
Now, in this chapter and the following chapter, I will show that the requirements of 
structural rationality are principles of this sort. Once both these steps are secured, I will have 
provided a realist account of structural rationality which explains the normativity of its 
demands.  
In this chapter, I will not yet attend directly to the question of why we are criticizably 
failing whenever we violate a rational requirement. Instead, I will finally look directly to the 
requirements of rationality themselves, in an effort to uncover what rationality, as a whole, is 
‘about.’  In Chapter 1, I introduced the content problem: the problem of drawing the 
boundaries of rationality and explaining what makes requirements of rationality co-members 
of a single domain of principles. A plausible theory of rationality must be able to explain why 
principles like IC, BC, ME, and EI are categorically related normative requirements, whereas 
some other normative requirements (like, for example, a requirement to follow just laws or a 
requirement to aid the needy) are unrelated. We need a theory that expresses and explains 
the unity and content of rationality. In this chapter, I will endeavor to provide such a theory. 
  My primary conclusion in this chapter will be that there is an ultimate requirement of 
structural rationality from which all the familiar requirements of rationality can be derived. 
Although the domain of rationality appears to be populated by requirements concerning 
consistency in intention and belief, means-end coherence, enkrasia, and so forth, these  
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requirements have a shared foundation in a fundamental requirement which I will call the 
General Requirement of Structural Rationality (or “General Requirement” or “GR”). The 
formulation I favor, stated in the broadest terms available, is this: 
The General Requirement of Structural Rationality 
You are rationally required not to attitudinally undermine the functional success 
of your agential attitudes.
62 
The General Requirement prohibits attitudinal self-undermining or, in other words, it 
demands that an agent not ensure that some of her attitudes will fail directly as a result of 
how those attitudes are employed. 
Introduced so abruptly, it is bound to be unclear why this is the most plausible 
expression of rationality’s ultimate demand. In the course of this chapter I will construct an 
“unpacked” formulation of the General Requirement which lays bare its contours and 
implications, and I will argue that every other requirement of structural rationality can be 
derived from it. If I am correct, then violations of the various well-known requirements of 
rationality are in fact simply violations of the General Requirement. In other words, every 
irrational agent is, at root, exhibiting precisely the same attitudinal mistake. 
  The General Requirement is, by itself, enough to solve the content problem: it tells 
us what rationality as a whole is ‘about,’ and it gives us guidance in articulating the members 
of the rational domain. Solving the content problem is a significant achievement in its own 
right, but it is not the only benefit of finding the General Requirement. In solving the 
content problem and explaining the unity of rationality, the General Requirement illuminates 
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62 Throughout Chapters 5 and 6, whenever I say “attitudes” or “agential attitudes,” I have in 
mind only intentions and beliefs. There are interesting questions about how and whether rationality 
constrains our other kinds of attitudes (e.g,. suspicions, desires, emotions), but I cannot attend to 
those questions here.   
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the underlying standard relative to which every ‘ought’-claim of rationality is made. The 
General Requirement shows us what every irrational agent is doing (or failing to do) and so 
shows us what standard irrational agents are failing to live up to. As we will see, this will give 
us insight into why irrationality is a criticizable failure. By solving the content problem, and 
seeing what rationality is ‘about,’ we will begin to see why its claims are normative. But, as I 
said, I will not here go all the way toward conclusively establishing that violating the General 
Requirement is criticizable—that will be the business of Chapter 6. 
 
5.2 – Methodology 
Before beginning, I need to say something about the process that I will be relying on. To 
arrive at the correct formulation of the General Requirement, all that we can do, I believe, is 
propose possible formulations of GR, test those formulations against salient and intuitively 
clear cases, and assess whether the formulations’ verdicts about such cases are acceptable. 
This means that searching for a proper formulation of the General Requirement will depend 
partially on judgments about rationality that we bring to the investigation. In some cases, we 
must reject a formulation of GR because it produces what seems to be the wrong result—
because it declares that an agent is suffering from structural irrationality when that seems to 
not be the case, or because it cannot find the fault in an agent who seems like a paradigmatic 
example of a structurally irrational agent. But, in other cases, we might reasonably allow our 
less firmly held judgments about certain cases to be revised or abandoned, if an otherwise-
appealing formulation of GR produces an unexpected verdict about a case.  
Of course, I am describing a method of reflective equilibrium. But although this 
methodology is a commonly employed procedure in other areas of philosophy—and  
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especially normative philosophy—some might find it to be a worrisome practice when 
thinking about the requirements of structural rationality. One might claim that our starting-
point judgments are sparser, less precise, and less firmly held in the case of structural 
rationality than in the case of, say, morality, and that for this reason we ought not to feel 
entitled to carry out the investigation in the same way.  
I am confident that the methodology is a justifiable one and that, in fact, the 
similarity between investigations of structural rationality and morality are quite strong. There 
are a number of requirements of structural rationality which we can use as fixed points in an 
investigation. Any non-skeptical investigation into structural rationality must assume that the 
requirements set out in Chapter 1—BC, IC, ME, EI—are legitimate requirements in need of 
explanation. Versions of these requirements can be used to test proposed formulations of 
the General Requirement; if a formulation cannot derive a plausible version of these 
requirements, then it must not be an appropriate formulation.
63 At the same time, we can 
accept that some other accepted judgments about structural rationality are less secure and 
may reasonably be revised or abandoned for good theoretical reasons. This is similar to a 
moral philosopher holding that her moral theory must be able to explain the wrongness of 
promise-breaking, while simultaneously (I) acknowledging that she is not (yet) confident 
about precisely what form the prohibition on promise-breaking must take, and (II) also 
being willing to revise or abandon certain pre-theoretical moral judgments that are less 
entrenched than her judgments about the wrongness of promise-breaking. 
With these thoughts in mind, I will now endeavor to build a formulation of the 
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63 One would then be left to judge whether (i) this is because there is not a single general 
requirement from which all such requirements can be derived or (ii) this is because the proposed 
formulation of the General Requirement is just not the proper formulation.  
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General Requirement that illuminates its details. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, I will focus on some 
of the most familiar principles of structural rationality to help me reach a plausible 
formulation. In Sections 5.5 and 5.6, I will investigate what my account has to say about 
some less-familiar principles. 
 
5.3 – Consistency in Belief and Intention 
The proposal I favor is undergirded by a certain conception of intention and belief. 
Specifically, my proposal assumes that beliefs and intentions each have a particular 
constitutive function. Although the conception of intention and belief I have in mind is not 
immune to criticism, it is broad enough and general enough that it should not be the source 
of much controversy. 
We can illuminate the functions of belief and intention by reflecting on what an 
agent is doing when she believes P and, alternatively, when she intends to X. Consider the 
case of belief. What is a person “up to,” as it were, when she has a belief? A person who 
believes P is taking a particular proposition to be true or, put differently, taking a certain 
state of affairs to obtain. For instance, if you believe that it is raining outside, we might 
describe your mental state by saying that you have an is-true attitude toward the specified 
proposition. Conceived of in this way, the function of a belief is to represent (some part of) 
the way things are. Accordingly, we might then say that your belief succeeds, functionally 
speaking, just in case it is true. A related point can be made about intending. A person who 
intends to X is setting out to make a proposition true or, put another way, setting out to 
bring about a specified state of affairs. If you intend to open your umbrella above your head, 
you are setting out to make it obtain that your umbrella is opened above your head. While  
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the function of a belief is to represent the way things are, the function of an intention is to 
change the way things are. An intention succeeds, functionally speaking, just in case it makes 
its object true.
64 
I am not proposing a full theory of belief and intention, and I have no need for one. 
I am only characterizing a general way of thinking about what intentions and beliefs are. In 
short, I am proposing that a belief is an is-true attitude and an intention is a make-true 
attitude. According to this way of thinking, a belief succeeds when its object is true, while an 
intention succeeds when it makes its object true. Although I submit that these ideas are 
extremely plausible, a defense would require a significant detour. I believe that it would be a 
mistake to venture into that territory here.
65 
If these claims are granted, we can observe that many cases of structural irrationality 
have something interesting in common: they involve agents whose attitudes cannot all 
succeed. An agent who is violating one of the well-known requirements governing 
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64 For the remainder of this chapter, when I talk about the success or failure of an attitude, I 
always have in mind functional success or failure. It is plausible that there are other standards relative 
to which beliefs and intentions can succeed and fail. For example, a false belief that is adopted on the 
basis of overwhelmingly strong evidence could be called “successful” in a certain sense. Even more 
naturally, one might say that it is a kind of “good belief.” But that is not the standard I have in mind. 
It does no harm to my view that there may be other legitimate standards by which beliefs and 
intentions may be assessed. 
 
65 While many people find this view about the functions of intention and belief plausible (or 
even obvious), I admit that some may not. As I have tried to stress above, it is not—and cannot be—
a primary focus of this particular chapter to defend the view, and so I must take it as an assumption. 
However, I believe that the arguments in the remainder of this chapter offer defeasible evidence in 
favor of this assumption about the functions of belief and intention: in short, the fact that this view 
about belief and intention can do so much explanatory work is reason to take it seriously.  
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consistency of intention or belief will be such that at least one of her beliefs or intentions 
must fail. Consider the familiar requirement of belief consistency which I have previously 
labeled “BC”: 
BC 
You are rationally required not to [believe P, believe P→Q, and believe –Q]. 
When you violate BC your beliefs cannot all be true. Now I can introduce a related and 
similarly familiar requirement prohibiting directly contradictory beliefs. 
BC2 
You are rationally required not to [believe P and believe –P]. 
If you violate BC2, it must be that at least one of your attitudes fails. 
  These rather mundane and obvious facts are enough to deliver a proposal. Perhaps 
what unifies all of structural rationality is the basic rational impermissibility of having a set of 
attitudes in which at least one of the involved attitudes must fail. We can use the label 
“GR1” to refer to this provisional formulation of the General Requirement.
66 
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66 Proposals along these lines have been considered but quickly rejected by several writers. 
For instance, on p. 151 of Broome 2013, Broome writes: “[A]s people say, it is in the nature of 
beliefs that they aim at truth. Since two contradictory beliefs cannot both be true, that may explain 
why it is irrational to have contradictory beliefs. This seems plausible, but I do not know how this 
general idea can be worked out in detail, to provide a criterion for determining what rationality 
requires.” In Kolodny 2008a, Kolodny notes in passing that when one has a pair of intentions which 
one believes are incompatible at least one of one’s attitudes will fail. Kolodny does not pursue the 
underlying thought that all of structural rationality is rooted in a more general prohibition on 
attitudinal self-undermining. Raz 2005a discusses the putative irrationality of harboring a set of 
inconsistent beliefs, but concludes that the guarantee of having a false belief is insufficient to serve as 
the basis of a general account of irrationality. These writers would be right to reject an account which 
presents GR1 as the unifying principle of structural rationality. Nevertheless, as I will explain, there is 
a much more promising account nearby.  
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GR1 
You are rationally required not to have a set of attitudes which is such that at 
least one of the involved attitudes must fail. 
One promising feature of GR1 is that it shows that practical and theoretical requirements 
can have a common source. As we have seen, GR1 can be used to quickly derive two 
theoretical requirements. It can also be used to derive a version of a familiar practical 
requirement that I have been referring to throughout this project. Recall the requirement of 
intention consistency which I have been calling “IC”: 
IC 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, intend to Y, and believe that you 
cannot both X and Y]. 
If you violate this principle, you do so by intending to X, intending to Y, and believing that 
you cannot both X and Y. When you do this, at least one of your attitudes must fail. If your 
belief is true (and so the two intentions are incompatible) then at least one of your intentions 
is sure to fail. And if both of your two intentions could succeed (together) in realizing their 
objects, then it must be that your belief is false. In violating IC you have your attitudes 
arranged such that at least one of them must fail. So IC can be derived from GR1. 
  This is a good start, but it cannot be the whole story. GR1 offers an incomplete and 
potentially misleading characterization of what is distinctive about cases of structural 
irrationality. To begin working toward an improved formulation of the General 
Requirement, here is a small but important point of clarification. Consider the “must” 
invoked in GR1. Whether GR1 is plausible depends crucially on the modality of the term. 
Imagine, for example, that you both intend to drive your mother to the airport tonight and 
intend to bake a cake tonight. Although you have not thought about your plans in great 
detail, you imagine that you will spend a couple of hours in the car with your mother and 
then return home to begin baking the cake. But you have badly miscalculated. You have  
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forgotten that driving your mother to the airport is actually a huge undertaking, since the 
airport is at least four hours away by car. By the time you return home from the eight-hour 
round trip, it will be long after midnight, and baking a cake during the (previous) evening will 
no longer be an option. None of this is at all apparent to you, and so you continue to both 
intend to bake a cake tonight and intend to drive your mother to the airport tonight. What 
are we supposed to say about your rationality in this case? Intuitively, it would be a mistake 
to deem your behavior in violation of any requirement of structural rationality. Someone in 
your position has an awful plan, but uncritically planning to do more than you could actually 
accomplish is not the sort of thing that can render you irrational. Nevertheless, there is a 
clear sense in which one of your two attitudes really must fail. Accomplishing both the 
mother-driving and the cake-baking in the same evening is not an open possibility for you. 
So it looks as though GR1 may condemn you for having the relevant arrangement of 
attitudes. This is the wrong result. 
The obvious response is that the “must” contained in a proper formulation of the 
General Requirement invokes a broader form of possibility than is involved in our judgment 
that it is “impossible” for you to accomplish both your cake-baking and mother-driving 
tonight. After all, the world could easily be a bit different—your car could have been built to 
move faster, or the airport could have been stationed closer to your home, or you could have 
learned to bake a cake while driving—and then your two intentions could have jointly 
succeeded. In the relevant sense of “must,” it is not the case that your attitudes are 
structured so that at least one of them must fail. 
By invoking a broader form of possibility, GR1 can be revised to accommodate this 
small point. Instead of GR1, we can now consider 
GR2 
You are rationally required not to have a set of attitudes which is such that,  
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logically, at least one of the involved attitudes must fail. 
This is a small modification, but it makes an important difference. We can still use GR2 to 
derive the three genuine requirements listed above. At the same time, GR2 gets the 
appropriate result in the mother-driving case, by not rationally condemning you when you 
intend to drive your mother to the airport tonight and intend to bake a cake tonight. GR2 
helps to clarify an ambiguity in GR1. And this is an important lesson to be carried through 
the rest of this investigation: the attitudinal failure involved in structural irrationality is 
logically guaranteed.  
GR2 is an improvement, but it, too, cannot be a proper formulation of the General 
Requirement. To see why, consider the following case. Imagine that after reading a 
(vandalized) Wikipedia entry on prime numbers, you come to believe that Euclid’s argument 
has been disproven and that there are actually only finitely many prime numbers. Of course, 
your belief is false. And, presumably, your belief is necessarily false—it is a logical impossibility 
that there are only finitely many prime numbers. Call your belief b. Any set of attitudes 
containing b as a member (including the set of attitudes containing only b) will have at least 
one attitude (namely, b) which is, logically speaking, guaranteed to fail. This means that you 
will be in violation of GR2, since GR2 prohibits sets of attitudes in which at least one 
member is bound to fail, logically speaking. But this is an odd result. You are not irrational 
for having the false belief about prime numbers. And there is nothing special about the 
Euclid case; in general, one is not irrational simply for having a belief in a necessarily false 
proposition. 
The problem with GR2 is that it does not capture the fact that structural irrationality 
is a structural matter. GR2 suggests that the problem with the structurally irrational agent is 
just that, within a given attitudinal set, it is impossible for all of her attitudes to succeed. This  
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is a misleading characterization. It is true that the structurally irrational agent is bound to 
have at least one failing attitude. But that is not the most important point. The most 
important point is that some of her attitudes are bound to fail because of the way her 
attitudes are arranged or combined. The structurally irrational agent has a combination of 
attitudes which is such that it is logically impossible for all of the attitudes to succeed, due to 
the relations between those attitudes. We can revise GR2 to be responsive to these 
considerations. Consider: 
GR3 
You are rationally required not to have a set of attitudes which is such that, 
logically, due to the relations between the attitudes in the set, at least one of the 
involved attitudes must fail. 
In Euclid-type cases, you are not violating GR3. Although you have a belief that is 
guaranteed to fail, the failure is not due to the relations between your attitudes, and so you 
are in compliance with GR3’s demands. GR3 is a clear improvement on GR2. It allows us to 
derive all of the genuine requirements of structural rationality listed above and it avoids 
getting the wrong result in Euclid-type cases. At the same time, GR3 begins to shed some 
light on the fundamental standard that undergirds rationality: a prohibition on attitudinal self-
undermining. So GR3 is brings us much closer to the truth. But it also generates verdicts that 
some may find unsettling. It is worth exploring some of these implications.  
If GR3 is correct, then there are no particular attitudes which are, in themselves, 
banned by structural rationality. Because GR3 prohibits only sets of attitudes containing 
members that stand in certain relations to each other, GR3 can only prohibit sets of attitudes 
containing at least two members. On its face, this may not look like a problem. After all, the 
tendency for GR2 to prohibit single-member sets of attitudes was partially responsible for 
generating the problematic conclusion in the Euclid case. And, in the end, I am quite happy 
with GR3’s blindness to single attitudes. But considering certain cases may make one worry  
! 125 
that GR3 has taken us off track. 
For example, consider an agent, Mark, who has the following set of two beliefs: (i) 
that O is a perfect circle and (ii) that O is not a perfect circle. Mark is violating BC2, according to 
which you are rationally required not to [believe P and believe –P]. This requirement is 
immediately derivable from GR3, just as it was derivable from GR2 and GR1. There is 
nothing weird about this since Mark does indeed seem to be exhibiting a standard form of 
structural irrationality in belief. 
Now consider a different agent, Luke, who has a single, conjunctive belief that O is a 
perfect circle and O is not a perfect circle. GR3 has nothing to say about Luke’s rationality, because 
the guaranteed failure of Luke’s attitude is simply the result of the content of that attitude, 
rather than the result of the relations between any attitudes. Just as GR3 was silent on your 
rationality in the Euclid case, GR3 is silent on Luke’s rationality. This might strike you as a 
bad result. You might think that if Mark is violating a principle of rationality, then so must 
be Luke. And you might think that if GR3 cannot accommodate this point—by reaching 
identical verdicts about Mark and Luke—then GR3 must not be a legitimate formulation of 
the General Requirement. 
I think that GR3 can be retained despite this seemingly odd result. In any case that 
suitably mirrors the Mark/Luke example, an agent with a Luke-type conjunctive belief will in 
fact be violating GR3, because he will, in addition to having a single conjunctive belief, have 
independent beliefs in each of the conjuncts. In the case at hand, it is not plausible that Luke 
would believe that O is a perfect circle and O is not a perfect circle but not believe both (i) that O is a 
perfect circle and (ii) that O is not a perfect circle. I am not making a point about rationality here. I 
am not saying that in virtue of believing the conjunction Luke is rationally required to believe 
each of the conjuncts. (If I said that, then I would have to explain the basis of that rational  
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requirement.) Instead, I am saying that a belief in a conjunction just does not come without a 
belief in each of the conjuncts. This is a fact about the constitution of our mental lives, and 
the nature of belief, rather than a normative fact. If I am correct—if Luke has these two 
independent beliefs—then Luke is violating BC2 and, so, GR3 as well. Our inclination to 
deem Luke irrational is justified by the fact that he is actually in Mark’s doxastic position.
67  
One might argue that it is not strictly speaking impossible for an agent to believe a 
conjunction without believing each of its conjuncts. However, I think we must accept that 
someone in such a position would not necessarily be irrational. Such an agent would believe 
something that is, as it so happens, necessarily false. But as is suggested by our judgment in 
the Euclid case, there is nothing immediately irrational about believing a logical impossibility. 
Taking this stance creates pressure to explain what it is about “splitting up” the belief into 
multiple beliefs that generates a violation of structural rationality. In the final section of this 
chapter, in exploring the normativity of structural rationality, I hope to shed light on this 
question. For now I must set it aside. The correct move is to retain GR3. 
The challenge just considered proposes that GR3 fails to capture certain cases of 
irrationality. GR3 faces challenges in the opposite direction, too. It may seem that GR3 
prohibits certain combinations of attitudes that we would not traditionally judge to be 
structurally irrational. One obvious case is worth focusing on. 
Up to this point, I have presented IC as saying that you are rationally required not to 
[intend to X, intend to Y, and believe that you cannot both X and Y]. Certainly, GR3 allows 
us to derive IC. But GR3 also gives rise to a broader requirement concerning the consistency 
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67 Perhaps not identical. Mark may lack a belief in the conjunction. Although a belief in a 
conjunction is always accompanied by a belief in each of the conjuncts, an agent can believe P and 
believe Q without also believing [P & Q].  
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of our intentions. Specifically, from GR3 we can conclude that you are rationally required 
not to [intend to X and intend to not X]. An agent with such a combination of intentions 
has, due to the relations between her attitudes, guaranteed that at least one of those 
intentions will fail. So GR3 finds rational fault in an agent who has two intentions with 
directly incompatible contents, regardless of whether the agent has any belief about the 
incompatibility of the intentions. This is likely to be a surprising result, because most 
paradigmatic cases of irrationality through intention inconsistency involve a crucial element 
of belief.
68 
I do not find this implication of GR3 unpalatable. Imagine that I have two 
intentions: I intend to touch the button with my finger at 1:00pm sharp and I intend to not 
touch the button with my finger at 1:00pm sharp. I am inclined to view this case as a 
straightforward instance of structural irrationality. A belief does not need to be in the picture 
to generate structural irrationality in intention. A belief is normally present in these cases, 
because we rarely have intentions with directly incompatible contents. In a normal case, I 
intend to X and intend to Y, and it is only in also believing that I cannot both X and Y that I 
come to have a set of attitudes which is mutually unsatisfiable. In these standard cases, a 
belief about the (perceived, practical) impossibility of realizing two different intentions is 
what generates the (actual, logical) structural inconsistency of the three involved attitudes. 
But a belief is not strictly required in order to create a case of structural irrationality in 
intention. So I think that we should accept: 
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68 See, for example, Scanlon 2007 and Kolodny 2008a. 
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IC2 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X and intend to not X].
69 
To close this section, I will briefly focus on a rather different sort of reason for 
doubting that GR3 is a proper formulation of the General Requirement. Some philosophers 
are dialetheists: they believe that a proposition can be true while its negation is also true. This 
raises an interesting question for GR3 (and for any account of rationality). The interesting 
question is not what dialetheists might say about GR3. Instead, the interesting question is 
what those of us investigating structural rationality should say about the dialetheists. Suppose 
a committed dialetheist both believes P and believes –P. Suppose also that, although the 
dialetheist acknowledges that these are contradictory beliefs, she maintains her beliefs on the 
grounds that the beliefs are both true. According to GR3 and BC2, she is structurally 
irrational. But we might worry that this is an unfair result. She is (by stipulation) an expert in 
logic with a reasoned justification for her position. We might think that, regardless of 
whether her peculiar view ultimately succeeds, it would be a mistake to endorse a principle of 
structural rationality which automatically charges her with irrationality. Perhaps we should 
treat her case as different, and modify GR3 to allow for such exceptions.
70 
I do not think that we should modify GR3. My response to this concern is in part to 
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69 A more precise formulation of IC2 would say that you are rationally required not to 
[intend to X-at-t and intend to not X-at-t]. The formulation of IC2 provided in the body of the 
chapter could be interpreted as prohibiting you from, for example, intending to go to the gym and 
intending to not go to the gym, even if those intentions were held with respect to different times. 
That would be a mistake, and so a precise formulation of IC2 would not have this implication. As I 
noted in Chapter 1, I am not here focused on the inner details of the lower-level requirements of 
structural rationality, and so I will continue to ignore these complexities. 
 
70 See Broome 2013, p. 91 and p. 155.  
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dig in my heels and in part to suggest that the problem is less serious than it appears. 
Assuming that dialetheism is false, it is simply true that an agent who believes P and believes 
–P is violating the demands of structural rationality, even if she has putative justifications for 
their beliefs. That is the heel-digging part. But (here is the second part) it is important to 
note that GR3 does not imply that endorsing the dialetheist’s axiom is irrational. If the 
dialetheist is violating a requirement of structural rationality, she does so when she believes P 
and believes –P, but not when she makes the (higher-order) judgment that there can be a 
proposition which is true while its negation is true. It may be odd if GR3 committed me to 
saying that Graham Priest is structurally irrational just in virtue of his views about logic. But 
endorsing GR3 does not commit me to saying this. 
 
5.4 – Means-End Coherence 
I began with the idea that it is structurally irrational to have a set of attitudes in which at least 
one of the involved attitudes must fail. It turned out that this was too broad a 
characterization of structural irrationality. An agent is only structurally irrational if at least 
one of her attitudes will fail because of the way that they are structured. So I revised the working 
requirement to prohibit only sets of attitudes in which the guaranteed functional failure of an 
attitude was the result of the relations between the present attitudes. 
Still, this cannot be the whole story. GR3 misses out on one of the two key ways in 
which an agent’s attitudinal organization can ensure that at least one of her attitudes will 
functionally fail. In some cases, as we have seen, the failure is guaranteed because the 
contents of the present attitudes are related in ways that make their joint success impossible. 
But in other cases, which I have so far in this essay ignored, the failure is guaranteed by the 
absence of an attitude.  
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We can see this by turning to requirements of means-end coherence. The finer 
details of instrumental requirements need not concern us here. A simplified version of 
central instrumental requirement looks like this: 
ME 
You are rationally required not to [intend to X, believe that you can X only if 
you intend to Y, and not intend to Y]. 
Imagine that you intend to rob the bank at noon, believe that you can succeed in robbing the 
bank at noon only if you intend to first bail your brother out of jail, and that you lack the 
intention concerning your brother. In this case, there are two relevant attitudes present: the 
end-focused intention and the belief about what you take to be the necessary means to your 
end. You are violating ME and we need to explain why this is so. But GR3 does not give us 
the explanatory tools.
71 
Consider what is going wrong in your case. As long as you do not intend to bail your 
brother out of jail, at least one of the two attitudes that you do have will fail. The possibility 
of their co-success depends on the presence of the means-focused intention. If your belief is 
true, and so the success of your end-focused intention does depend on the presence of the 
means-focused intention, then it is guaranteed that in the absence of the means-focused 
intention your end-focused intention will fail. Alternatively, if your end-focused intention 
can succeed even without the presence of the means-focused intention, then this could only 
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71 So-called cognitivists have argued that ME (and perhaps other intention-involving 
requirements) can be derived from a theoretical requirement like BC. The standard cognitivist 
arguments require an assumption that when one has an intention to X, one necessarily has some 
belief about one’s X-ing. (Depending on the version of cognitivism, what belief one is purported to 
have varies.) These assumptions are contentious. However, the more pressing problem for 
cognitivists is that they leave unexplained the basis of theoretical requirements of structural 
rationality. See Setiya 2007 and Wallace 2001.  
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be because your belief is false. So your end-focused intention and your belief about the 
necessary means can co-succeed only if you have the means-focused intention. 
It is clear that your structural failure is similar to the structural failure prohibited in 
GR3. As stated, however, GR3 cannot account for your irrationality. In your case, it is not 
the co-existence of attitudes that guarantees an attitude’s failure, but instead the absence of an 
attitude which is required to make possible the co-success of your other attitudes. We can 
revise GR3 to accommodate the fact that an agent can attitudinally undermine the success of 
her attitudes in more than one way. Consider:  
GR4 
You are rationally required not to have a set of attitudes which is such that, 
logically, due to the relations between its members or due to the absence of 
some other attitude(s), at least one of the attitudes in that set must fail. 
GR4 allows us to derive each of the requirements that I endorsed in Section 3, but also to 
derive ME. 
One interesting though not undesirable implication of GR4 is that it makes it 
possible for an agent to exhibit structural irrationality in virtue of holding only a single 
attitude. Articulating this point requires some care. When assessing GR3, I said that the 
requirement could not prohibit any particular attitude. This remains true of GR4: no single 
attitude, regardless of its content, is by itself rationally off limits. But GR4 could find fault in 
an agent who holds only a single attitude, if that attitude’s functional success depends 
crucially on the presence of another attitude. This will not change our verdict about cases 
like the Euclid example. In that case, you have a single belief in a logically impossible 
proposition. I claimed that you are not irrational for holding that belief. And GR4 would not 
deem you irrational, because your arrangement of attitudes is not responsible for your 
belief’s falsity. There is no additional attitude that could make successful your necessarily 
false belief, and so your belief will fail regardless of what attitudes you happen to hold. GR4  
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is silent on that case.  
But imagine a case in which you believe that you intend to donate to charity while, in 
fact, you do not intend to donate to charity. You are just a miser with delusional beliefs 
about your own generosity. You are violating GR4, because you have a belief which, due to 
the absence of an attitude (an intention) from your total network of attitudes, cannot 
succeed. This is a plausible result, as having these kinds of false beliefs about one’s attitudes 
certainly has the feeling of irrationality. We can accept the following rational prohibition 
concerning believed intentions: 
BI 
You are rationally required not to [[believe that you intend to X] and [not intend 
to X]]. 
Having the belief while lacking the intention is irrational. There are other related instances of 
irrationality concerning the relationship between our attitudes and our attitudes about our 
attitudes. GR4 allows us to account for such forms of structural irrationality. 
One might be worried that the move from GR3 to GR4 is ad hoc. All I have done, 
after all, is insert a clause that allows us to capture cases of instrumental irrationality. But this 
is the wrong way to look at things. Recall that what caused us to abandon GR2 was its 
blindness to the fact that the guaranteed functional failure involved in structural irrationality 
is the result of the way that one’s attitudes are structured. In transitioning to GR3, we were 
focused on a certain range of cases in which the simultaneous holding of certain attitudes 
makes the co-success of those attitudes logically impossible. This is one way, but only one 
way, in which an agent’s attitudes can have their functional success undermined by the 
network of attitudes in which they are involved. An agent can also have her attitudes’ 
functional success compromised by ‘holes’ within her system of attitudes. In some cases, the 
holding of certain attitudes in the absence of other attitudes makes impossible the success of  
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the attitudes which are held. The General Requirement of Structural Rationality must be able 
to accommodate both phenomena. So transitioning from GR3 to GR4 is an effort to 
accomplish what we set out to do when we revised GR2. 
We have arrived at a powerful formulation of the General Requirement. From GR4 
we can derive the BC, IC, ME, and a number of other less-often-considered (but intuitively 
plausible) requirements. GR4 allows us to do all of this without overreaching. I believe that 
GR4 should be accepted, provisionally, as an accurate formulation of the General 
Requirement. As I claimed at the outset, the General Requirement of Structural Rationality, 
concisely stated, says that you are rationally required not to attitudinally undermine the 
functional success of your agential attitudes. At the time, you might have wondered: how 
does one attitudinally undermine the functional success of one’s agential attitudes? GR4 
answers the question: by having one’s attitudes structured such that, as a result of the 
relations between one’s present attitudes, or as a result of the absence of an attitude or 
attitudes, one makes impossible the joint functional success of one’s attitudes. 
I now want to briefly consider two further classes of structural requirements. In 
Section 5.5, I will discuss whether there are any closure requirements governing belief. In 
Section 5.6, I will discuss requirements governing enkrasia. 
 
5.5 – Are There Any Closure Requirements? 
Some writers have proposed that not only does rationality require that we not have 
inconsistent beliefs, and that we not have contradictory beliefs, but also that our network of 
beliefs is “closed.” Up to this point, I have not considered whether there are any rational 
requirements governing doxastic closure. 
There are various proposals available. According to a very strong proposal, you are  
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required to believe every proposition entailed by any propositions which you believe. For 
example, this proposal says: 
Where Q is entailed by P, you are rationally required not to [believe P and not 
believe Q]. 
GR4 could not be used to derive this principle. According to a somewhat weaker proposal, 
you are rationally required to believe whatever propositions you believe are implied by your 
beliefs. For example, this proposal says: 
You are rationally required not to [believe P, believe that P entails Q, and not 
believe Q]. 
Again, GR4 could not give rise to any such principle.  
At first glance, GR4’s inability to account for requirements of doxastic closure may 
seem like a problem for my proposal. However, I think that this is the appropriate result. I 
am skeptical that there are any rational requirements governing closure per se. Requirements 
concerning consistency in intention and belief seem absolutely indispensible to a theory of 
rationality, as they are the principles which provide our initial conceptual foothold in the 
domain. But closure requirements do not seem as theoretically attractive or important. 
Consider the following two points.  
First, closure requirements raise intuitive concerns that are not raised by the 
requirements I have already discussed. Broome and others have pointed out that standard 
closure principles are exceptionally demanding—far too demanding for any actual agent to 
satisfy. While perfect compliance with principles like BC, IC, and ME is difficult for 
imperfect agents like us, compliance with closure requirements is completely out of reach. 
We simply do not have the cognitive capacity required to satisfy even the weaker of the two 
closure principles introduced above. So if we are disinclined to see compliance with 
rationality’s demands as unattainable, then it would be a mistake to include closure  
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requirements in our theory of rationality.  
Second, the claim that we are required to have a closed system of beliefs is intuitively 
under-motivated. As I indicated at the outside of this project in Chapter 1, through the 
examples of (1), (2), and (3), violating requirements like BC, IC, and ME always seems to 
involve getting something wrong. Structurally irrational agents are agents who are making a 
mistake, and I submit that it is this prospect of failure that motivates our pre-theoretical 
judgments about the legitimacy of these requirements. But an agent lacking a closed system 
of beliefs need not be making any mistake at all. Many of the propositions entailed by (or 
believed to be entailed by) our beliefs are irrelevant or obscure and, intuitively, a failure to 
hold these beliefs seems rationally unassailable. At most, we might say that an agent without 
a closed set of beliefs is not to be taking every possible opportunity to do something 
(epistemically) good. Accordingly, one could plausibly hold that having a closed set of beliefs 
is an epistemically laudable although supererogatory goal. (I do not believe even this much, 
but I will not argue against the thought here.) It is unlikely, however, that we are required to 
comply with any demands of closure—that we would be making a mistake if we did not. 
I suspect that some will disagree with me on this point. Rather than attempting to 
refute any potential proposal in favor of closure requirements, I will explain how my view 
accommodates a closure-like phenomenon. Although I am skeptical about closure 
requirements per se, I believe that there are specific cases in which rationality does find fault 
in those who do not believe the consequences of their beliefs. It is important to be able to 
account for these cases within the framework I am offering. For example, imagine that you 
believe that your partner has been receiving calls from an unknown sultry-voiced person, and 
you also believe that if your partner has been receiving calls from such a person then it is 
very likely that your partner is having an affair. And suppose that your mind is fixed on these  
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issues. Many would be inclined to say that you would be irrational if you did not at the same 
time believe the (perceived) implication: that your partner is very likely having an affair. 
Despite appearances, GR4 has something to say about such cases. But to see how the story 
works, I must first attend to a different part of structural rationality. I will return briefly to 
closure requirements at the end of the next section. 
 
5.6 – Enkratic Requirements 
It is widely accepted that there are requirements of rationality governing enkrasia. In Chapter 
3, we saw that even the error theories put forward by the reasons fundamentalists seem to 
turn on the requirements of enkrasia. Although I do not think that enkrasia is especially 
central to an account of rationality, I do believe that there are enkratic requirements. Since I 
am attempting to show that every requirement of structural rationality is rooted in the 
General Requirement, my goal in this section is to say something about how we might derive 
enkratic requirements. 
There are many related requirements governing the relationships between our beliefs 
about our normative circumstances and our other attitudes. The phrase “our beliefs about 
our normative circumstances” is meant to capture judgments like the belief that we have 
decisive reason to have an attitude, the belief that we lack sufficient reason to have an 
attitude, the belief that the evidence favors a certain proposition, and so on. To keep things 
manageable, I will focus on one rather narrow principle of enkrasia, which I introduced in 
Chapter 1. At the same time, I am confident that what I will say about this enkratic 
requirement could be extended to deal with other forms of enkrasia. Recall the following 
principle governing enkrasia in intention: 
  
! 137 
EI 
You are rationally required not to [[believe that you have decisive reason to 
intend to X] and [not intend to X]].
72 
According to this requirement, it would be irrational to at the same time believe that you 
have decisive reason to have an intention and yet not have the intention. The requirement 
demands that we not suffer from a particular form of akrasia in intention. 
What does GR4 have to say about someone who flouts EI? At first glance, it might 
seem that the answer is “nothing.” Suppose that you believe that you have decisive reason to 
intend to exercise this evening, and yet you do not have an intention to exercise this evening. 
GR4 appears to be silent about your rationality. After all, the truth of your belief is not 
tethered to the intention in question. Your belief is not guaranteed to be false due to the 
presence or absence of any other attitudes. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 There are two important facts about EI that are worth flagging, and which I have so far 
ignored. First, my description of the relevant belief is admittedly somewhat artificial. We rarely think 
in terms of having (or not having) “decisive reason” to intend to do something. EI applies to any 
agent who has a belief with content equivalent to “I have decisive reason to intend to X.” Second, EI 
applies only to agents who believe that their so-called object-given reasons demand that they X. An 
example will help to explain why this must be so. Suppose I believe that I have decisive reason to 
intend to square the circle, but that I have this normative judgment only because I have been told 
that my intending to square the circle would win me a million dollars. Intuitively, I am not irrational 
if I fail to have the unrealizable intention. Although you might feel sorry for me for being unable to 
earn the million dollars, it is unlikely that you would deem me irrational. The important feature of the 
case is that I would not see myself as having any object-given reasons to intend to square the circle 
(i.e., my judgment would not be based any considerations having to do with squaring the circle). Instead, 
I would see myself as having tremendous state-given reasons to have the intention (i.e., due to the great 
benefits of being in the relevant mental state). EI does not apply these kinds of cases. This constraint 
agrees with what I say below concerning the function of self-regarding normative beliefs. Self-
regarding normative beliefs based on state-given considerations appear not to have the same function 
as normal self-regarding normative beliefs.  
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Nevertheless, I think that we may be able to use GR4 to derive this requirement. 
What is called for here is not a revision of GR4, but a change in our view about the relevant 
standard—or standards—of success for the beliefs in question. In the preceding paragraph, I 
assumed that your belief functionally fails only if it is false. This is a natural assumption 
since, as I proposed in Section 3, truth is the standard of functional success for belief. But I 
submit that truth is the sole standard of functional success only across a certain range of 
beliefs that aim to represent the world outside of ourselves. Self-regarding normative beliefs—
such as beliefs concerning what we have decisive reason to intend—have an additional 
standard of functional success, because they play a crucially distinct role in the agency of 
rational beings. Standard beliefs about the world aspire to represent the world as it is and 
they succeed just in case they do so correctly. But self-regarding normative beliefs of the sort 
involved in EI are different. Self-regarding normative beliefs not only aspire to represent the 
world, but also to bring one’s attitudes into conformity with a perceived normative demand. 
Self-regarding normative beliefs successfully play their distinctive functional role when they 
are accompanied by whatever attitude they represent as to-be-held.
73 When a self-regarding 
normative belief is functionally successful, there is no gap at all between the formation of the 
normative verdict and the holding of the attitude demanded by the verdict.
74 
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73 Likewise, a normative belief that holds a particular attitude as not-to-be-held (i.e., the 
belief that one has insufficient reason to intend to X) plays its distinctive functional role when it 
directly terminates the relevant attitude (if it was previously held) or ensures the non-generation of 
that attitude. 
 
74 I am not offering a full-blown theory of the relationship between self-regarding normative 
beliefs and other attitudes. I am only committed to two crucial claims. First, it is important to my 
view that self-regarding normative judgments (e.g., the belief that I have decisive reason to intend to flip the 
! 
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Of course, the relationship between the normative verdict and the relevant intention 
can break down. This is what happens in many cases of akrasia. You may judge that you 
have decisive reason to intend to exercise right now but for some reason not also have the 
intention to exercise right now. There are many possible explanations of how this might 
happen. I will not attempt to offer an account of the mechanisms of akrasia in intention. My 
point is not to explain how an akratic agent becomes or remains akratic. My point is just that 
an akratic agent of this sort—one who believes that he has decisive reason to have a certain 
intention and yet does not have the intention—has a functionally failing self-regarding 
normative attitude. 
It is worth making a few clarificatory remarks. First, I am not suggesting that self-
regarding normative beliefs do not also have truth as a functional standard of success. My 
proposal is that these beliefs play double-duty, in both aiming to represent the world as it 
(normatively) is and aiming to bring one’s attitudes into conformity with one’s judgment. My 
account does not require that attitudes have only a single dimension of functional success 
and failure (though most do). Second, although I am using the phrase “self-regarding 
normative beliefs,” I am targeting only a select range of such beliefs. For example, a belief 
that in June of 2018 I will have decisive reason to try to run a marathon is a sort of self-regarding 
normative belief, but because of its time-indexed nature it does not function like the self-
regarding normative beliefs I have in mind. A future-oriented self-regarding normative belief 
like this is similar to a normative belief that I might have about another person. For example, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
switch) and the attitudes they concern (e.g., the intention to flip the switch) are distinct attitudes which 
can come apart, and which do come apart in defective cases. Second, I am committed to self-
regarding normative beliefs being functionally involved in bringing about the attitudes that they 
represent as to-be-held. Each of these claims could be fleshed out in a variety of different ways.  
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I might believe that Greg has decisive reason to intend to buy a parachute. These normative 
beliefs do not have any special role to play in our agency. But these beliefs can be converted 
into beliefs of the kind I have in mind. If I come to believe that now is June of 2018, or 
come to believe that I am Greg, then I will have a self-regarding normative belief whose 
functional success depends on my also having the attitudes isolated in the belief. 
I am offering only a suggestive sketch of a proposal. Admittedly, a great deal more 
would need to be said to defend this proposal about self-regarding normative beliefs. But 
suppose that my proposal is correct: beliefs succeed when they are true, intentions succeed 
when they realize their objects, and self-regarding normative beliefs (of the sort I have in 
mind) succeed when they are accompanied by whatever attitude they represent as to-be-held. 
If this is all true, then GR4 rather easily delivers EI. Suppose that you believe that you have 
decisive reason to intend to exercise right now, and yet you do not have the intention to 
exercise. In this case, your normative belief fails (and is guaranteed to fail) as long as you do 
not have the intention. Enkrasia in intention is prohibited by the General Requirement. 
I can now return to the issue of doxastic closure. In Section 5.5, I proposed that 
there are no structural requirements of doxastic closure per se. But I also noted that there 
seem to be some cases in which failing to believe something obviously implied by other 
things that you believe is irrational. Recall the example involving your partner’s mysterious 
phone calls. It seems irrational, I proposed, to believe that your partner has been receiving 
the phone calls, and believe that if your partner has been receiving such phone calls then 
they are likely having an affair, without also believing that your partner is likely having an 
affair. I propose that such cases are governed by a requirement of belief enkrasia, rather than 
a requirement of strict closure. This requirement could be stated as follows: 
EB 
You are rationally required not to [[believe that you have decisive reason to  
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believe P] and [not believe P]]. 
EB can be derived from GR4 in the same way that EI is derived. 
We are inclined to view you as irrational in the phone call example because we take it 
for granted that your network of attitudes includes the judgment that you have decisive 
reason to believe that your partner is likely having an affair. If you do have a belief of this 
sort, then we need only to appeal to a requirement of structural rationality governing 
enkrasia in belief, rather than to a principle of doxastic closure per se. So while we cannot 
derive any strict closure requirements from the General Requirement, the General 
Requirement allows us to account for the cases which might have otherwise made us 
inclined to endorse a principle of closure.
75 
 
5.7 – Structural Rationality and Self-Undermining 
I admit that the arguments of this chapter are not exhaustive. There are some putative 
requirements of rationality which I have ignored entirely. And my proposed derivations and 
arguments in this chapter are surely open to criticisms that I have not considered, and rely 
on premises that I have insufficiently defended. But it is beyond my ambitions here to 
decisively settle all objections. It is enough for my purposes if I have offered a promising and 
plausible new way of thinking about the foundations of rationality. 
I have sketched a theory structural rationality which sees the entire domain of 
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75 This is one point of overlap between my view and the error theories explored in Chapter 
3. Although I do not think that we can use the requirements of enkrasia to derive or explain away 
other requirements of rationality, I think the demands of enkrasia undergird our intuitions about 
some closure-involving cases.  
! 142 
requirements as rooted in a fundamental prohibition on a certain form of attitudinal self-
undermining. I believe that the whole of structural rationality is contained in the General 
Requirement. To be structurally rational, we must not attitudinally undermine the functional 
success of our own attitudes.  
  We are still left with a question: why are the requirements of rationality normative? 
According to the core argument of this project, answering this question requires that I 
explain why it is that structural irrationality is a criticizable agential failure. In light of the new 
finding that irrationality is a matter of self-undermining, it should appear less mysterious 
why, and in what sense, we ought to be rational. In the next chapter, I will say more about 
the form of criticizable failure rooted in agents’ attitudinal self-undermining. 
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6 – THE NORMATIVITY OF STRUCTURAL RATIONALITY 
 
6.1 – Attitudinal Integrity and Self-Undermining 
The normativity of structural rationality has seemed puzzling because insufficient attention 
has been paid to what rationality, as a whole, is about. By attending to the question of 
structural rationality’s content—by revealing that rationality’s demands are different 
applications of the General Requirement of Structural Rationality—it is easier to see why we 
are bound to comply with its demands. In this brief closing chapter, I will aim to detail the 
form of criticizable failure involved in violating the General Requirement and in doing so to 
give an account of the distinctive normativity of structural rationality. 
  The standard set by the General Requirement is something we might call the standard 
of attitudinal integrity. An agent exhibits attitudinal integrity, in this formal sense, when her 
intentions and beliefs form a network of attitudes in which each attitude is afforded (by the 
network) the possibility of success.
76 In other words, an agent exhibits attitudinal integrity 
when her network of attitudes is not self-impairing. Structural rationality demands that we 
meet this standard of attitudinal integrity. Put in negative terms, we can say that structural 
rationality demands that we not harbor self-undermining collections of attitudes. I propose 
that a deviation from this standard is a criticizable agential failure and, as such, that the 
‘ought’-claims or requirements issued by this standard are normative. 
  In Chapter 4, I argued that whether deviation from a standard is a criticizable failure 
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76 This means not that each attitude in the network actually can succeed (since it may be, for 
example, that one holds a belief in a necessarily false proposition), but rather that each attitude can 
succeed as far as the network of attitudes is concerned.  
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(a failure of the normatively relevant sort) is a substantive issue that can be settled only by 
reflecting on why we might care about our deviation from that standard. So we might ask: 
“Why care about attitudinal integrity?” or “Why care whether we have self-undermining 
combinations of intentions and beliefs?” Now, it seems almost undeniable to me that, as a 
being whose engagement with the world hinges crucially on your beliefs and intentions, you 
are making a mistake if your employment of your attitudes cuts itself off at the knees. But 
there is no method by which I can prove my conclusion here. The best I can do is to explain 
why it seems to me that attitudinal integrity is something that we should (and perhaps could 
not help but) be concerned with. 
  Consider the fact that the central, defining feature of our agency is our capacity for 
belief and intention. Were it not for our ability to represent the world to ourselves and to try 
to change the world, we would not be agents at all. No doubt, our agency extends both prior 
to and beyond our intentions and beliefs. Our intentions and beliefs are often (though not 
always) the culmination of reasoning, and that reasoning is part of our agency. And, on the 
other side, our intentions and beliefs often (though not always) reach out into the world 
through our actions, and movements, and words. These external behaviors are parts of our 
agency, too. I am not denying that there is more to our agency than intending and believing. 
But intending and believing are, I think, the central and defining aspects of our agency. A 
being that engaged in reasoning or deliberation but who could not herself hold beliefs or 
intentions would be unrecognizable as an agent. While reasoning is an important part of our 
agency, it is not, in itself, what makes us agents. At the same time, an agent whose 
physiological impairment tragically prevented her beliefs and intentions from extending into 
the world and resulting in actions would be no less of an agent than the rest of us (though 
what she could do with her agency would be, sadly, limited). Intending and believing is at the  
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center of our status as agents. We are, above all else, intenders-and-believers. 
  A structurally irrational agent, then, is an agent who is turned against herself, 
inhibiting her functioning as the type of being who she is. The problem with the irrational 
agent is not just that some of her attitudes will fail or, even, that some of her attitudes are 
certain to fail. Having a failing attitude (e.g., an eternally unrealized intention) or an attitude 
which is bound to fail (e.g., a belief in a contradiction) is not necessarily a failure attributable 
to the agent, because things outside of a person can conspire against her to make her 
attitudes fail. A storm might prevent one of your intentions from being realized, or 
someone’s lie might lead you to have a false belief, or the metaphysical or nomological 
structure of the world might (unbeknownst to you) leave you with a belief in a complex 
contradiction. In cases like these, an agent’s attitudinal failure does not belong to the agent in 
the sense I have in mind. For the structurally irrational agent, on the other hand, she alone 
(rather than anything outside of her) is responsible for ensuring that not all of her attitudes 
can succeed. My proposal is that this breakdown in her attitudinal integrity undergirds our 
judgments about rationality and irrationality. 
  Following Raz, some writers have wondered whether a functional-defect account of 
irrationality could capture the normativity or bindingness of rational requirements, as I am 
suggesting. Even if I am correct that every case of irrationality is a case of self-undermining, 
is this enough to explain the normative force that rational requirements seem to exhibit? 
After all, the human organism has other dimensions of proper functioning and these are not 
all tied to normative requirements.
77 A human agent may be said to malfunction in a certain 
respect if she has a leaky heart or if she has a physiological condition that inhibits the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 As I suggested in Chapter 3, I believe that this thought is beneath Raz’s contention that 
there are no normative requirements of rationality at all. See Bratman 1987 and Scanlon 2007.  
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functioning of her appetite or her desire to reproduce. And it would be ridiculous to suggest 
that there are normative requirements demanding non-leaky hearts or normally functioning 
appetitive systems. This observation might make us doubt that identifying the form of faulty 
functioning involved in irrationality is enough to provide an explanation of rationality’s 
normativity. 
  Of course, I am not suggesting that any old kind of functional deficiency found 
anywhere inside or relating to an agent can give rise to normative requirements. Attitudinal 
self-undermining is not much like having a malfunctioning organ or an unusual appetite or 
reproductive drive. Based on what I have argued above, we can see at least two crucial 
differences. First, our organs and appetites are dissimilar to intentions and beliefs because 
intentions and beliefs (but not organs and appetites) are central features of our agency and 
identity. A malfunctioning in one of my organs or in one of my biological faculties is not a 
functional failure in me, as an agent or person, in any deep sense. Second, an agent’s 
malfunctioning organ or an agent’s abnormal biological drive is not attributable to the agent 
in the way that attitudinal self-undermining seems attributable to the agent. An agent can do 
things which might contribute to her heart’s leaky valve, but only indirectly and contingently. 
In the case of attitudinal self-undermining, however, the agent is the unmediated cause of 
her own failure. These two considerations suggest that a breakdown in attitudinal integrity is 
a special form of functional defect, both because it involves the agent actively and directly 
impairing herself and because it involves an impairment of the agent as an agent. This is why 
irrationality is a criticizable form of failure and the basis for normative claims, while other 
functional deficiencies may not be. 
Here is an easy, though indirect, way of clarifying the point I am pursuing. Upon 
reflecting on the requirements of structural rationality defended in Chapter 5, some people  
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might become skeptical that any such requirements exist. Their skepticism would not be 
rooted in the difficulty of explaining where these requirements come from, but instead in the 
thought that these principles seem impossible to violate in the first place. These skeptics find 
the notion of structural irrationality implausible, because they find unintelligible the thought 
that there could be genuine beliefs and intentions arranged in the relevant ways. When told 
of the requirement I have called “IC,” for example, a skeptic might say: “But if I were to 
intend to X, and I really believed that I could not X if I also Y-ed, then I just could not really 
intend to Y while still intending to X. I don’t mean that I shouldn’t at the same time intend to 
Y. I mean that intending to Y is something that I really could not do. To actually start 
intending to Y, I would have to not intend to X. Or I would have to stop believing in the 
incompatibility. Or something. Having all of those attitudes at the same time makes no 
sense—I just couldn’t do it.” The skeptic is left thinking that the search for the requirements 
of rationality is pointless, because they are not principles we could violate. 
This skeptical position is too strong. We are, as a matter of fact, sometimes irrational. 
But the thought fueling the skeptic’s objection is an important one and it is closely related to 
why structural irrationality is a criticizable failure. The skeptic observes that an agent’s 
structural irrationality is difficult to interpret, as it is not the behavior of an agent who is 
behaving as an agent. This is what tempts the skeptic into concluding that some of the 
agent’s attitudes must not be the genuine article. However, this is the wrong conclusion to 
draw. The skeptic is correct that what the irrational person is doing “makes no sense” and 
may border on unintelligibility. This is because the irrational person is an agential mess who 
is putting her attitudes to work in a way that prevents their success. Structural irrationality is 
not impossible, but for an intending and believing being there are few clearer grounds for  
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criticism.
78 Someone in the business of intending and believing could not help but find fault 
in their own self-undermining. If someone alerted to their structural irrationality responded 
with a shrug of the shoulders, we could only conclude that they had not understood what 
they had been told. 
I am running the risk of making irrationality seem much too serious and grave. There 
is usually no great drama to be found in cases of inconsistent beliefs or intentions, or in 
other forms of irrationality. I am not suggesting that our attitudinal integrity is some precious 
condition to be respected, or promoted, or preserved at all costs. (In fact, I am not making 
any claim at all about the practical importance or instrumental value of avoiding self-
undermining.) What I am trying to do is to uncover the basis of the intuitive judgments that 
led me into this project in the first place. And underneath those judgments, I am suggesting, 
is the conviction that an agent who guarantees his own attitudinal failure is making a 
significant mistake, given the type of being who he is. 
  In virtue of the considerations canvassed here, and in combination with the 
arguments of Chapter 4, I am persuaded that the requirements of structural rationality are 
normative in their own right, even though we have no general reasons for complying with 
them. They are normative because not living up to rationality’s standard of attitudinal 
integrity, as expressed in the General Requirement, is a criticizable failure. We are free, then, 
to say that you ought to comply with rationality’s demands, as long as we are aware of what 
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78 In line with the arguments of Chapter 4, it is worth observing that the considerations 
outlined here will constitute reasons for caring about whether or not we comply with the requirements 
of structural rationality. But this is not an indication that the normativity of the requirements is 
rooted in reasons. The requirements of structural rationality need not be constituted by, nor offer 
any, reasons for compliance in order for them to be binding. We are bound to comply with their 
demands because if we do not then we will be engaged in a form of criticizable failure.  
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we mean by ‘ought.’
79 
   
6.2 – The Distinctive ‘Ought’ of Structural Rationality 
This conclusion comports with the common-sense judgments I observed at the outset of 
this project. Suppose I find you in a state of typical structural irrationality, holding a pair of 
intentions which you believe cannot both be realized. Recall, for instance, case (1) from the 
opening chapter, in which you intend to spend the weekend with your family, intend to 
complete your new manuscript on this same weekend, and also believe that doing both of 
these things together is impossible. There are (at least) two very different kinds of claims that 
I would make about you and your circumstances. First, I would have some judgment about 
whether you have reason to maintain or abandon some of your attitudes. I might judge that 
you ought to focus on your manuscript or instead that you ought to see your family. Or I 
might judge that you ought to abandon both projects and head out of town to a conference. 
Or I might point out that you ought to abandon your belief in the incompatibility of your 
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79 It is worth considering my arguments in the light of Southwood 2008. Although 
Southwood does not explicitly endorse normative pluralism, I believe that his ambition is similar to 
mine. Southwood argues that it is a mistake to look for a “justification for rational compliance 
outside of rationality, a source of normativity that is external to rationality” or, in other words, to 
look for independent reasons to obey rational requirements. There is, at least, a terminological 
discrepancy between us, as Southwood suggests that in vindicating the normativity of rationality we 
will locate “reasons that are internal to rationality.” It is difficult to tell whether Southwood is 
positing that we have so-called intrinsic reasons to be rational, or whether he is offering a use of the 
word “reason” that is disconnected from the reasons fundamentalists’ usage. I prefer to avoid this 
use of “reasons” altogether and to say instead that the normativity of rationality is not constituted by 
reasons. It is worth noting that Southwood’s positive proposal about the unique normativity of 
rationality is quite different from mine, although there are areas of overlap. 
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intentions. In any of these judgments, I would be using the ‘ought’ of reasons, which you are 
bound by in virtue of your status as a reasons-responsive agent. Second, I would judge that, 
whatever else you do, you ought not have your current combination of intentions and belief. 
I would see it as a mistake to deploy your attitudes in this self-undermining way, and so I 
would judge that you ought to do otherwise. Here I would be invoking the ‘ought’ of 
rationality. I would not be commenting at all on what your reasons demand of you. I would 
be saying only that in virtue of being an intending and believing agent (and apart from being 
a reasons-responsive one) it is failure to put your attitudes to work in a way that undermines 
your agency. This same normative bifurcation is also the best explanation of our judgments 
about the Mary-Mary* case in Chapter 3, which the reasons fundamentalists were unable to 
resolve. 
  If what I am saying is true, then the ‘ought’ of rationality is normatively distinct from 
the ‘ought’ of most or decisive reason, because they are made relative to fundamentally 
different standards. This means, as I argued in Chapter 4, that these two different ‘ought’-s 
do not issue competing kinds of demands. What your reasons tell you to do is one thing and 
what rationality tells you to do is another. There is not, on the view I am proposing, any 
shared or ultimate normative measure between reasons and rationality. 
  I want to bring out both the intuitively satisfying and potentially startling 
implications of this position. Recall Section 1.3 of Chapter 1, where I considered what we 
should say about someone who could bring about some tremendous amount of good simply 
by violating a requirement of rationality. That discussion was meant to show that rationality’s 
demands cannot simply be the demands of our reasons. Intuitively, an agent who brings 
about some tremendous amount of good by violating a requirement like IC is, while doing 
something quite right in one sense, nevertheless making a rational mistake. I pointed out in  
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Chapter 1 that if we ought to have our attitudes arranged in compliance with IC simply 
because we have strong reasons to have our attitudes arranged in the relevant way, then we 
would be unable to explain our judgments about cases in which our reasons favor not 
complying with IC. We now have an explanation of what is going on in these interesting 
cases. Plausibly, an agent who could bring about some tremendous good by violating IC 
ought to do so in one sense (i.e., the reasons-involving sense), even though she also ought 
not to do so in another sense (i.e., the rationality-involving sense). This is an excellent result, 
because we are of two minds about these sorts of case. We are of two minds about these 
cases precisely because there are two different normative standards at play.
80 
  This result is intuitively appealing. But it may seem to have jarring consequences if 
my point is misunderstood. An implication of what I am arguing is that there is no ultimate, 
all-in normative fact about what the agent in this example really ought to do, which takes into 
account both the claims of her reasons and the claims of rationality. This may be an 
unappealing conclusion, because we may feel inclined to say that (rationality be damned!) the 
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80 Imagine a case in which an agent can rescue a dying person but only by shaving a couple 
of days off of his own life. Suppose the agent chooses (rightly!) to save the dying person’s life. In a 
case like this, involving competing moral and prudential considerations, we are left with the judgment 
that the agent has made no normatively relevant mistake at all in choosing to save the life. We are not 
of two minds about cases like this—we will not say “Well, he got something right in one sense, but 
something wrong in another sense.” Instead, we will judge that the agent has not failed in any 
normatively salient way. This is because these moral and prudential claims are made relative to the 
same ultimate standard (i.e., the reasons standard). The case of an agent who violates IC in order to 
bring about some tremendous value seems very different. Although the agent’s violation of IC is 
praiseworthy in one way, it is obviously a mistake in another way. The fact that the agent brings 
about a lot of good by violating IC does not cut against or diminish the judgment that violating IC is 
a mistake. This is strong evidence that the ‘ought’ of rationality is made relative to a non-reasons-
based standard.  
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agent really ought to do the thing that will bring about the tremendous amount of good. If 
there is an opportunity to do a lot of good, then who cares about rationality? It sounds plain 
silly to suggest that rationality and reasons are on a par with each other—that either choice 
would be satisfactory. The demands of our reasons seem much more important than the 
demands of rationality. My claim that the ‘ought’ of reasons and the ‘ought’ of rationality are 
fundamentally normatively distinct seems blind to this fact. 
  I feel the pull of the concern, but it rests on a mistake. I must emphasize that I am 
not saying that rational requirements and the demands of our reasons are on a par with each 
other. Rationality and reasons could be on a par with each other only if rationality and 
reasons had some common measure or some shared standard. And this is precisely what I 
am denying. The demands of rationality and the demands of our reasons are simply different 
kinds of demands, made relative to fundamentally different and unrelated standards. When 
we judge that the agent who has the opportunity to bring about a great amount of good 
simply by violating a requirement of rationality ought to violate the requirement of 
rationality, we are making this judgment relative to the standard of most or decisive reason. 
And of course, it goes without saying, relative to that standard it will be true that the agent 
ought to do whatever she can to violate the requirement of rationality. On my view, this is a 
perfectly legitimate judgment. My point is that the reasons standard is not the only legitimate 
normative standard. If we were to ask rationality what it thought, it would have a different 
verdict. Rationality, which sets its sights only on formal (rather than substantive) matters, 
would demand that you not harbor a self-undermining combination of attitudes. My claim 
about the separateness of rationality and reasons seems counterintuitive only if it is 
misunderstood as the claim that the requirements of rationality and reasons are on a par with 
each other, or for the claim that we would not be making any mistake in complying with IC  
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and foregoing the tremendous amount of good we might have brought about. 
  As I indicated in Chapter 4 but could not prove until now, the normative domain as 
a whole is fragmented into at least two parts. It may seem odd that I am content to reach this 
conclusion, given that I have been focused on finding unity within the (sub-)domain of 
rationality. If unity within rationality is so important, then why is fragmentation within the 
normative domain as a whole acceptable? There is not much to say, I think, other than that 
this is just the way things are. Rationality has the appearance of a contained class of 
requirements, while the normative domain as a whole seems broken in half. I did not set out 
to find fragmentation within the normative domain; there is no sense in defending a version 
of normative pluralism just for its own sake. But what I have found in this dissertation is that 
there is compelling evidence that the normative domain is fragmented, that this appearance 
of fragmentation cannot be explained away or accounted for within a monist system, and 
that we have access to both a metanormative theory and a theory of rationality which 
together make sense of all of our intuitive judgments.
81  
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81 In light of this conclusion, I now have the opportunity to address a concern that has been 
lurking in the background since Chapter 1. The concern is that I may have cast the net too narrowly 
when looking for reasons to comply with the requirements of rationality in the first place. In light of 
the arguments of Section 6.1, one might ask whether all I have done is uncover the basis of our 
reasons to comply with rationality’s demands. 
In Chapter 1, I proposed that our reasons to comply with the dictates of rationality would (if 
they existed) come in the form of values or benefits that our compliance would promote or serve. I 
considered, as examples, the possibilities that our compliance with rational requirements might help 
us to gain more true beliefs, or gain fewer false beliefs, or achieve more of our ends, or produce more 
total good in the world. But a reader might have worried about my focus on reasons with this 
instrumental foundation. Not all reasons have this structure. For example, consider my reasons for 
loving my wife. The fact that it would make me feel happy and fulfilled is (or gives me) some reason 
to love my wife. This is a reason of the normal, instrumental variety. But, arguably, I also have 
! 
! 154 
6.3 – The Truth in Raz and Korsgaard 
As my argument comes to an end, I should pause for a moment to reflect on the extent to 
which my account of structural rationality mirrors or depends on the arguments of some of 
the authors I have focused on in this project. In making the arguments of Section 6.1, it 
would be hard not to notice the extent to which my view overlaps with both Raz’s and 
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reasons to love my wife which have nothing to do with bringing about anything good, simply because 
loving my wife is something intrinsically worth doing. If there are so-called “intrinsic” reasons to love 
someone, there may be intrinsic reasons for other things, including intrinsic reasons for complying 
with rationality’s demands. See Kolodny 2005. 
  We might wonder, then, whether what I have done over the past two chapters is uncover 
our intrinsic reasons for being rational. According to a possible reinterpretation of my arguments, our 
reason(s) for complying with the requirements of rationality are grounded in the fact that non-
compliance involves an agential breakdown that is intrinsically worth avoiding. It may be that non-
compliance has no general, negative consequences (and that compliance has no general, positive 
benefits). But we could nevertheless have intrinsic reason to comply with rationality’s demands, 
simply because attitudinal integrity is worth preserving in its own right. 
  It strikes me as awfully fantastical that we have reasons to be rational grounded in the fact 
that it is intrinsically good to exhibit attitudinal integrity. (If this were the case, then it seems that we 
would have at least some reason to exhibit this virtue whenever possible; perhaps we should go 
around collecting as many new sets of consistent beliefs and intentions as we can!) However, if this 
proposal were true, it would not be such a bad outcome for my argument. It would be a decent 
achievement to have found these intrinsic reasons that have so far eluded us. And if there were any 
intrinsic reasons to be rational, the proposal just sketched is as plausible as any.  
In light of my arguments of this section, however, I am deeply skeptical that we should rush 
toward the conclusion that rationality’s normativity is constituted by these intrinsic reasons. My 
conclusion that the normative domain is fragmented is not just a consequence or theoretical 
commitment of my view, but one of the key benefits of the position. If we were to argue that the 
normativity of rationality were constituted by some intrinsic reasons to be rational, we would not 
only be gaining nothing (since we already have a perfectly good, independent explanation of 
rationality’s normativity), but also giving up something important. 
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Korsgaard’s. Indeed, in personal conversations about the view I am putting forward here, I 
have been asked both whether I am just offering some modification to Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism and whether I am just rehashing Raz’s arguments from nearly a decade ago. 
This is a bit remarkable, given the tremendous space that separates Korsgaard and Raz on 
the topics of rationality and normativity. So it would be remiss not to say something about 
the relationship between my view and each of theirs. 
  To begin, recall this crucial comment from Raz:  
The fallacy to avoid is the thought that irrationality […] occurs only if one fails 
to conform to a reason […].  It can consist in faulty functioning, that is in ways 
of […] forming beliefs or intentions, and so on, which do not conform to 
standards of rationality.
82 
This is very similar to something that I would be happy to write. I agree with Raz that 
irrationality is not a matter of failing to conform to a reason. (That has been one of the 
central claims of my project.) And I would also say that irrationality is a matter of faulty 
functioning in our beliefs and intentions. The difference comes in how narrowly Raz seems 
to view the notion of faulty functioning, and in what conclusion Raz draws from the fact 
that we do not have reason to comply with rationality’s demands. For Raz, the relevant form 
of faulty functioning is enkratic failure and the implication of rationality not being based in 
reasons is that rationality is not a source of normative requirements.
83 I depart from Raz’s 
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82 Raz 2005a, p. 15. 
 
83 There are moments in Raz’s work where it looks as though he may be open to the 
possibility that rationality involves more than responsiveness to one’s perceived reasons. For 
example, he says that irrationality may be a matter of failing “to conform to rational standards of 
deliberation, of belief or intention formation, of coherence of belief and intention or others.” In 
isolation, this comment makes Raz seem open to the possibility that rationality is about much more 
than reasons-responsiveness. But, as far as I am aware, Raz does not follow up on this possibility.  
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position on both of these points. 
  Now consider Korsgaard’s claim that the constitutive standards of agency deliver 
unconditionally binding requirements. As I said above about Raz’s crucial remark, 
Korsgaard’s claim is something that I might be happy to say myself. Over the last two 
chapters, I have proposed that as (unavoidable) intenders-and-believers, we are required not 
to use our intentions and beliefs to thwart the function of those same attitudes. What this 
means is that the nature of our agency delivers standards which it is a failure not to live up 
to, even if there is no external purpose served by our meeting those standards. And this is 
precisely what Korsgaard has argued, even though the content of her arguments is 
considerably different. I disagree with Korsgaard about a number of crucial points—most 
importantly about how much we can get out of the conceptual analysis of action, about the 
form that rational requirements take, and about the role that rationality plays in our lives—
but my arguments are indebted to her insights about the possible foundations of normative 
claims. 
  It would be misleading to say that my view is a simple combination of Raz’s and 
Korsgaard’s or of reasons fundamentalism and constitutivism. But what I have done, I 
believe, is use a Korsgaardian insight—the idea that we can be bound to live up to the 
standards set by the nature of our agency—in order to take Raz’s original ideas in a different, 
more positive, and more explanatorily complete direction. As we saw in Chapter 3, the 
Razian theorists are left appealing to a range of rational requirements (the requirements of 
enkrasia) whose normativity they feel compelled to deny. These error theorists feel that they 
must deny the normativity of these requirements, because they do not believe that the notion 
of proper functioning could serve as the basis for normative claims. My arguments over the 
last three chapters are intended to allay this concern. By adopting the thesis of normative  
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pluralism, and by unpacking the form of functional failure involved in every instance of 
structural irrationality, we can accept that irrationality need not involve a failure with respect 
to our reasons without abandoning the idea that rationality is normative.  
 
6.4 – Conclusions 
I should emphasize that the arguments of this dissertation are intended to be conciliatory 
and hospitable to reasons fundamentalists. Although I have claimed that the reasons 
fundamentalists are wrong to say that every normative requirement is based in reasons, I 
think that they would lose very little in giving up on this idea. My proposal does not need to 
unsettle anything important in their view. We can still hold that there are irreducibly 
normative facts about reasons, that assessing and responding to reasons is an important 
aspect of our practical and theoretical agency, and even that the dominant part of the 
normative domain as a whole is the part having to do with reasons. None of this is lost. But 
by accepting that the normative domain is broader than the domain of reasons, we gain the 
ability to do justice to our common-sense judgments about rationality. By accepting my 
amendment, the reasons fundamentalist gains a lot and loses very little. 
  In closing, it is worth reflecting on the fact that this dissertation has traveled a great 
distance to establish a point that may now seem obvious. What I have argued is that 
structural irrationality is a matter of undermining the success of our own attitudes, that this 
kind of self-undermining is a mistake, and that this is enough to establish that we ought not 
to violate the requirements of rationality. Looking back at the starting-point examples from 
the opening of Chapter 1, I am convinced that this is right. Of course when you intend to do 
two things this weekend while believing you cannot do both you are making it so that you 
will fail somewhere in your attitudes. And of course this is a mistake. And of course that makes it  
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sensible to say that you ought not to hold all of those attitudes at the same time, in some 
sense of ‘ought.’ Viewed in a certain light, these conclusions now look almost trivial. 
  If my conclusions do seem trivial or obvious, I am satisfied with the result. I am 
content if my project amounts to a long-winded vindication of common sense thinking 
about rationality. My concern with rationality in the first place was that philosophy was 
having trouble making sense of a range of my settled intuitions. If it now turns out that those 
intuitions can be accommodated without damaging anything else of importance, then I have 
reached my goal. 
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